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ABSTRACT

Scarce water resources in the Western United States, in concert with population
growth and climate change, constitute a need to better understand factors that impact
water demand. In this dissertation, Chapter 1 provides cultural and historical context for
water use in the West and argues that understanding water demand is important,
especially when managing scarcity is a goal. Chapter 2 uses aggregate city-level data
from four municipalities in New Mexico to investigate seasonal trends and breakpoints.
Although per premises and aggregate demand tend to decline in all geographies
investigated, existence and timing of breakpoints varies by geography. Additionally,
drivers of declining trends are difficult to quantify but are likely related to price
increases, uptake of water saving technology, the generally soft economic environment,
and increased interest in water conservation.
Chapter 3 models water demand for the city of Clovis, New Mexico using
administrative premises-level monthly data. Water use declines are associated with
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utility-controlled action such as price increases and rebates for landscaping changes and
water saving technologies. Water demand was found to be price inelastic and in the
neighborhood of -0.50. However, low-volume users were more sensitive to price than the
high-volume users. Similarly, low-volume users were more income elastic than high
volume users. Additionally, premises receiving water-saving toilet and washing machine
rebates were more price inelastic than premises receiving landscaping rebates, perhaps
implying that the most effective means of reducing water use for toilet and washing
machine rebate-receiving premises is through the installation of new technology rather
than price response. Finally, toilet rebates were found to be the most cost effective rebate
type per volume of water saved.
Chapter 4 employs an optimal control framework to investigate utility-level fiscal
impacts of demand management, such as rebated technology. Given that water-saving
technologies reduce water demand, and apparently negatively impact the utility’s
revenues and costs, it is not immediately clear what benefit this activity provides.
Outlined are optimal paths illustrating tradeoffs between infrastructure investment, repair,
and advertising. A testable econometric model is also developed.
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by summarizing major findings and
discussing limitations and future work.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Stimulated by population pressures and climate change, the fear of water shortage
is often at the forefront of our cultural conscience. The prospect that the volume of water
supplied may be insufficient to fulfill the quantity demanded, and the associated
vulnerability felt by individuals and communities, is frequently highlighted by the media
and in popular culture and serves to reinforce this point. For example, recent newspaper
and periodical headlines from outlets such as The New York Times, The Wall Street
Journal, National Geographic, and others include: Two-thirds of the World Faces Severe
Water Shortage (St. Fleur, 2016); Water, Water Everywhere Can’t Quell a Western
Drought (Carlton, 2018); These Are the Forgotten Victims of the West’s Drought (Nobel,
2016); Drought Planning: Water Shortages Expected in New Mexico (Montoya Bryan,
2017). Additionally, popular non-fiction books such as Cadillac Desert (Reisner, 1987)
and Unquenchable: America’s Water Crisis and What to Do About It (Glennon, 2009)
underline the notion that society has a history of sometimes ineffectively managing water
resources; and works of literary fiction such as Steinbeck’s 1939 novel the Grapes of
Wrath (Steinbeck, 2006) highlight the social and cultural dislocations that can be caused
by extended periods of drought and water shortage. Even films such as the acclaimed
Chinatown (Polanski, 1974) put water (and shortage) at the forefront, making the
resource not only a passive plot device, but rather, a character integral to the narrative.
The fact that water, and in particular water shortage, is so commonly reported on
and used as inspiration by media, literature, and the arts is probably unsurprising, as
access to high-quality water is critically important; without an adequate water supply, a
population will have difficulty flourishing.
1

While there has always been an interest in cultural aspects of water, management
over the past several decades has been further challenged by periods of extended
drought, 1 significant inter-jurisdictional challenges, 2 and conflicts between agricultural
irrigators and cities, 3 all of which have punctuated a need to better understand and more
effectively manage water resources. As a key element to effective management, much
effort has been devoted to ensuring that water is reliably supplied (e.g. Colby et al., 2010,
2014). Supply enhancement strategies take forms both large and small, and include
everything from infrastructure enhancement, to water reuse and desalination, to transfers
from one water user to another, and are based on the argument that if water shortage
exists then bolstering supply to meet demand is an effective way to manage shortage.
Understanding the supply side is clearly important when it comes to water
shortage – or any type of shortage for that matter. However, the demand side is equally
important, because it, like the supply side, also has the ability to “equilibrate” the water
market by ensuring that the quantity of water demanded at a given price is equal to the
quantity supplied. In other words, rather than focusing simply on increasing supply to
match demand, it may be more effective to develop policies that decrease demand to
match supply; the benefit of this perspective is particularly true when supply

1

For example, see Cook et al. (2004); Diffenbaugh et al. (2015); Gutzler & Robbins (2011); and
Woodhouse & Overpeck (1998).
2
Such as legal challenges between NM and Texas over Rio Grande water (see Texas v. New Mexico (1983)
and the ongoing litigation in Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado, (n.d.)), or potential conflict between
Mexico and the US over water via the Convention of May 21, 1906 (Distribution of Waters of Rio Grande,
1906) and the Treaty of February 3, 1944 (Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the
Rio Grande, 1944).
3
For example, see Garrick (2015); Gleick & Heberger (2014); Molle & Berkoff (2006); and Wines (2014).
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enhancement may be constrained by capital budgets, political challenges, and
environmental considerations – especially in the near term. 4
Nevertheless, water demand is often ignored in favor of water supply or even
other water-related concepts such as water quality. To put this in perspective, figure 1.1
shows Google Trend index values for worldwide search popularity for the terms “water
demand,” “water supply,” and “water quality” from January 2004 to March 2018.
Index Value
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
water demand

water supply

water quality

Figure 1.1 Google Trends index values from January 2004 to March 2018

Each line in figure 1.1 shows the relative search popularity for all three terms over the
period with an index value of 100 corresponding to the most searched term in any period
and all other terms indexed to that term at that point in time. In other words, the most
popular search term was “water quality” in early 2004. Since then, the term “water
quality” has become relatively less popular. Beginning in 2009, the term “water supply”
has become relatively more popular than the term “water quality” as shown by the water
4

In the language of economics, an increase in supply corresponds to a “rightward” shift of the upwardsloping supply curve and a decrease in demand corresponds to a “leftward” shift of the downward-sloping
demand curve. Either, or both, of these movements can clear the market in a situation where the price paid
for a good is below the true market price – as is generally the case with municipal water.
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supply line overtaking and consistently being above the “water quality” line. Still, the
terms “water quality” and “water supply” remained relatively popular throughout the
entire period. The search term “water demand,” on the other hand, has always been
relatively unpopular as it has consistently been well below the other two lines, perhaps
suggesting that our first instincts are to focus on topics other than demand when it comes
to water. Given that the demand side is often overlooked compared to other water-related
issues, at least with regard to apparent public awareness, this dissertation focuses
specifically on the demand side with particular attention on water demand in the arid
American West.
Before delving more deeply into understanding demand, it is useful to digress
briefly to discuss the genesis of water institutions in the West as those institutions, and in
particular legal institutions, undergird the current water regimes and incentive structures.
US water law originally stems from English common law under the so-called riparian
doctrine (Hobbs, 1997). This doctrine states that water in a river or stream is the property
of the public and does not belong to any one individual (Hobbs, 1997; Wilkinson, 1985).
Adjoining landowners are typically permitted to use small volumes of water for personal
use provided that runoff returns to the stream or river and that they do not alter the
waterway (Hobbs, 1997). The Eastern US, which was settled first (i.e. prior to the West),
generally had a non-arid climate so was a natural fit for the system developed in England,
which also had a generally wet climate (Hobbs, 1997). Further, rivers and streams in the
East were typically located in places where the water could be most productively used in
situ; these waterways gave rise to the shipping and milling industries that were important
in the early Eastern US (Hobbs, 1997).

4

With expansion to the arid West, however, it became clear that, unlike the East,
streams and rivers were not proximal to where the water could be most productively
used; rather, water could be more valuable if used outside of the waterway. In particular,
settlers discovered that the most valuable uses of water were in irrigation and mining;
however, using water in this manner required a break from the tenants of the riparian
doctrine as individuals had a desire to divert water from the stream to their respective
claims and agricultural plots (Hobbs, 1997; Wilkinson, 1985). As a result, a new rule
called the doctrine of prior appropriation was born and essentially provided the user with
an entitlement based on seniority (Hobbs, 1997; Wilkinson, 1985). 5 Under this
mechanism, the first to divert and (beneficially) use the water had the most senior right.
What was once recognized as a custom eventually gave way to codification in several
states in the West and this new legal structure bestowed the user with an entitlement that
could be secured against more junior users in times of shortage.
Later, The US federal government, which was interested in settling the largely
vacant West, took note of the state-sanctioned ability to divert water from the stream. Via
large expanses of public, federally-owned, lands, the federal government instituted The
Reclamation Act of 1902, 6 which enabled funding for large scale water diversion and
infrastructure development (Fahlund et al., 2014; Holland & Moore, 2003; Wilkinson,
1985). So while miners and irrigators on the western frontier were the original
beneficiaries of the newly available prior appropriation doctrine, population centers and

5

There are other requirements under the doctrine of prior of appropriation including the requirement of
beneficial use and the no waste requirement. There are also issues regarding management in times of
shortage. Those issues are not discussed here; however, for a full treatment, see Hobbs (1997) and
Wilkinson (1985).
6
43 U.S.C §§ 371-600(e) (1994)
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cities also benefited as prior appropriation permitted large volumes of water to be moved
to water-poor areas, resulting in more reliable supplies.
Through time, investments in the diversion and supply of freshwater to arid areas
led to economic and population growth that would likely not have occurred but for
enhanced water supplies (Tarlock, 2001). The removal of a key limiting factor to near
term growth, however, also gave rise to a potential feedback loop: surplus water enabled
additional population growth via net birth or in-migration, which in turn stimulated
demand for goods and services. As a consequence of fulfilling that new demand, actions
of enterprising individuals enhanced economic growth and prosperity and aided in
improving the standard of living. Given new opportunities and higher standards of living,
additional population growth was fostered and the cycle continues.
Provided sufficient water supply to satisfy the demands of the population,
including both current and expected future use, increases in water use can continue
unabated. In more recent years, however, the adequacy of reliable water supplies to
satisfy future demand in arid regions, including in the west, has been questioned (US
Bureau of Reclamation, 2012; Zabarenko, 2011). An important driver to this conclusion
is the common expectation that water use should rise with population and economic
growth (City of Los Angeles, 2010; City of Phoenix, 2011; Griffin, 2006). And at the
very least, for a fixed volume of water, additional population or other demands from the
economy necessarily reduces the volume available per capita, perhaps leading to tensions
among users (Rijsberman, 2006). 7

7

Further exacerbating the problem is climate change which may not only impact water supply and demand
but also may affect the legal institutions related to water (Gober et al., 2010; Hobbs, 2003; MacDonald,
2010).

6

However, despite population and economic growth in recent decades (as well as
increased climate variability), water use, which once appeared to move in concert with
population growth (City of Los Angeles, 2010; City of Phoenix, 2011), has apparently
become decoupled with population levels and growth (Fleck, 2016). In other words, even
with population and economic growth, per capita use, and in some cases total aggregate
use, has declined in many western cities (ABCWUA, 2012; Balling & Gober, 2007; City
of Los Angeles, 2010; City of Phoenix, 2011; Donnelly, Kristina & Cooley, 2015; Fleck,
2016). 8
For example, from 1990 to 2010 water use in Phoenix, Arizona declined from
about 250 gallons per capita per day (GPCD) to below 190 GPCD. These figures include
both residential and municipal and industrial (M&I) users; however, even stripping out
M&I users, residential use declined over the same period from over 140 GPCD to about
110 GPCD. Furthermore, while the population served by the Phoenix water utility
increased by 8% from 2002 to 2010, total aggregate water demand declined by more than
16% over that period (City of Phoenix, 2011). Los Angeles, California experienced
similar declines over the period as water use was 173 GPCD in 1990 and fell to 117
GPCD by 2010. Like Phoenix, after peaking in aggregate water use in the early-2000’s, it
has declined since (City of Los Angeles, 2010). Water use in Albuquerque, New Mexico
also declined over the last few decades. Even as the number of accounts serviced by the
utility increased by 43% from 1995 to 2012, the total aggregate volume demanded fell by

8

In fact, the pattern of declining demand is not confined only to the American West; rather, declining use
has been observed in other parts of the US as well as some other arid and semi-arid countries (Gleick,
2003b; March & Sauri, 2017).
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15%; this translates to a decline from 251 GPCD in 1995 to 148 GPCD in 2012
(ABCWUA, 2013).
Several factors have generally been suggested to have contributed to this
declining trend, including improved and more efficient plumbing, smaller residential lots,
landscaping changes, and increased awareness of drought; however, those, and other,
factors may weigh differentially depending on location, climate, preferences, etc. (City of
Phoenix, 2011; Fleck, 2016).
Given a need to better understand the drivers of water demand, and to tease apart
the various drivers of declining demand, this dissertation investigates the issue of
declining water use with particular attention to water use trends in the Western US, and
specifically in the arid state of New Mexico. While this research is generally useful in
terms of understanding trends in water demand, it is particularly useful for the
stakeholders that may be impacted by growth and changing water demand trajectories.
One such stakeholder is the community who is interested in ensuring that adequate
volumes of water are available to satisfy future populations given expected population
levels and growth. Because access to reliable water supply is necessary to provide the
community and its constituents the confidence to make costly investments (infrastructure,
economic development, etc.) and to thrive, it is critical to understand the drivers of water
demand.
Similarly, water utilities that are responsible for ensuring access to a high quality
and reliable supply of water are also impacted by the decoupling of growth and water
demand. Over time, a utility’s pumping and storage capacity may require expansion in
order to accommodate increased demand due to population growth, exogenous factors
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such as climate variability, and the like. Meanwhile, existing systems degrade and must
be maintained or replaced. Given population growth, but consistent per capita water
demand and water rate structures, a water utility may recover its high capital investment
costs – especially costs related to system expansion, maintenance, and replacement.
However, while the decoupling of water demand and growth may help to achieve water
conservation goals often imposed by legislators and regulators, reduced water demand,
all else equal, puts financial pressure on water utilities and requires a rethinking of rate
structures and timing of capital investments.
Therefore, because population and economic growth can apparently no longer be
the sole proxy for water use, the following chapters investigate various aspects related to
better understanding water demand – and in particular factors contributing to declining
demand. To help document and illustrate declining municipal water demand in New
Mexico, Chapter 2 begins at an aggregate level by investigating trends in total
(aggregate) and premises-level water use in four municipalities in New Mexico. The four
municipalities of interest are the cities of Albuquerque, Rio Rancho and Clovis and the
town of Edgewood, each of which has vastly different population bases and industrial
structures. Although the localities are dissimilar with regard to composition, they share
the common feature that significant volumes of water delivered by the water utility come
from underground aquifers or wells. Seasonal trend analysis and breakpoint analysis,
which are rarely utilized in published literature, are employed to identify general water
demand trends and systematic breaks in that trend.
Additionally, although this analysis is atheoretical or descriptive, this chapter
highlights institutional and economic factors that help to explain (declining) trends and
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breaks in water use trends. Results are compared by municipality and factors that are
expected to impact trends are discussed. Although per premises and aggregate demand
tends to decline in all geographies, existence, timing and apparent reasons for breakpoints
varies by geography. For example, the city of Rio Rancho experienced a systematic break
in water demand, which changed the slope from increasing to decreasing, near the end of
2013. This is likely due to both the slowdown in manufacturing activity as well as the
sharp increase in water price. Clovis experienced two breakpoints which were temporally
proximal to extreme drought conditions. Meanwhile, neither Albuquerque nor Edgewood,
despite facing similar climate patterns, experienced significant series breaks; however,
the trend of declining demand was prominent throughout each series. Reasons for
declines are difficult to pinpoint but are likely related to price increases, uptake of water
saving technology, the generally soft economic environment, and increased interest by
the community for water conservation.
While it is true that both declining demand and breakpoints were observed in the
data, seasonal trend and breakpoint analysis only permit a qualitative understanding of
the factors contributing to the observed patterns. Therefore, a model of water demand at
the spatial scale of a city is developed in an attempt to better quantify the factors
contributing to falling demand. For this purpose, aggregated data for the city of Clovis is
used (aggregated at the spatial scale of the entire city). Results confirm that weather and
climate conditions impact water use in the city. In addition, econometric estimation
suggests that water is inelastic at current prices. Estimation at the city-level is also
compared against estimation at the US Census block group spatial scale and the
premises-level spatial scales (both discussed in detail in Chapter 3). Results indicate that
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while signals that generally impact all premises (i.e. climate and price signals) can be
picked-up at large spatial scales, other more localized signals, such as premises-level
rebates for water saving technology, cannot be accurately identified by city-level
aggregation.
Utilizing a large account-level monthly administrative data set over a ten-year
period, Chapter 3 models water demand in the city of Clovis, New Mexico. The modeling
strategy is informed in part by results obtained in Chapter 2 as well as the relevant water
demand literature. Outcomes from this analysis add to the extant water demand literature
and also provide the city of Clovis with useful information that may be used in planning
and management decisions. Pertinent results include price elasticities, the efficacy of
water demand management strategies, effects of climate on water demand, and other
results useful for setting policy. In addition to the narrow modeling outcomes, which may
be utilized by the local utility, estimation may be compared against the existing water
demand literature and results may be applied to other municipalities with similar
population and industry characteristics. Finally, since a water utility is interested in
ensuring sufficient capacity to satisfy demand on a day-to-day basis, Appendix 3.3.4
examines the issue of peak day estimation.
This Chapter finds that water use declines are associated with utility-controlled
actions such as price increases and rebates for landscaping changes and water saving
technology in Clovis. Overall water demand was found to be price inelastic and in the
neighborhood of -0.50; however, it is relatively more inelastic for premises receiving
toilet and washing machine rebates and more elastic (though still inelastic) for premises
receiving landscaping rebates. Average premises receiving toilet or washing machine
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rebates reduced water use by more than 9% while premises receiving landscaping rebates
reduced water use by less than 5%. In addition, toilet rebates were determined to be the
most cost-effective rebate type (from the perspective of the utility) under a reasonable set
of assumptions, with washing machine rebates being the second most cost effective per
volume of water saved; landscaping rebates are the least cost effective. This result is
likely due to outdoor watering only occurring in part of the year whereas toilets and
washing machines are used throughout the year. In addition, the study provides empirical
support for climate-related impacts related to water demand. Estimated marginal effects
suggest that one inch of precipitation reduced Clovis water use by about 1.2%, while a
one degree (Fahrenheit) increase in temperature increases water use by about 1.0%.
It is important to note that different user types had different responses to changes
in price and income. While both high and low volume water users were found to be price
inelastic, the low volume users were more sensitive to price than the high volume users.
Similarly, low volume users were more income elastic than high volume users; in other
words, that group changed its water use by a relatively larger amount for a given income
change. Given its relatively higher income sensitivity, it stands to reason that the low
water-use group, on average, is a relatively lower-income cohort – that in concert with
the fact that the group was more price-sensitive, it begs the question about whether water
rate increases in pricing are regressive. Therefore, as a policy matter, the utility and
regulator should investigate how rate increases affect different user groups to ensure that
equity is properly accounted for.
While the municipal water demand literature is generally well-developed, one
area that is understudied is the impact of spatial effects on water use. This topic is
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pursued in Appendix 3.3. After controlling for factors shown to impact demand, this
analysis investigates the applicability of spatial econometric methods via application of a
spatial weights matrix to a panel municipal water consumption dataset. While diagnostics
suggest the presence of spatial lag and spatial error, thus indicating the potential
usefulness of spatial empirical methods, several important pitfalls must be acknowledged.
First, the application of spatial weights in a panel setting is computationally intensive,
especially when the number of time periods or observations is large, and perhaps
necessitates aggregation. Second, because most users in a municipality are likely to be
subject to similar utility action, climate, etc., a spatial lag signal may be spurious. Third,
because premises served by the utility may enter or exit the dataset through time, the
requirement of balanced panels requires careful consideration. Fourth, if the option to use
premises-level (or similar) data or aggregated data are available it is typically advisable
to use premises-level data despite the possible presence of spatial effects.
Because water demand management strategies were shown to effectively reduce
demand in Chapter 3 and elsewhere (Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014). Chapter 4
employs an optimal control framework, which is used to investigate financial impacts of
demand management rebates provided by a water utility. Municipal water utilities
regularly invest costly resources for the purpose of water demand management programs.
One example of this activity is advertisement of water-saving technologies such as low
flow toilets, high efficiency washing machines, and the like, and utilities often subsidize
the purchase of qualifying products. Given that water-saving technologies reduce water
demand, and apparently negatively impact the utility’s revenues and costs, it is not
immediately clear what benefit this activity provides.
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To investigate this issue, an optimal control model is developed using a capital
accumulation framework. Under this model, the utility can use costly resources to replace
depreciated capital through direct infrastructure investment and replacement or it can
devote costly resources through a demand management advertising program, which
reduces stress on existing capital and allows the utility to put off investment and repairs.
Outlined are the optimal paths for infrastructure investment and advertising and
enumerated are the conditions that must exist for the utility to tradeoff between
investment types. In addition, given the results derived from the optimal control model,
testable empirical models are developed. Because tradeoffs between infrastructure
investment, repairs, and advertising (for rebated technology) have not yet been
investigated in the literature, this chapter adds to the literature by providing qualitative
outcomes for an optimizing utility, testable empirical hypotheses, and a roadmap for
further investigation.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a synthesis of results,
limitations of the current research, and discusses directions for future research.
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Chapter 2: Understanding Declining Municipal Water Demand in the
Western USA: A Time-series and Breakpoint Analysis of Water
Demand in Four Municipalities
2.1. Introduction
Water demand projections for several western municipalities in the United States
call for increasing aggregate water demand over the next several decades (City of Los
Angeles, 2010; City of Phoenix, 2011; Olsen & Wilson, 2012; Woodard, 2015).
Projections for municipalities and regions in New Mexico are no exception to this general
trend (ABCWUA, 2013; Llewellyn & Vaddey, 2013; OSE, 2013, 2016, 2017; Stroud &
Kilmer, 2016). However, recent analyses suggest that demand, including aggregate
demand, is declining in some western municipalities (Fleck, 2016; Pratt, 2015; Santos,
2013; Wentz & Gober, 2007).
The disconnect between demand projections and the trajectory of recent aggregate
water demand is likely due to application of the “requirements approach” to water
demand projections (Griffin, 2006). This approach, used in one form or another by
municipal water providers as well as state and regional planners, essentially assumes
some baseline water use per capita, often dictated by a recent data point, or declining per
capita demand with an arbitrary floor, and projects aggregate water demand based on
assumed population or economic growth. Critically, the approach may not fully
incorporate demand-side effects of increased resource scarcity, efficiency improvements,
or temporal preference changes, all of which may invalidate the assumed floor placed on
per capita demand. Therefore, demand is essentially taken as given, and as a result of
increasing water scarcity, water managers and planners principally focus much of their
energy on the supply side of the supply-demand relationship (Davis & Hanke, 1971;
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Griffin, 2006). As such, the trajectory of per capita demand is not fully accounted-for in
some demand projections, thereby potentially overstating future aggregate demand
(Woodard, 2015) and possibly incentivizing unnecessary investment or supply
augmentation.
To investigate the demand side of this issue, this study applies time series analysis
to aggregate and per premises water demand data from four New Mexico four
municipalities: Albuquerque, Rio Rancho, Clovis, and Edgewood. Structural breaks are
also estimated using breakpoint analyses; breaks are tied to exogenous events such as
policy changes or extreme climate events. Results suggest that per capita and aggregate
water demand is declining in nearly all cases over the last decade for both low volume
(residential) users and high volume (industrial) users. Breakpoint analysis suggests that
series breaks occurred in Clovis and Rio Rancho; however, likely explanations for the
breaks are different. The major structural break in Rio Rancho coincides with large water
rate increases, which caused a sharp and rapid decline in water demand and is confined to
industrial users. Breaks in Clovis were upward in nature and coincided with periods of
extreme drought; breaks were observed for both the residential and industrial water users.
While the presence (or absence) of breaks are identifiable and related to
exogenous events such as extreme climate or large rate changes, the persistent declining
trend in per premises and aggregate water demand for both residential and industrial
users in nearly every municipality in this analysis is perhaps the most critical observation.
To that end, this study also considers factors that are likely to contribute to changing
demand patterns, with special attention to institutional factors, population factors,
economic factors and policy interventions, and climate. Using Clovis, New Mexico as an
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example, an econometric model designed to capture behavioral responses, is developed.
Results confirm that water use responded to variation in temperature and precipitation;
additionally, water use was found to be price inelastic at current prices. While the thrust
in this analysis is at a large spatial scale (i.e. an entire city), estimation results are also
compared against two other spatial scales: US Census block groups and premises-level.

2.2. Study Areas
The cities of Albuquerque, Rio Rancho, Clovis, and the town of Edgewood, each
in New Mexico, USA are used to investigate temporal trends in municipal water demand.
The city of Albuquerque, which is part of the larger Albuquerque Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA), is located roughly in the center of the state and is its major economic hub;
according the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, the MSA’s share of New Mexico GDP
averaged more than 45% from 2012-15. The city is located at the base of the Sandia
Mountain range and is adjacent to the Rio Grande. Critically, two major US highways,
Interstate-25 and Interstate-40, intersect in the city, which provide east/west and
north/south thoroughfare for goods and services originating from or passing through the
state. Its location puts it relatively close to the surrounding states of Arizona, Utah,
Colorado, Oklahoma and Texas, as well as the US-Mexico border.
The city of Rio Rancho, which is also located within the Albuquerque MSA and
the town of Edgewood are both proximal to Albuquerque and there is significant
commuter traffic to and from each municipality. Rio Rancho is about 20 miles north-west
of Albuquerque and is its largest suburb. The city, however, provides a broad array of
public services through its local tax base; services include public works programs such as
streets and water, public schools, police, etc. The town of Edgewood is located about 20
miles east of Albuquerque and is a small commuter town in the Sandia Mountains.
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According to its own budget documents, the city’s annual budget is in the neighborhood
of about $5.7 million dollars (http://www.edgewoodnm.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2221). Much of its expenditures are operational in nature,
but also include police and capital projects.
The most geographically distinct municipality is the city of Clovis, which is
located near the Texas border in the east-central part of the state on Interstate-60. The city
is around 220 miles to the east and slightly south of Albuquerque. Its closest mediumsized cities are Lubbock and Amarillo, Texas, both of which are around 100 miles further
east.

2.3. Institutional Frameworks & Demand Projections
To provide greater context for the demand projections discussed in this analysis,
this section begins with a brief discussion of the entities charged with tracking or
managing water resources in the respective areas or municipalities as well as developing
projections.

2.3.1 Institutional frameworks
The institutional frameworks governing water use decisions in New Mexico are
overlapping, with the state providing general guidance via the Office of the State
Engineer (Verhines, 2013), who under Article 2 of Chapter 72 of the New Mexico State
Code (NMSA, 2006, §72-2), is imbued with broad authority over New Mexico’s waters.
In addition, sixteen regions within the state have some authority over general regional
water determinations (OSE, 2013), while individual city or municipal utilities make local
water supply decisions.
At the city or municipal level, each water utility operating within the geographies
contemplated in this analysis have slightly different organizational structures. EPCOR,
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which supplies water in Clovis and Edgewood, is a private utility authorized to operate
within the respective municipality. In 2011, EPCOR took over operations from the
former private sector provider New Mexico American Water. The city of Rio Rancho
currently operates its own public water utility whereas the Albuquerque Bernalillo
County Water Authority (ABCWUA), which is a public water utility, serves
Albuquerque. Historically, groundwater has been the source used by these utilities to
fulfill constituent demand; while that is still generally true for the municipalities
discussed here, the San Juan-Chama Project, which directs water from the Colorado
River to the Rio Grande, began to supplement the city of Albuquerque’s supply in 2008.
That surface water now accounts for approximately 60% of Albuquerque’s total annual
supply (Wickert, 2015).
Each bureaucratic layer (state, region, and municipality) develops plans to ensure
future water supply reliability. For example, regional water planning in New Mexico
began in 1987 for the purpose of demonstrating to other states and the federal
government that New Mexico needed its full allotment of water (Buynak et al., 2010). To
coordinate and systematize the disparate regional plans, and to ensure that the state was a
good steward of it water resources, the state enacted the State Water Plan Act (2003),
which requires the State Engineer, in conjunction with the Interstate Stream Commission,
to produce updated plans every five years (Buynak et al., 2010). Meanwhile, cities and
municipalities develop utility-level water plans dedicated to ensuring adequate supplies
and water planning at a local level (ABCWUA, 2013; Rio Rancho, 2014).
In addition, each water utility in conjunction with its local governing body,
develops drought management plans, which may be initiated in times of drought.
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Drought, according to ABCWUA wastewater ordinance §4-1-3 is defined as: “when there
is insufficient precipitation combined with other environmental factors that cause an
increase of overall water usage.” Drought management plans may exist at all bureaucratic
levels; even at the state level, the State Water Plan requires that the State Engineer
develop a drought management plan “designed to address drought emergencies, promote
strategies for prevention of drought-related emergencies in the future and coordinate
drought planning statewide” (NMSA, n.d., §72-14-3.1(6)). The regional drought plans
are consistent with the State Water Plan as that plan lays out the methods for assessing
drought conditions generally (OSE, 2013). Likewise, individual water utilities develop
plans to manage periods of shortage. For example, contingent on approval from the local
Water Authority Board, ABCWUA’s Executive Director is authorized to institute
enhanced watering restrictions or temporary rate increases in times of drought
(ABCWUA, 2012). Similarly, chapter 52 of the Rio Rancho city ordinances provides
analogous tools to the water utility in times of shortage or drought (Rio Rancho, 2016,
§52.05(E)).

2.3.2 Demand projections
Water demand projections produced by municipal water utilities as well as
relevant state and federal agencies call for increasing aggregate municipal demand in
many populated regions in New Mexico (ABCWUA, 2013; Llewellyn & Vaddey, 2013;
OSE, 2013, 2016, 2017; Stroud & Kilmer, 2016). For example, the 2017 regional water
plan for the 16th region, which includes Bernalillo and Sandoval Counties (containing the
cities of Albuquerque and Rio Rancho, respectively), projects increasing aggregate
demand over its planning horizon from 2010 to 2060 in both counties (OSE, 2017).
Although the projection calls for per capita demand in Bernalillo County to slowly
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decline from 155 gallons per capita per day (gpcd) in 2010 to 130 gpcd by 2060 (but no
lower than 130 gpcd), projected aggregate water demand increases in both the low and
high demand scenarios (OSE, 2017). In the near term from 2010 to 2020, projected
aggregate demand for premises on public water supplies increase by 7.7% and 5.7% in
the respective high and low demand scenarios (OSE, 2017).
ABCWUA, the public utility charged with servicing the Albuquerque-municipal
area, also recently published water demand projections. Although aggregate demand
generally trended downward since 1990 (ABCWUA, 2013), ABCWUA projects
aggregate demand to increase because reductions “cannot reasonably be expected to
continue” in the future “without significant mandatory restrictions” (ABCWUA, 2013).
The US Bureau of Reclamation similarly projects increasing aggregate municipal demand
due to assumed constant per capita indoor demand with population growth (Llewellyn &
Vaddey, 2013).
The assumption of increasing demand is not only confined to the Albuquerque
Bernalillo County service area or even to this region. The OSE projection for Sandoval
County projects that aggregate demand will increase from 2010 to 2020 by 24.5% in its
high scenario, and will not decline in its low scenario (OSE, 2017). The city of Rio
Rancho’s projections also call for increasing demand (Rio Rancho, 2014). Similarly, the
state of New Mexico’s 1st region, which includes Curry County (and the city of Clovis),
also assumes increasing municipal demand (on public water supplies) over the period
from 2010 to 2020 to the tune of 14.1% and 8.0% in the respective high and low demand
scenarios (OSE, 2016). However, it is unsurprising that projections for this region are
similar because the methodology is dictated by the larger state water plan – which, like
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the 16th region projection, assumes a floor on per capita demand and that population
grows more rapidly than per capita demand declines (OSE, 2013).

2.4. Population Size and Population Growth
In 2014, the population within Albuquerque, the state’s most populous city, was
estimated to total 553,576 persons. This total only includes individuals residing in the
city limits and does not include that larger metropolitan area which was estimated to total
about 904,587 persons. The city of Rio Rancho, which is included in the Albuquerque
metropolitan region, but is its own separate municipality, totaled 90,627 persons in 2014.
Illustrating the relatively small population in the state of New Mexico is that, despite the
relatively small population of the city of Rio Rancho, it is the third most populous city in
the state.
Table 2.1 Population by geography through time
Population
2000*
2010*
2014 Estimate**
New Mexico
1,819,046
2,059,179
2,080,085
Clovis
43,423
45,499
48,702
Edgewood
1,893
3,735
3,763
Rio Rancho
51,765
87,521
90,627
Albuquerque
448,607
545,852
553,576
Notes: * from respective Decennial Census; ** from American Community Survey Estimate
State/City

The city of Clovis had an estimated population size of 48,702 persons in 2014,
making it the eighth most populous city. Meanwhile, the town of Edgewood, which like
Rio Rancho is proximal to Albuquerque, is sparsely populated with an estimated
population of 3,763 in 2014. In 2014, the population in the four municipalities accounted
for about one-third of total state population. However, note that the percentage is much
larger if the Albuquerque MSA, which includes the cities of Albuquerque and Rio
Rancho as well as adjacent incorporated and unincorporated areas, is considered.
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According to the American Community Survey, the population in the MSA totaled nearly
900,000 persons in 2014, or about 44% of total state population.
The population in the city of Clovis experienced relatively slow growth from
2000 to 2010, growing at an average rate of growth of only 0.5% per year; however, from
2010 to 2014, growth accelerated to 1.8% per year on average. The town of Edgewood,
on the other hand experienced the opposite, as did the cities of Rio Rancho and
Albuquerque. Edgewood population grew an average of 9.7% per year from 2000 to 2010
but then slowed to only 0.2% per year from 2010 to 2014. The population of Rio Rancho
grew at an average rate of 6.9% per year from 2000 to 2010 and only 0.9% per year from
2010 to 2014 while the city of Albuquerque grew at average rate of 2.2% per year from
2000 to 2010 and then slowed to 0.4% per year on average from 2010 to 2014.
Table 2.2 Housing units by geography through time
Housing Units
2000*
2010*
2014 Estimate**
New Mexico
780,579
901,388
907,233
Clovis
18,421
19,138
19,623
Edgewood
755
1,563
1,647
Rio Rancho
20,209
33,964
34,800
Albuquerque
198,465
239,166
240,961
Notes: * from respective Decennial Census; ** from American Community Survey Estimate
State/City

The number of housing units in each municipality has increased through time,
with particularly large increases from 2000 to 2010 in Edgewood and Rio Rancho. Clovis
and Albuquerque only experienced modest gains. However, growth from 2010 to 2014
slowed considerably in all four places.
Building permit data, or permits granted by permit-granting jurisdiction for future
construction of single- or multi-family homes are available from the University of New
Mexico’s Bureau of Business and Economic Research from January 2005 through
August 2016 for the cities of Albuquerque, Rio Rancho and Clovis. Contractor or builder
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demand for permits are related to the demand for new construction. Increases in permit
demand may also be correlated with population growth and perhaps even increasing
incomes. In all cities, but especially in Albuquerque and Rio Rancho, permits granted
were especially high in 2005 and 2006; however, building permits fell during the Great
Recession and growth has essentially been flat since 2008.
Building Permits
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Albuquerque

2011

2012

Rio Rancho

2013

2014

2015

2016

Clovis

Figure 2.1 Building permits by jurisdiction

2.5. Economy and Economic Transformation
The state of New Mexico has experienced significant shifts in industry
composition over the last decade. Movements away from goods producing industries
such as manufacturing have given way to rapid increase in service industries such as
healthcare and accommodation and food services. Likely exacerbating the shift is the
intervening Great Recession from which the state is yet to recover completely.
The city of Albuquerque’s economy is relatively diverse. The city supports Sandia
National Laboratories, which is privately managed but is funded through the US
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Department of Energy; the city also houses Kirtland Air Force Base. Albuquerque also
has a relatively large contingent of small high technology manufactures that specialize in
a variety of enterprises. However, over time, the economy has moved away from largescale manufacturing and toward healthcare and hospitality jobs. The city also boasts the
University of New Mexico, which is the state’s flagship university.
Rio Rancho has grown significantly over the last three decades as it has moved
away from being solely a commuter suburb, has developed its industrial base, and
expanded the reach of its public services. Principally responsible for the transformation is
Intel, which began operations in the area in 1980. As worldwide demand for personal
computers expanded in the 1990’s, Intel expanded its manufacturing operations.
However, as demand has waned, so have the number of jobs at Intel – which now number
fewer than 50% of the job-peak (Robinson-Avila, 2016). Meanwhile, the rest of the
economy has become more diversified and relatively less reliant on one large employer.
As a result, much like Albuquerque, the center of mass has moved away from
manufacturing to healthcare services and the hospitality industry.
The city of Clovis is generally reliant on a small number of relatively large
employers. Although not within the city limits, Cannon Air Force Base employs Clovis
residents. Individuals that provide local services, including local government workers,
such as police or public school teachers, are another relatively large bloc. Within the
private sector, Clovis has a large number of healthcare and retail workers. Additionally,
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway has been a mainstay, although it has recently
moved some employees out-of-state. Clovis also has a large cheese manufacturing plant,
which has seen recent expansion. Edgewood, given its small size and proximity to larger
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population centers such as Albuquerque and Santa Fe, has little industry and is primarily
a commuter town. Therefore, it is unlikely that employment- and industry-dynamics, at
least within the town, are major drivers of water demand.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show total employment and manufacturing sector employment
levels, respectively. In each case, employment levels are shown for the county that each
city of interest is located. This is done for two main reasons. First, city-level employment
data tend to be relatively unreliable, especially for relatively low-population cities.
Second, the highlighted cities, with the exception of Edgewood, are the largest population
and industrial centers within each county; so county-level data is likely to reflect the
trends in those cities. The table shows that the Great Recession affected Bernalillo
County negatively as employment levels in 2010 are well below the 2005 level; as of
2015, the level continued to stay below the 2005 threshold. Curry and Sandoval Counties,
on the other hand, saw no similar slowdown as 2010 levels are above 2005 levels.
However, although growth was still positive from 2010 to 2015, employment growth
slowed in both counties.
Table 2.3 Total employment by county through time (except Santa Fe County)
Total Employment
State/City
County*
2010
2015
2005
(growth since 2005)
(growth since 2010)
New Mexico
N/A
778,233
781,694 (0.4%)
822,991 (5.3%)
Clovis
Curry County
16,034
16,764 (4.6%)
17,217 (2.7%)
Edgewood
Santa Fe County
N/A
N/A
N/A
Rio Rancho
Sandoval County
27,114
29,114 (7.4%)
29,156 (0.1%)
Albuquerque
Bernalillo County
319,561
311,725(-2.5%)
318,962 (2.3%)
Notes: * Employment given by county totals from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages

The manufacturing sector is a key water user and employment in this sector can
offer insight into the direction of water demand (Hester & Larson, 2016). In the cities of
Albuquerque and Rio Rancho, manufacturing employment has fallen. From the period
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2005 to 2010, employment fell by nearly 3,000 persons in Albuquerque, and the slide,
although slower, continued through 2015. Rio Rancho also lost significant jobs over the
period with manufacturing employment levels in 2015 being about half of the 2005 level.
Clovis, on the other hand, experienced an uptick in employment over the period.
Although the absolute levels are relatively low, numbering fewer than 1,000 persons,
employment growth in this sector averaged around 5% per year.
Table 2.4 Manufacturing employment by county (except Santa Fe County) through time
Manufacturing Employment
2010
2015
2005
(growth since 2005)
(growth since 2015)
New Mexico
N/A
36,306
29,026 (-20.1%)
27,778 (-4.3%)
Clovis
Curry County
443
614 (38.6%)
678 (10.4%)
Edgewood
Santa Fe County
N/A
N/A
N/A
Rio Rancho
Sandoval County
6,424
4,123 (-35.8%)
3,277 (-20.5%)
Albuquerque Bernalillo County
15,588
12,685 (-18.6%)
12,428 (-2.0%)
Notes: * Employment given by county totals from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
State/City

County*

2.6. Climate and Drought
Average annual temperature in all municipalities is generally similar. Over the
period from 2006 to 2015, both Clovis and Rio Rancho experienced an average annual
temperature of 56.2° Fahrenheit; Albuquerque’s average annual temperature was slightly
higher at 58.3° Fahrenheit. No data were available for the town of Edgewood. Over the
ten- year period, Clovis experienced an average of 16.9 inches of rainfall per year. Rio
Rancho and Edgewood experienced similar rainfall volumes at 10.9 inches and 10.4
inches, respectively. The city of Albuquerque only experienced 8.7 inches per year on
average.
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Table 2.5 Location and climate statistics
Lat., Long.
Elevation
Temperature Precipitation
City/Town
34.5988°,
-103.2161°
4,435.04
ft.
56.2° F
16.9 Inches
Clovis
35.1764°, -106.176°
6,751.97 ft. N/A
10.4 Inches
Edgewood
35.2836°, -106.6194° 5,229.99 ft. 56.2° F
10.9 Inches
Rio Rancho
35.0419°,
-106.6155°
5,310.04
ft.
58.3°
F
8.7 Inches
Albuquerque
Notes: Lat.,Long. represents the latitude and longitude of measuring station; elevation is the height above
sea level of that station. Temperature is the annual average temperature from 2006 to 2015 and
precipitation is the average annual precipitation over that period for Clovis, Rio Rancho and Albuquerque
and 2008 to 2015 for Edgewood.

In terms of annual temperature variation, figure 2.2 shows that all geographies
experienced similar inter-annual trends from 2006 to 2015 with the Clovis and Rio
Rancho trends usually overlapping and with Albuquerque temperature generally
surpassing the other two.
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Figure 2.2 Average monthly temperature (Fahrenheit)

Precipitation trends throughout the year, from the period 2006 to 2015, were also
generally similar – at least in terms of peaks and valleys. In most cases, the cities of
Albuquerque, Rio Rancho and the town of Edgewood overlap especially with regard to
summer peaks. Precipitation generally trends downward for the remainder of the year
with the possibility of an end-year spike. Clovis precipitation is also similar in that it
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peaks in the summer; however, it trends upward earlier.
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Figure 2.3 Average monthly precipitation (inches)

Both central New Mexico, which includes Albuquerque, Rio Rancho and
Edgewood, and the eastern part of the state have experienced several periods of drought
since 2000; this is especially true over the last several years where both regions have
experienced prolonged, deep, drought. Figure 2.4 shows Palmer Drought Severity Index
(PDSI) values for the Albuquerque Area (data collected at the Albuquerque International
Airport) and Clovis. Positive values indicate wet conditions while negative values
indicate dry conditions; large deviations from the horizontal axis indicate relatively larger
anomalies. Unique values are not available for Rio Rancho or Edgewood; however, due
to spatial proximity, PDSI behavior is likely similar to Albuquerque.

29

PDSI
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Albuquerque (PDSI)

2012

2014

Clovis (PDSI)

Figure 2.4 Palmer Drought Severity Index (monthly): 2000-2015

Both Albuquerque and Clovis experienced drought-like conditions from 2002 to
2004 and for a short period in 2006. Beginning in 2008 and extending to about the end of
2013, Albuquerque experienced prolonged drought. That trend was broken in 2014 when
the area oscillated between wet and dry conditions. Clovis’ recent drought, on the other
hand, began in earnest in 2011 and finally broke near the end of 2014. For much of 2015,
the city experienced conditions that were much wetter than normal.

2.7. Policy Interventions
Policy interventions include any decision made by a governing jurisdiction (such
as regulators, the legislature, or local municipality) or water use decisions made by the
utility itself. Specific examples of interventions include water rate adjustments or the use
of rebates for water-saving technology, both of which have been shown to impact
demand (Arbués et al., 2003; Kenney et al., 2008). In fact, recent empirical work on
Albuquerque has shown that premises-level water demand falls as price increases and
that water rebates reduce water use (Price et al., 2014).
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2.7.1 Water rates
In all jurisdictions, marginal water rates are given by an increasing block-rate
schedule and rates have been adjusted a number of times in each jurisdiction.
Albuquerque experienced water rate increases in 2007 and each year from 2013 to 2015.
The most recent increases were done to compensate the utility for reduced water use over
the period. The city of Clovis, after adjusting rates in 2005, has increased rates on three
separate occasions: in 2007, 2009 and 2012. After purchasing the interest in a private
utility servicing the city of Rio Rancho, the city has (recently) increased rates four times:
it increased rates twice in 2013 and then once in 2014 and 2015. Rio Rancho rate
increases are notable because they were large. In particular, the rate adjustment in
February 2013 increased the average bill 8.8% and was subsequently followed by
additional increase of 7.8% in July of the same year. The average rate has increased each
July since by 7.8% in each year (Lucero, 2016). The town of Edgewood is an outlier.
Although the town has increased rates twice, in 2010 and 2015, it actually lowered rates
in 2012. Table 2.6 shows the month and year of rate changes in each jurisdiction.
Table 2.6 Summary of water rate change dates (2005-2015)
City/Town
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Clovis
Feb
Jun
May Edgewood
Jul**
Rio Rancho
Albuquerque
Jul
Jul**

2011
-

2012
May
May*
-

2013
Feb/July
Jul

2014
Jul
Jul

2015
Jun
Jul
Jul

Notes: * Edgewood received a rate decrease in that year; ** Rate hike to a small number of
residents taken over by utility

2.7.2 Water rebate programs
The city of Albuquerque has the greatest number and variety of rebate programs
and has had rebate programs for a number of years. The city currently provides rebates
for the installation of low-flow toilets, showerheads, washing machines, and hot water
recirculating systems (Price et al., 2014). The city also provides a rebate for converting
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outdoor turf to xeriscape. Rio Rancho has three rebates for water-saving technology,
including rebates for clothes washing machines, toilets and evaporative cooler
thermostats (http://ci.rio-rancho.nm.us/index.aspx?NID=422). The city of Clovis offers
toilet rebates, clothes washer rebates, and landscaping rebates
(http://www.epcor.com/efficiency-conservation/rebates-clovis/Pages/rebates.aspx). The
town of Edgewood does not offer rebates.

2.7.3 Outdoor watering restrictions
The cities of Rio Rancho and Albuquerque each have outdoor water restriction
programs; however, the Rio Rancho program is mandatory while the Albuquerque
program is voluntary. The city of Rio Rancho restricts outdoor sprinkler/spray irrigation
from April 1 through October 31 to hours after 7:00 P.M. to before 11:00 A.M. However,
watering by hand, or the use of drippers and low-emitting bubblers are allowed at any
time (http://www.rrnm.gov/index.aspx?NID=913). Albuquerque’s current program is
voluntary but suggests watering once a week in March, twice a week in April and May,
three times a week in June, July and August, twice a week in September and October, and
once a week in November (http://www.abcwua.org/Water_by_the_Numbers.aspx). The
program does not restrict the day of the week or the timing of watering. Neither the city
of Clovis nor the town of Edgewood have restricted watering schedules.

2.8. Methods
Seasonal decomposition and breakpoint analysis are applied to data provided by
municipal water authorities. This analysis extends the time series methods utilized by
Hester and Larson (Hester & Larson, 2016), who investigated water demand trends in
North Carolina, USA municipalities; those municipalities, unlike the municipalities
studied here, tend to experience high levels of precipitation, relatively less aridity, and
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have different institutional and industrial structures. The authors found that declines in
per capita demand likely coincided with reduced manufacturing demand in the late
1990’s. Additionally, coordinated state-level drought responses in the late 2000’s
suppressed demand and conservation pricing in 2010 in at least one municipality
(Raleigh) caused demand to fall further.

2.8.1 Water data
A variety of sources provided water consumption data for this analysis. The
Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Authority (ABUCWA) provided data for its
coverage area; Rio Rancho data from the city water authority; Edgewood and Clovis
from private supplier EPCOR.
Water data are reported in terms of aggregate consumption on a monthly timestep. Total water use includes residential and industrial users within each city or town.
Analysis is done based on aggregate water consumption as well as on an average water
user basis. This analysis is different from Hester and Larson (Hester & Larson, 2016),
who used an estimated per capita figure (based on American Community Survey
estimates), because the number of accounts in each month is known with certainty but the
population is not. Monthly demand was divided by the number of days in each month to
produce two statistics: mean daily total daily demand and mean daily demand per
premises.

2.8.2 Water data decomposition procedure
Seasonal trend analysis is employed to strip out the seasonal elements (Cleveland
et al., 1990). Water demand is assumed to take the following form
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𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡

(2.1)

𝑡𝑡 = 1, … . . , 𝑛𝑛

where 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is water use in a city in time 𝑡𝑡 (total aggregate demand and per premises

water demand are estimated separately); 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 is an unobserved trend component; 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is the
recurring seasonal component – with monthly data there are twelve periods, so 𝑠𝑠 = 12;
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 is an unobserved residual.

2.8.3 Breakpoint analysis

Breakpoint analysis elucidates structural breaks in the data. Models are estimated
based on total water use in each period and water use per premises and takes the
following form
𝑠𝑠−1

(2.2)

𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡 + � 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖=1

∗
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗−1
+ 1, . . … , 𝑡𝑡,∗

𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are the intercept and slope parameters, respectively, for the 𝑗𝑗 regimes occurring
between the 𝑚𝑚 breakpoints (Bai & Perron, 2003; Haywood & Randal, 2014; Hester &

Larson, 2016). Seasonal effects are estimated by 𝛿𝛿 for each season 𝑖𝑖 through a series of
monthly indicators, 𝐷𝐷. Application of the breakpoint analysis to water use data was

done using the BFast and strucchange packages in R (Chu et al., 1995; Hester & Larson,
2016; Verbesselt, Hyndman, Newnham, et al., 2010; Verbesselt, Hyndman, Zeileis, et al.,
2010; Zeileis et al., 2002). Dependent variables are log transformed in all cases.

2.9. Seasonal Trend and Breakpoint Results
Results are estimated for each municipality using each municipality’s entire
dataset. Data are then subsetted into low volume (residential) water users and high
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volume (industrial) users to determine wither there are differences in behavior between
broad user classes. In the case of Clovis, low volume users are grouped based on the use
of less than 2,000 average gallons used per day. However, unknown is whether the
particular account is technically residential or non-residential.
The Central Limit Theorem requires at least 12.5% of the observations before and
after the estimated breakpoint (Bai & Perron, 2003; Zeileis et al., 2003). However, given
only 120 monthly periods for Clovis, 93 periods for Rio Rancho, 96 period for
Albuquerque, and 94 periods for Edgewood, this study imposes a requirement of at least
15% of the data pre- and post-estimated breakpoint. The conservative window is used to
better control for drought-like conditions that began early in 2006 (in the case of Clovis)
as well as the protracted drought from 2011 to nearly 2014 – both of which may be
expected to impact aggregate water demand and on a per premises demand. Forthcoming
figures display premises-level data because demand responses are likely to be at that
level; however, supplemental material contain aggregate-level results. In addition, results
from statistical test of each break identified in the breakpoint analysis are shown in table
2.9 in Appendix 2.1.
Figure 2.5 shows seasonal trends and breakpoints for mean water use in Clovis for
all water users and high volume users (left panel and right panel, respectively). The top
graphs show monthly mean water use with shaded regions representing drought
(sequential PDSI readings of -1.5). The middle graph shows the seasonally decomposed
trend with breakpoints given by the vertically hashed loci and 95% confidence intervals
shaded. The bottom graph shows estimated breakpoints with confidence intervals and
fitted trend lines.
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Figure 2.5 Seasonal trends and breakpoints for mean daily water use per premises in Clovis for all
premises (left) and for high volume premises (right)

Figure 2.6 shows seasonal trends and breakpoints for mean water use in Rio
Rancho for all water users and low volume users (left panel and right panel, respectively).

Figure 2.6 Seasonal trends and breakpoints for mean daily water use per premises in Rio Rancho for all
premises (left) and for low volume premises (right)

The left panel in figure 2.7 shows seasonal trends and breakpoints (or rather, lack
of breakpoints) for water use in Edgewood. The de-seasoned trend clearly indicates
declining water use from 2009 through 2015. The trend also indicates a sharp uptick
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beginning at the end of 2015 through September 2016; however, because a full year of
2016 data are not yet available, it is unclear whether the pattern is truly indicative of a per
premises uptick or whether partial year data are causing the sharp increase. Even so, the
data exhibit no significant breakpoints. The right panel in figure 2.7 shows seasonal
trends and lack of breakpoints for the city of Albuquerque from the period from January
2009 to December 2015. In this case, mean daily water use for all premises is displayed;
however, the outcome, with regard to continuously declining demand throughout the
period, as well as lack of breakpoints, is consistent across type of user and metric.

Figure 2.7 Seasonal trends and breakpoints for mean daily water use per premises in Edgewood (left) and
Albuquerque (right) for all premises

2.10. Seasonal Trend and Breakpoint Discussion
In most cases, municipalities experienced declining total use and use per premises
over the periods investigated. However, existence, timing, and reason for breakpoints
appear to be different in each case. Demand trends and breakpoints for each place are
discussed in turn.
The city of Clovis generally experienced declines in water use; however, data for
all water users (low and high volume users) suggest that the series experienced two
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breakpoints. The timing of the breakpoints does not appear to relate to significant
economic or industrial events, nor do they appear to relate to rate changes; rather, the
breakpoints logically occur in relation to the timing of drought. For example, in figure 5,
the first breakpoint occurs as the series flattens out after the short-but-severe drought in
the first half of 2006. Because drought occurred near the start of the series, the fitted
series adjusts upward at the start. Providing additional evidence of these drought effects
is the timing of the second breakpoint, which occurs in 2011, and is proximate to the start
of the second period of drought.
However, this does not explain the water use patterns (per premises) for high
volume users, which is generally increasing, although the series experiences a downward
break in 2011. However, the reason for the upward sloping trend is that the number of
premises classified high volume (i.e. 2,000 gpd) declined through time, thereby leaving
only the largest users in the dataset. In particular, premises that are relatively close to the
2,000 gpd threshold began to reduce water use through time and fell into the low-user
category. For example, in 2006, the average number of premises that qualified as a high
volume user totaled 257 premises; by 2016, the average number fell to 123 premises. The
very high users, on the other hand, who are likely to be larger business and
manufacturing interests, continued to use high water volumes, thus increasing use per
premises for the high volume group. Supporting this position is that when total aggregate
water use for high volume users (instead of per premises use) is examined, the series and
breakpoints appear similar to the analogous series for low volume users.
Although water use has generally declined through time in Rio Rancho –
especially residential use – high volume use dipped significantly in 2013 and continued
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to fall. A likely culprit for the decline is the change in the manufacturing sector, and
specifically the change in the water demand from Intel. The company, which uses a
combination of water supplied from the city water utility as well as its own wells and
reuse programs, began to reduce its reliance on city wells in 2013 (Intel, 2014). In
particular, from June 2012 to December 2013, the monthly volume of water purchase by
Intel fell from 118.4 million gallons to 968,000 gallons (Intel, 2014). Additionally, to the
extent that employment and production are correlated, reduced manufacturing
employment levels may help to explain reduced demand. However, production
efficiencies also likely contribute to the decline. Nevertheless, because Intel is a large
water consumer, changes in its water use patterns is the leading candidate to explain the
breakpoint.
Left unexplained, however, is the generally declining water use trend through
time. While it is unclear exactly why this seemingly sharp decline exists for these groups,
it may be related to the series of relatively large rate adjustments beginning in February
2013. These rate adjustments likely play a role in recent water use reductions for
residential consumers and likely also explain why Intel traded off city water use with its
own well use. However, without premises-level data and an ability to estimate price
elasticity of demand, this effect cannot be quantified accurately.
Data from the town of Edgewood also suggest declining water demand at both the
aggregate and premises level. Output from seasonal trend analysis suggests that per
premises use declined almost uninterrupted from 2009 to near the end of 2015. The
analysis also suggests an uptick in demand near the start of 2016. However, despite the
apparent change in direction, the uptick is not accompanied by an identifiable breakpoint.
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The lack of a breakpoint in this case may be due to not having enough data near the end
of the series to characterize the break.
Similar patterns of generally declining demand but a recent uptick are shown at
the premises level when all data are examined as well as for low- and high-volume users.
This is also generally true for aggregate demand except for high volume users, who
experienced large variation and directional change several times over the period. For the
period, three breakpoints, as shown in table 2.9, were detected: March 2010, November
2011 and May 2015 (although statistical significance was rejected), which broke the
series into four distinct regions: declining from January 2009 to March 2010, increasing
from March 2010 to November 2011, flat from November 2011 to May 2015 and then
increasing after May 2015.
However, volatile aggregate water use for high volume users in Edgewood is
probably unsurprising given that it is primarily a commuter town (so little industry) and
because there are relatively few users (an average of 75 per month) in this category. In
addition, the average user in this group uses only 571 gallons per day, which is much
different from the nearly 5,800 gallons per day and 2,650 gallons per day used by high
volume users in Clovis and Rio Rancho, respectively. This suggests a categorical
difference between the types of operations undertaken by high volume Edgewood users
and likely makes their water use trends and patterns not directly comparable to high
volume users elsewhere. 9

9

Because Edgewood is primarily a commuter town (and almost entirely residential) it probably makes
sense to compare all of its users to low volume water users in the other municipalities. When examining all
users in Edgewood, no statistically significant breakpoint is observed and the series generally declines (see
left panel of figure 2.7).
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The city of Albuquerque, like the other municipalities, experienced declining
water demand over the period of study. This is true of both demand per premises and
aggregate demand, even though the number of premises increased over the period – from
an average of 194,758 premises in 2009 to 201,742 premises in 2015. Although not
discussed specifically in this context, prior analysis investigated some of the factors that
are likely related to declining demand, including price increases, rebates for water saving
technology, and rebates for conversion of turf to xeriscape (Price et al., 2014).
However, Price et al. (2014) did not assess or estimate all of the potential factors
that are likely linked to reduced demand in Albuquerque. One possible factor is that the
Albuquerque economy has fared poorly since the Great Recession. 10 Some of this is
captured by the decline in total and manufacturing employment shown in tables 2.3 and
2.4, respectively. To give greater context, the Albuquerque Metropolitan Statistical Area,
which is comprised of a four county region (including Sandoval County, where Rio
Rancho resides), was only the 387th fastest growing region in terms of employment
growth (0.2% over the period) out of 436 metro regions as defined by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics from 2009 to 2015 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/). Furthermore, the
Albuquerque MSA experienced the slowest rate of growth of any metro region with at
least 200,000 jobs. Given the relative lack of business growth and the likely dearth of
investment, it is perhaps not surprising that water use is declining.

10

Price et al. (2014) included a time trend in a secondary analysis which may have captured at least some
of the effect of the poorly performing economy. However, to the extent that other factors influencing
demand, such as uptake of rebated technology (or other factors potentially impacting demand), are
temporally correlated with Albuquerque’s poorly performing economy, the time trend will be unable to pull
apart the impact of both effects.
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Additionally, increasing preference for water conservation is not estimated by
Price et al. (2014) but may be driven by myriad factors. These include the public
information campaigns pursued by ABCWUA regarding relative water vulnerability –
which, among other things, required water supply investment via the San Juan-Chama
water project; the large number of news stories by local media outlets; and perhaps a
greater awareness of the potential impacts on the water supply due to climate change.
An additional avenue of potential investigation in all municipalities is the rate of
housing stock turnover and the extent to which new or improved building materials or
different landscaping standards have reduced water demand per-premises, which has not
been fully investigated in the literature (Woodard, 2015). Relatedly, improvements may
have been made to existing businesses, households and city infrastructure – all of which
may have reduced system leakage. Further investigation is needed to uncover and
quantify these and additional drivers of declining demand in Albuquerque and elsewhere.

2.11. Econometric Estimation: Case of Clovis, New Mexico
Given the results from the previous section, it appears as though either extreme
drought conditions (in the case of Clovis) or severe utility action (in the case of Rio
Rancho) may create a series break at least in some instances. In effort to quantify a more
precise behavioral response, this section estimates an economic model of water demand
for the city of Clovis. Output from this model is compared against known output from
models at the US Census block group level and premises-level. Of particular interest is
the degree to which water users respond to utility action, such as rate changes and rebate
programs, and climate conditions. For a thorough discussion of the empirical challenges
involved in estimating water demand, including managing endogenieity and fixed effects,
please see Chapter 3.4.
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2.11.1 Data
Monthly data on water use (January 2006 to December 2015) in Clovis was
converted to average daily water use. Average water price (per gallon) was calculated by
taking the bill amount (i.e. amount paid by water users) and dividing by the volume used.
Because the time period is relatively long (10 years), price is adjusted for inflation on an
annual basis using the consumer price index (CPI) using 2015 as the base year. Data on
rebates for water saving technology and landscaping changes were provided by EPCOR.
Data are known at the premises-level; at larger geographic scales (i.e. US Census block
group or city levels), the relevant variables are defined as the fraction of premises that
received a rebate by rebate type.
Daily temperature data was used to construct average temperature for each month
while daily precipitation data was summed to arrive at a monthly precipitation total. Over
the study period from January 2006 to December 2015, Clovis experienced several
periods of extreme drought: from a short period of drought in 2006 to extended and deep
drought from 2011 to 2014. Monthly Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) data were
also employed in an effort to better account for the effects of drought.
In an attempt to control for socioeconomic and demographic shifts, county-level
(Curry County) estimates for household size and income were employed. Also used were
permits granted for single family construction in the city of Clovis; this was done to
proxy for the age of the housing stock. Table 2.7 shows descriptive statistics and data
sources for the key variables used in this analysis.
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Table 2.7 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Variable

Description

WU
AvgPrice
ToiletPrem
Washer
Landscape
Income
HHSize
Permits
Temp
Precip
PDSI

Average daily
household water use
Average water price
Premises toilet rebate
indicator
Washing machine
rebate indicator
Landscape rebate
indicator
Average household
income in county
Average household
size in county
Number of single
family building permits
Average monthly
temperature
Average total monthly
precipitation
Palmer Drought
Severity Index

Period

Unit

Mean

Std.
dev.

Source

Month

Gallons

323.6

653.51

EPCOR

Month

$/Gallon

0.003

0.002

EPCOR

Month

1/0

0.03

0.18

EPCOR

Month

1/0

0.02

0.13

EPCOR

Month

1/0

0.01

0.08

EPCOR

Ann.

Dollars

40,945

1.02

Ann.

Persons

2.61

0.08

Month

Permits

10.37

5.47

BBER & Clovis

Month

Fahrenheit

56.80

14.86

NOAA

Month

Inches

1.28

1.44

NOAA

Month

Unitless

-0.28

2.45

NOAA

US Census
(ACS)
US Census
(ACS)

2.11.2 Model and estimation
Econometric estimation is undertaken according to the following model:
lnWU𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1 lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝐵𝐵2 Temp𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵3 Precip𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

+ 𝐵𝐵4 lnIncome𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵5 HHsize𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵7 BldPermit 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵8 PDSI𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2.3)
3

11

3

𝑗𝑗=1

𝑘𝑘=1

𝑙𝑙=1

+ � 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 Rebate𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + � 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 Month𝑘𝑘 + � 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 MeterSize𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝐵𝐵0 is the intercept and terms from 𝐵𝐵1 to 𝐵𝐵8 correspond to estimated coefficients on
continuous variables. lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) , is water price lagged one month. Due to

endogenous price, this variable is constructed based on a first stage estimates using
marginal price as instruments (Arbués & Villanúa, 2006; Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al.,
2014). 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 , at the premises-level, corresponds to the receipt of a rebate and at the more
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aggregated spatial scales to the proportion of premise that had received a toilet rebate,
washing machine rebate and/or landscaping rebate at the respective spatial scale. 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 is

the coefficient on month; December is the base month. 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 controls for the size of the

water deliver pipe attached to the premises. 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 controls for premises or block group fixed

effects (at the city spatial scale, fixed effects are not employed), while 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error

term. 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 are indices that correspond to premises (or census block) and time period,
respectively.

Table 2.8 Modeling results

Variable Name
lnAvgPrice
ToiletPrem
Washer
Landscape
lnIncome
Temp
Precip

Model 2.1
FEIV
Premises-Level
-0.534***
(0.008)
-0.083***
(0.004)
-0.060***
(0.006)
-0.100***
(0.007)
0.568***
(0.027)
0.010***
(0.000)
-0.012***
(0.000)

Model 2.2
FEIV
Block Group
-0.406***
(0.039)
-0.123
(0.106)
-0.613***
(0.157)
-0.937***
(0.170)
0.829***
(0.142)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.012***
(0.003)

PDSI

Model 2.3
2SLS
City-Level
0.021
(0.670)
-12.194**
(4.483)
21.890*
(10.165)
-11.207***
(1.894)
0.044
(0.481)
0.013***
(0.996)
-0.007
(0.992)

Model 2.4
2SLS
City-Level
-0.440***
(0.147)

Model 2.5
2SLS
City-Level
-0.508***
(0.125)

0.590
(0.507)
0.013***
(0.004)
-0.019***
(0.008)

0.232
(0.437)
0.011***
(0.003)

-0.021***
(0.003)
1,575,980
3,960
N
119
119
119
2
R
0.280
0.581
0.865
0.856
0.892
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. The following variables and controls suppressed:
month, BldPermit, HHsize, suppressed. MeterSize control used in premises-level estimation but
not block group or city-level estimation. No fixed effects are employed in the city-level
estimation.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Models 2.1 and 2.2 correspond to estimations undertaken at the premises level
and US Census block group level, respectively. Models 2.3-2.5 correspond to estimates at
the city-wide spatial scale. In other words, the data are aggregated to the spatial level of
the entire city. It is clear that the larger spatial scales improve the overall model fit; at the
premises-level (model 2.1), R2 is only 0.28, at the block group level (model 2.2), R2 is
0.58 and the fit nearly reaches 0.9 in the city-wide estimations (models 2.3-2.5).
However, despite the improved model fits, compressing the data into a single spatial
scale comes at a cost. For example, at the larger spatial scales, the estimated coefficients
on the rebate variables, in terms of magnitude and significance, are affected (when
compared against the results from the premises-level analysis). Additionally, the rebate
variables appear to impact the magnitude and significance of the price variable
(lnAvgPrice). It turned out that at the most aggregated level (city level), the price variable
was found to correlate at a 1% level with the toilet, washing machine, and landscaping
rebates (𝜌𝜌 = 0.82, 0.83, and 0.74, respectively). The justification for including the rebate

variables at the spatial scale of an entire city is somewhat dubious (because it effectively
applying a premises-level concept to an entire city), so it may make sense to exclude
those variables when investigating water demand at large spatial scales. Results are
shown in models 2.4 and 2.5.

In models 2.4 and 2.5, several salient points are illuminated. First, demand is price
inelastic, and depending on the particular model, falls near to the elasticity estimates in
models 2.1 and 2.2. Therefore, although the breakpoint analysis did not appear to identify
a significant break in trend due to rate increases, the regularity of the increases appeared
to operate to reduce demand and likely helped contribute to the declining trend. Second,
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the temperature coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level across models,
indicating that increased temperatures give way to increased demand. In models 2.1, 2.2,
and 2.4, the precipitation variables are negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating
that water use increases in times of low precipitation. Overall, the temperature and
precipitation variables are particularly interesting because they are similar across models
and imply that in times of low precipitation or high temperature, water use increases. In
model 2.5, precipitation is replaced with PDSI. Precipitation is removed in this model
because it is correlated at a 1% level with PDSI (𝜌𝜌 = 0.40). The estimates of the climate
variables provide some support for the notion that weather-related events, including
drought, may not only impact water use, but might also contribute to the systematic
breaks seen in the breakpoint analysis. Overall, at the city-wide level, the estimates
suggest that much of the variation can be understood in terms of price change and
weather/climate conditions. Therefore, if adequate projections for price and climate are
known, that information may be used to produce projections of water demand at large
spatial scales, especially in the near term. This issue is briefly considered Appendix 2.2.

2.12. Conclusion
This analysis utilized seasonal trend decomposition and breakpoint analysis to
investigate trends in temporal water demand in four arid municipalities in New Mexico.
These methods can help inform water demand analysis by stripping away seasonal noise
to uncover trends in demand and systematic series breaks. Seasonal trend and breakpoint
analysis have been relatively underutilized in a water demand estimation context (Hester
& Larson, 2016); however, given the relatively light data requirements, these analyses
can be useful in quickly identifying patterns or trends that can be qualitatively compared
against known events.
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This study found that water demand has been declining in the investigated
municipalities. This pattern is generally true for both high and low volume users and
terms of aggregate water use or per premises water use. However, there are a few of
exceptions to this general rule. For instance, water use per premises for high volume
users appeared to be increasing in the city of Clovis and water use per premises for high
volume users increased (slightly) from about 2009 to 2014 in Rio Rancho. However,
those are exceptional cases. In the case of Clovis, the pattern is explained by the decline
in the number of high volume users through time, leaving only highest water demanders
in the high volume cohort. Rio Rancho’s explanation is different not only because of the
large increase in the number of water users over the period, but also because the city’s
population and industrial growth likely contributed to increased water use from high
volume users. However, it is important to note that although the trend was only slightly
increasing until about 2014 but has been falling since.
Likewise, significant breakpoints were uncovered in the trends for the cities of
Clovis for all users, and Rio Rancho for high volume users. Despite the generally
declining trend in water demand in the city of Clovis, upward breaks appear to be related
to severe drought conditions. This is interesting because, despite the fact that all
municipalities experienced drought over their respective series, no other municipality
exhibited that degree of apparent climate sensitivity. Nevertheless, given the timing of the
Clovis breaks drought is the most likely culprit. The explanation for the break in the Rio
Rancho series, however, is likely associated with the large rate increases experienced in
the municipality and the associated reduction in demand from industrial users, and in
particular, reduced demand from Intel.
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No significant breakpoints were detected for Albuquerque or Edgewood. While
there is no definitive reason for the lack of breaks in these two municipalities, one
plausible explanation is the relative size of each municipality (in terms of the number of
water-user accounts in each place). For example, the large number and type of varied
users in Albuquerque could operate to put a floor or ceiling on rapid declines or spikes in
demand. Edgewood, on the other hand, experiences high statistical variability due to
having relatively few users. This statistical noise can operate to muffle the effect of
spikes.
Exceptional cases aside, this leads back to a primary theme in this analysis: that
aggregate and per premises water demand is generally declining in the municipalities
investigated in this study. However, although it appears that premises-level demand is
likely to continue to fall in the near future, left unanswered is how long aggregate
demand declines will persist. And although some projections assume that aggregate
demand declines “cannot reasonably be expected to continue” (ABCWUA, 2013), given
the recent trend, it makes demand projections, especially in the near term, somewhat
puzzling and it perhaps calls into question the use of the requirements approach, at least
in its current form (Griffin, 2006). Nevertheless, the application of the requirements
approach, or placing a seemingly reasonable but arbitrary floor on assumed per capita
demand, is understandable in terms of risk aversion as the risk of being wrong is likely
more palatable in cases of oversupply as compared to undersupply (Woodard, 2015).
However, if the errors always fall on the side of oversupply, costly overinvestment in
infrastructure or potentially unnecessary supply augmentation strategies may be
incentivized.
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As such, agencies engaged in water demand projections should seek to minimize,
or at least limit, the oversupply buffer. Seasonal trend and breakpoint analysis provides a
preliminary approach to understanding premises-level and aggregate water demand
trends in the four municipalities. This knowledge may be leveraged in the development of
economic models and further econometric estimation strategies such as those suggested
in section 2.11. This type of analysis can allow for a deeper investigation and important
insights into some of the elements and key variables that impact demand even relatively
large spatial scales. However, the utility of large scale estimation is clearly limited; while
it is possible to make some useful inferences regarding general water use, it is nearly
impossible to develop more fine-tuned inferences of individual or premises level action
using only city-level or aggregate data.
With the goal of developing a better understanding of the factors that are likely
contributing to declining demand at smaller spatial scales in mind, Chapter 3 develops
models at the premises-level.
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Appendix 2.1 Statistical breakpoint analysis
Table 2.9 Breakpoint statistics

Municipality

User Type

Mean
Number of
Premises

Mean Usage

Water-use
Statistic

Breakpoint
Date

95% Confidence Interval

F-statistic

Prob > F

June 2007

May 2007 - January 2008

11.67

0.0000

February 2011

August 2010 - March 2011

29.45

0.0000

June 2007

May 2007 - November 2007

15.81

0.0000

January 2011

September 2010 - February 2011

39.34

0.0000

June 2007

May 2007 - January 2008

12.71

0.0000

February 2011

July 2010 - March 2011

23.07

0.0000

June 2007

May 2007 - November 2007

18.56

0.0000

January 2011

August 2010 - February 2011

33.74

0.0000

June 2007

May 2007 - April 2008

6.89

0.0015

January 2011

September 2009 - February 2011

33.48

0.0000

October 2009

June 2009 - April 2010

3.82

0.0251

Total water use
All Users

14,986

333 gal/day
Use per premises
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Total water use
Clovis
Low Volume

14,786

259 gal/day
Use per premises

Total water use
High Volume

199

5,795 gal/day
Use per premises

Table 2.9 (cont.)

Municipality

User Type

Mean
Number of
Premises

All Users

Rio Rancho

Low Volume

High Volume

32,082

30,779

1,303

Mean Usage

Low Volume

1,929

1,854

Breakpoint
Date

95% Confidence Interval

F-statistic

Prob > F

Total water use

June 2013

May 2013 - February 2014

22.07

0.0000

Use per premises

June 2013

May 2013 - January 2014

28.87

0.0000

Total water use

None

Use per premises

None

Total water use

May 2013

April 2013 - April 2014

19.60

0.0000

Use per premises

May 2013

March 2013 - December 2013

19.44

0.0000

301 gal/day

205 gal/day

2,650 gal/day
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All Users

Water-use
Statistic

Total water use

None

Use per premises

None

Total water use

None

Use per premises

None

185 gal/day

169 gal/day

Edgewood

Total water use
High Volume

75

March 2010

February 2010 - June 2010

1.03

0.3617

November 2011

October 2011 - July 2012

3.92

0.0238

May 2015

January 2015 - June 2015

7.62

0.0009

571 gal/day

Use per premises

None

Table 2.9 (cont.)

Municipality

User Type

Mean
Number of
Premises

All Users

Albuquerque

Low Volume

High Volume

198,238

184,105

14,133

Mean Usage

Water-use
Statistic

Breakpoint
Date
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Total water use

None

Use per premises

None

Total water use

None

Use per premises

None

Total water use

None

Use per premises

None

95% Confidence Interval

F-statistic

Prob > F

365 gal/day

296 gal/day

1,264 gal/day

Notes: Low volume water users in Clovis defined as using less than 2,000 gpd and high volume water users defined as using at least 2,000 gpd. High water users
in Rio Rancho, Edgewood and Albuquerque defined as commercial users. Low volume users in Albuquerque defined as residential and multifamily users.
Breakpoints and confidence intervals estimated using the bfast procedure in R; Manual (Chow, 1960) test used to determine breakpoint significance.

Appendix 2.2 City-level sample prediction
Using the estimates given in models 2.4 and 2.5, near-term projections can be
developed by water managers. Specifically, figure 2.8. shows in-sample projections using
temperature and precipitation is explanatory variables (model 2.4) and temperature and
PDSI as explanatory variables (model 2.5). Also shown is a series that only includes a
monthly time trend as well as the actual data series.
Gal. per day
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul
06 06 07 07 08 08 09 09 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15
Actual

Econometric Prediction

PDSI Prediction

Monthly Trend

Figure 2.8 Trends actual and predicted series (gallons per day per premises)

It is clear that all estimated series account for the generally declining trend over
the period. However, time trended series does not account for the peaks and valleys of the
series. The predictions that use temperature and precipitation (or PDSI) follow the peaks
and valleys of the actual series and have a much stronger model fit – although the PDSI
has the strongest model fit over the series. In order to visually inspect to model fit, figure
2.9. shows predicted versus actual values for the three estimated series already described
as well as a series using an annual (rather than monthly) time trend.
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Figure 2.9 Scatter plot, predicted versus actual with 45-degree line: (a) From model 3.4; (b) From model
3.5; (c) monthly time trend; (d) annual time trend (horizontal axis are actual vertical axis are predicted)

Panels (a) and (b) provide similar results with panel (b) fitting slightly more
tightly with the 45-degree line. Panels (c) and (d) show the results from a monthly and
yearly time trend, respectively; both models fit poorly. With regard to the models that fit
well, panels (a) and (b), although the PDSI model appears to be slightly more accurate, in
terms of the development of actual projections, and the requirement of input series to
produce out-of-sample estimates, it may be more realistic to use precipitation projections.
In any event, the utility of using this method to project demand ultimately turns on the
quality of the price and climate projections; the more accurate those projections, the more
accurate the demand projections are likely to be. In addition, the underlying equations
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should be periodically re-estimated to ensure that the statistical relationships hold. If
those relationship change through time then the updated estimates should be employed.
Given that the econometric model (that includes precipitation in inches) and the
PDSI model (which uses PDSI but excludes precipitation) generally produce the
strongest fit, models 2.4 and 2.5 were re-estimated in an effort to perform out-of-sample
prediction. In particular the estimation range was restricted from the full 120 months to
the 60 month period from January 2006 to December 2010. Based on these estimation
results, an out-of-sample predictions beginning January 2011 were produced. A
comparison of the two out-of-sample predictions and the actual series is shown in figure
2.10.
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Figure 2.10 Out-of-sample prediction (gallons per day per premises)

Interesting is that although the model fit for the PDSI model (model 2.5) was
slightly stronger than the model fit in the econometric model (model 2.4), with an R2 of
0.89 versus 0.86, the out-of-sample prediction for the econometric prediction
(precipitation model) is generally tighter to the actual series than the PDSI prediction.
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This result provides some evidence of the benefit of using a more straight-forward
measurement (precipitation) as opposed to a measurement that may be more attractive at
first glance (PDSI). Chapter 3 in this manuscripts toils with the same issue in choosing
the appropriate model variables and also settles on the use of precipitation over PDSI. In
that case, the justification is similar: precipitation data are nearly instantaneous and is
easy to understand whereas PDSI data are required to be computed from other underlying
data, are complex, and may not be instantaneously available.
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Appendix 2.3 Full Seasonal Trend and Breakpoint Output
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Chapter 3: Understanding Falling Municipal Water Demand in a Small
City Dependent on the Declining Ogallala Aquifer: a Case Study of
Clovis, New Mexico
3.1 Introduction
I cross over the state line into Clovis, a city with ambition but not enough water.
Irrigation has drawn the aquifer down so low here that 73 wells deliver less water
than what 28 wells delivered to Clovis residents in 2000. “We are in a race to the
bottom,” Mayor David Lansford says (Parker, 2016).
Scarce water resources and a changing climate create incentives for more efficient
municipal water management, especially in areas such as the arid American southwest
where climate may be affecting snowmelt run-off, mountain-front recharge, and storage
(Brookshire et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2004). Compared with historical averages, water
managers must plan for projected temperatures increases, potentially greater precipitation
variability, and severe drought conditions, all of which underscores the significant
vulnerabilities facing municipal water supply (Deser et al., 2014; Gutzler & Robbins,
2011). This is acutely the case for the dispersed cities and towns of the high plains region
over the Ogallala aquifer, where agricultural withdrawals over the past century have
rapidly depleted groundwater supplies (Foster et al., 2017; McGuire, 2014; Steward &
Allen, 2016). The High Plains aquifer, of which the Ogallala is a part, is the primary (or
sole) source of water for a large number of municipalities and has seen average water
level declines of 15 feet over the last several decades; municipalities in some states such
as New Mexico, Texas, Kansas and Oklahoma in the central and southern portion of the
aquifer, have fared worse (McGuire, 2014). Figure 3.1 shows a selection of
municipalities that are also dependent on the High Plains aquifer.
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Figure 3.1 Declining High Plains Aquifer: predevelopment to 2013
Notes: High plains aquifer boundary from Qi (2010); water level change from McGuire (2014). Map based
on USGS digital data. Map produced by D. Ruiz at the Bureau of Business & Economic Research, UNM.

Given population pressures and a changing climate, rapid aquifer declines have
compromised the ability of municipalities to satisfy current and future demand and call
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for a careful evaluation of the factors that impact demand. This includes untangling the
effects of complicated histories of both changing rate structures and a mix of non-price
demand management programs implemented in combinations over time. Because Clovis’
situation is not unique with regard to depending on a declining aquifer, a better
understanding of the factors that influence water demand can be leveraged by similarly
situated municipalities.
Municipal water managers regularly confront shortage and scarcity. On the
demand side of the ledger, managers have both price and non-price tools at their disposal
to influence user behavior (Kenney et al., 2008; Krause et al., 2003). Due in part to these
efforts, per capita demand is falling in many large western cities in the US (Balling &
Gober, 2007; Brelsford & Abbott, 2017; Donnelly & Cooley, 2015; Kenney et al., 2008;
Price et al., 2014). In addition to the availability of demand-side response, relatively large
cities, given large population and tax bases, may have a reasonable degree of
maneuverability with regard to the supply side. For example, as part of a larger project,
diversions of Colorado River water to the city of Tucson, Arizona, via the Central
Arizona Project (CAP), became possible following aqueduct completion in 1993 and,
after substantial groundwater depletion, the city began to use significant volumes of its
CAP entitlement for domestic purposes in 2000 (Zuniga, 2000). Due to similar aquifer
depletion, Albuquerque, New Mexico bolstered its supplies in early 2009 as a result of
the San Juan Chama project; that project diverts water from the San Juan River to the Rio
Grande via a series of channels and tunnels and ultimately to the city (Wickert, 2015).
While much is known about large cities, less is known about small to mid-size
cities and towns (i.e., less than 50,000 residents). A number of small to mid-sized cities,
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especially those within the declining southern Ogallala aquifer, are dependent on the
aquifer as their sole source of water. Due to constraints such as small tax bases or the
inability to capture economies of scale in infrastructure investment, however, many of
these municipalities must operate almost exclusively on the demand side.
Using Clovis, New Mexico as our focus, this study analyzes monthly premiseslevel panel data from 2006 to 2015 to quantify the effects of pricing and demand
management efforts in a small municipality. Analysis accounts for factors such as
household income and climate factors in an effort to estimate the relative cost efficacy of
different utility actions that have contributed to declining water demand. Our focus is on
a small but rapidly growing city that is located in the arid southwest, is solely dependent
on the dwindling southern Ogallala aquifer, and at the present time has been unable to
engage in a large scale supply enhancement project. This analysis adds to the municipal
water demand literature by providing estimates of price and income elasticities, assessing
the cost efficacy of water rebate programs, and providing estimates for demand
responsiveness to drought conditions in a small municipality. These estimates may be
used by and compared against similar localities facing similar hydrological and climate
conditions as well as comparable demand management programs and resource
constraints.

3.2 Background and literature review
3.2.1 Background on Clovis, NM
Clovis, which is located in Curry County, New Mexico, is a small city near the
New Mexico/Texas border in the east-central part of the state whose population is
growing at a rapid rate. According to estimates from the 2015 American Community
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Survey, the city’s population numbered 39,480 persons – up from 37,775 persons in the
2010 US Decennial Census, and up more than 7,000 persons from the 2000 Decennial
Census. The climate in Clovis is arid and characterized by generally warm temperatures
and relatively low precipitation. Average annual daily temperature typically ranges from
around mid-30° F in the winter to the mid-70° F in the summer; meanwhile, total annual
precipitation has averaged around 15 inches over the last decade. Like most of the
western US, the area has recently experienced extended droughts; according to the US
Drought Monitor, 100% of Curry County, the county that Clovis resides in, was under (at
least) severe drought conditions from 2012 to 2014 (Simeral, 2016).
The city of Clovis is solely dependent on groundwater from the Ogallala aquifer
and therefore is an important case study for other municipalities that rely on a single
dwindling groundwater source or even where Ogallala water is a source within their
supply mix. For example, water utilities in cities shown in figure 3.1, such as Imperial,
Nebraska; Garden City, Kansas; and Guymon, Oklahoma, in the Oklahoma panhandle,
each rely entirely on groundwater sources to supply its municipal customers, with most
(or all) of the supply coming from the Ogallala formation. Even more populous cities
such as Amarillo and Lubbock, Texas, whose utilities use some surface water in their
respective supply mix, also use significant volumes of Ogallala water. However, at least
in the case of Lubbock, the city recognizes that because of aquifer’s relatively low water
table and due to decades of agricultural pumping, municipalities must seek alternative
supplies to satisfy future demand (City of Amarillo, 2012; City of Lubbock, 2013).
In Clovis, one proposed option for ensuring sufficient future supplies is via
construction of the long-proposed Ute reservoir and pipeline that would divert water from
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the Ute Lake in eastern New Mexico southward to towns such as Clovis. Although some
progress has been made along this front, the high cost of construction, which has been
estimated to be in the neighborhood of USD 550 million to USD 750 million, combined
with the fact that the project will require ongoing operational costs, have thus far
generally stalled this large-scale investment (Suzan Montoya Bryan, 2017).
Alternatively, municipalities may attempt to bolster supplies through water trades
and leases from local and regional users not supplied by the utility (Colby et al., 2010,
2014). This relatively small-scale purchase and lease activity is currently being
undertaken by EPCOR, the private water utility that is contracted by the city to supply the
roughly 15,000 premises (including residential, business and governmental entities) in
municipal Clovis. However, while this may be an effective near-term strategy, given that
irrigators are subject to the same dwindling aquifer and perhaps relatively greater stresses
due to climate change (Ziolkowska & Reyes, 2017), opportunities for trade may be
constrained.
Despite a general uptick in the number of premises that EPCOR services, from
about 13,500 premises in 2006 to about 15,500 by 2015, total water demand and water
demand per serviced premise has generally declined over the last decade. In particular,
mean daily water use per premises declined from about 360 gallons per day (gdp) in 2006
to 310 gpd in 2010 and then to 250 gpd in 2015. Similarly, aggregate demand declined
from about 5 million gpd to 4.7 million gpd and then to 3.9 million gpd in 2006, 2010,
and 2015, respectively. This trend of falling demand has been seen in other nearby cities
(Balling & Gober, 2007; Donnelly & Cooley, 2015). Fully understanding this apparent
behavioral change, and what might cause it to reverse (e.g., extended drought, a warming
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climate, continued population growth, or altering a rebate program, etc.) is an especially
critical challenge for a municipality like Clovis that does not have ready access to
alternative supplies.

3.2.2 Factors under the utility’s control
Strategies that utilities employ to influence water demand can broadly be
described as price and non-price strategies (Kenney et al., 2008; Krause et al., 2003).
With regard to price strategies, the law of demand suggests that price increases will bring
about a reduction in the quantity demanded; most empirical research has borne out this
expectation with regard to water use. In an analysis of the empirical water demand
literature, Worthington & Hoffman (2008) note that estimated price elasticities are almost
always negative and inelastic. Likewise, in a recent and large meta-analysis of water
demand studies from 2002 to 2012, Sebri (2014) found a mean price elasticity of -0.37,
confirming the general tendency of inelastic demand at current prices; however, given
inelastic demand, price increases will only result in relatively small decrease in quantity
demanded (Arbués et al., 2003; Dalhuisen et al., 2003). While most studies focus on the
short-run, several studies estimate long run price elasticity. Most find the long run
elasticity to be greater than the short run but still in the inelastic region (AlmendarezHernández et al., 2016; Worthington & Hoffman, 2008), and some studies even find
water demand to be price elastic in the long run (Ben Zaied & Binet, 2015; Yoo et al.,
2014). Still, the finding of generally (price) inelastic demand persists in the recent
literature. A collection of recent studies that have estimated price elasticity of water
demand, along with key meta-analyses, is presented in Appendix 3.1.
Because water demand tends to be inelastic, non-price strategies are often favored
by water utilitiess, especially when water conservation is a goal (Olmstead et al., 2007).
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Non-price policies include a variety of activities such as water use restrictions, public
information campaigns, rebates for the purchase (and replacement) of low-flow
appliances, landscaping subsidies, and other similar strategies. Especially popular
policies are rebate programs for low-flow appliances (e.g. toilets, showerheads, and
washing machines). Rebate programs of this type have been shown to be effective at
reducing water demand (Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014).

3.2.3 Factors not under the utility’s control
Household-level characteristics have also been shown to impact water demand.
For example, Arbués et al. (2003), Dalhuisen et al. (2003), and others, point out that
income impacts water demand in a positive fashion, making water a “normal” good. This
general result continues to be been borne out in the recent literature (see Appendix 3.1).
In addition, household size has been used to explain water demand; Arbués et al. (2010)
put a finer point on the topic when the authors find that smaller households are relatively
more sensitive to price changes than larger households.
Weather and climate-related variables also impact water demand, although studies
vary with regard to which climate variables to include or how to characterize weather.
Arbués et al. (2010) used the number of days in a billing cycle over a certain temperature
and no variable for precipitation; Kenney et al. (2008) included the average maximum
daily temperature over a billing period and the total precipitation over that period; and
Price et al. (2014) used average daily temperature over the billing period and total
precipitation. Furthermore, inter-annual or seasonal variation, which may be related to
outdoor activities such as gardening or pools, is likely to exist (Arbués et al., 2003).
In addition, vegetation conditions in the locality are unlikely to be under the
control of the water utility but may impact water demand. Gage & Cooper (2015), for
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example, investigated semi-arid Aurora, Colorado and found that land cover was
predictive of water use and that tree canopy cover and height reduced water use. The
authors also found consistency with previous studies that demonstrated that vegetation
cover was a spatially structured phenomenon; in other words, similar vegetative cover
type is likely in defined spatial areas (Franczyk & Chang, 2009; House-Peters et al.,
2010; Wentz & Gober, 2007).

3.3 Data
3.3.1 Water use and price
Monthly data on water use by premises from January 2006 to December 2015 was
provided by EPCOR and average daily water use by premises for each month was
computed. As this study is interested in measuring water user responsiveness to utility
price and non-price actions, this computed variable serves as the dependent variable for
all empirical estimation. Premises location was geocoded based on listed address. Water
price is given on a per unit basis and is determined jointly by the size of the premises’
delivery pipe and according to an increasing block rate structure. In this instance, one unit
is defined as one CCF (100 ft3) and equivalent to 748 gallons delivered to the premises.
Over the ten year period, the rate (price) structure has been adjusted three times: June
2007, May 2009 and May 2012, giving four distinct rates over the period. In addition, the
number of blocks has increased: for example, the residential block rate structure changed
in June 2007 from two blocks to three, while the structure for commercial premises
connected with a 1" water delivery pipe changed from a flat rate structure to a two block
structure. The left panel in figure 3.2 shows the nominal change in the residential block
rate structure through time and the right panel shows the change in the block rate
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structure for premises connected with a 1" delivery pipe. Combined, these two premises

types account for approximately 97% of all observations in the dataset.
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Figure 3.2 Change in block number and increase in nominal rates through time
Notes: Horizontal axis measured in CCF where 1 CCF = 748 gallons. Vertical axis measures marginal price
in USD. Left panel shows residential rates. Right panel shows non-residential rates for premises that have a
1” hookup.

For estimation purposes, because the time period is relatively long (10 years), price is
adjusted for inflation on an annual basis using the consumer price index (CPI) using 2015
as the base year.

3.3.2 Rebate programs
EPCOR’s rebate program, which began in 2008, and is ongoing, provides rebates
for toilets, washing machines and low water-use landscaping (i.e. conversion from turf to
xeriscape). Rebate data are at the premises level, which allows for estimation of changes
in water use due to the installation of qualifying technology or landscape change.
Nearly USD 500,000 has been spent by EPCOR on rebates over the life of the
program with toilet rebates and landscaping rebates accounting for the majority of total
funds spent. While 927 premises qualified for a toilet rebate, 1,686 total toilet rebates
were granted; therefore, on average, 1.8 toilet rebates were granted per premises. With
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regard to the landscaping rebates, approximately 565,000 square feet have been
converted from turf to xeriscape.

3.3.3 Climate
Daily climate data, and in particular temperature and precipitation data, were
obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2017).
Daily temperature data was used to construct average temperature for each month while
daily precipitation data was summed to arrive at a monthly precipitation total. Over the
study period from January 2006 to December 2015, Clovis experienced several periods of
extreme drought: from a short period of drought in 2006 to extended and deep drought
from 2011 to 2014. These trends are captured by the Palmer Drought Severity Index
(PDSI, 2017) readings from the city shown in figure 3.3. Negative values, as those shown
from about January 2011 until about January 2015 indicate dry conditions.
PDSI
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Figure 3.3 Palmer Drought Severity Index in Clovis, New Mexico by month (2006 – 2015) (PDSI, 2017)

3.3.4 Socioeconomics
Individual household-level socioeconomic data are unknown in this analysis;
however, aggregate data are available through the US Census’s American Community
Survey program. Although individual premises-level or census tract level data would
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have been preferred, and have been shown to perform relatively well (Ouyang et al.,
2014), this study utilizes county-level estimates for Curry county, the county that the city
of Clovis resides in, because tract-level estimates are sparse. In addition, given the
relatively large confidence intervals on the tract-level data, imputation was deemed to be
inappropriate. As county-level data were available for most, but not all years, linear
interpolation was used to interpolate between known years. The specific socioeconomic
data used in this analysis are data that have been shown to impact water demand in prior
studies; in particular, median household income (ACS, 2017b) and household size (ACS,
2017a), both at the county level, are included as explanatory variables. However, because
these data vary over time and not space, only temporal variation is captured.
In addition to characteristics of individuals residing in the household impacting
water demand, the characteristics of each or premises, or trend in aggregate premises
characteristics, should also impact demand. For example, the size of the housing stock
should be positively related to aggregate water use all else equal; however, it is unclear
how the size of the housing stock would impact unit-level water use. Also, the age of the
stock may be related to both aggregate or per capita water use (Brelsford & Abbott,
2017); if the stock ages, system losses and inefficiencies might be expected to increase
water use, while a stock that is getting younger through time (through attrition of
relatively old stock and replacement through new construction) are more likely to be built
with water efficiency in mind. Both housing stock size and housing stock age were
considered; however, preliminary analysis suggested insufficient variation in housing
stock size to explain aggregate or premises-level water use. In addition, estimates of
housing stock age via the American Community Survey (ACS, 2017) were correlated
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with other model variables. Therefore, permits granted for single family construction in
the city of Clovis were used as a proxy to control for housing stock age. These monthly
data were collected and compiled by the University of New Mexico’s Bureau of Business
& Economic Research (BBER, 2017).

3.3.5 Vegetation data
This analysis incorporates remote sensing data via the Normalized Difference
Vegetation Index (NDVI), utilizing the Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer
(AVHRR) Phenology series, produced by the United States Geologic Survey (USGS,
2017). The index, which is computed from remote satellite data, measures wavelengths of
light absorbed and reflected by green plants. In general, higher index values correspond
to ‘greener’ or denser plant coverage. At the time of analysis, data were available through
2013.
This analysis specifically utilizes a measure called the time integrated NDVI,
which is the cumulative value of NDVI from the start to the end of the growing season.
This measure was chosen in an attempt to better capture longer-term trends over the
growing season rather than other vegetation-related indices, which are more likely to
capture a particular peak or valley in at a point in time. Spatial resolution is 1 km2; each
square was geocoded and overlaid on premises-level geocoding – thus matching, at the
given spatial resolution, the appropriate index to each premises. The study utilizes a
larger spatial scale than Gage & Cooper (2015) and is a more general interpretation of
vegetation. This is done because the present analysis is interested in controlling for
aggregate inter-annual vegetation trends rather than specific premises- or neighborhoodlevel impacts.
Descriptive statistics for variables are shown in table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Variable

Description

Period

Unit

Mean

Std.
dev.

Source

WU

Average daily
household water use

Month

Gallons

323.6

653.5

EPCOR

AvgPrice

Average water price

Month

USD per
Gallon

0.003

0.002

EPCOR

Premises toilet rebate
Month 1/0
0.03
0.18
EPCOR
indicator
Washing machine
Month 1/0
0.02
0.13
EPCOR
Washer
rebate indicator
Landscape rebate
Month 1/0
0.01
0.08
EPCOR
Landscape
indicator
Average household
US Census
Ann.
Dollars
40,945 1.02
Income
income in county
(ACS, 2017)
Average household
US Census
HHsize
Ann.
Persons
2.61
0.08
size in county
(ACS, 2017)
Number of single
BldPermit
Month Permits
10.37
5.47
(BBER, 2017)
family building permits
Average monthly
Month Fahrenheit
56.80
14.86
(NOAA, 2017)
Temp
temperature
Average total monthly
Month Inches
1.28
1.44
(NOAA, 2017)
Precip
precipitation
VegIndex
Vegetation index
Ann.
Unitless
12.72
9.16
(USGS, 2017)
Palmer Drought
NOAA (PDSI,
PDSI
Month Unitless
-0.28
2.45
Severity Index
2017)
Note: The low standard deviation for household income occurs because the data are county-level and
annual in nature; thus, income variation is solely based on interannual behavior.
ToiletPrem

3.4 Modeling approach
A primary objective of this analysis is to estimate the impact of EPCOR’s price
and non-price policies on water demand in Clovis. A fixed effects instrumental variable
approach is used for this purpose. Although several explanatory variables are included in
this analysis, some important premises-level characteristics that may impact demand,
such as evaporative cooler use, yard size, irrigation type, and the like, are unknown. For
this reason, a fixed effects approach is brought to bear to control for those unknown
premises-level characteristics. Additionally, unlike Kenney et al. (2008), this analysis
controls for household (or community) socioeconomics that are expected to relate to
water demand. In that study, the authors attempted to use Decennial Census data, which
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did not vary through the study period and fixed effects analysis requires that explanatory
variables vary through time. Therefore, to control for socioeconomic characteristic, the
present study uses county-level annual estimates from the American Community Survey.
In addition, because water price is included as an explanatory variable in the
demand estimation, an instrumental variable approach is applied. This is done to remove
the inherent statistical bias resulting from endogeneity in the price signal when estimating
water demand (Arbués et al., 2004). In other words, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊, or water use, is estimated as a

function of price (among other things). However, price is also inherently a function of
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊, so changes to 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 can affect price. Therefore, if price was used as a regressor it

would likely be correlated with the error term, which would bias the estimated parameters
(Wooldridge, 2010).
To remedy this problem, a first stage estimation is undertaken where price is the
dependent variable and is a function of a chosen set of instruments. In this case, marginal
price, per the increasing block rate structure, is used to instrument for average price
(Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014). Next, predicted prices from the first stage
estimation are computed and then used as the new price variable, rather than actual price,
in the main regression. This process ensures that the new (predicted) price variable is
uncorrelated with the error term. Instrument validity was confirmed using the underidentification and weak identification tests.
An empirical challenge with estimating water demand stems from the block rate
pricing structure employed by EPCOR and many water utilities. Because the analysis
estimates the effect of pricing on water demand, choosing the correct price, or price
proxy, is important. There has been considerable debate over the years concerning the
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management of price under a block rate structure; however, because there is not a single
price for which water is sold under a block rate structure, a composite price must be
developed. Common practices analysts have used to create a composite price include:
marginal price, computation of an average price, or applying the so-called Nordin (1976)
specification.
Economic theory suggests that demand should respond to marginal price – or the
price of the last unit sold. However, for this to be the case in a municipal water demand
context, consumers are required to have contemporaneous information of their water use
in each period as well as an intimate understanding of the rate structure (Arbués et al.,
2003; Carter & Milon, 2005; H. S. Foster & Beattie, 1979). In practice, however, both
requirements are unlikely (Ito, 2014; Kenney et al., 2008). The Nordin (1976)
specification utilizes marginal price as well as an additional term captured by computing
the difference between the total bill and what the user would have paid if all units were
charged at the marginal price; this variable is designed to proxy the income effect
imposed by the block rate structure (Arbués et al., 2003). As a practical matter, this
technique suffers from the same downsides as the use of straight marginal price.
Therefore, because consumers are likely to only have a general understanding of
the relationship between their water use and their water bills, the present analysis
employs an average price structure similar in nature to Kenney et al. (2008) and Price et
al. (2014). Under this method, average price is computed by dividing the total bill amount
by the water volume consumed (i.e., the volume reflected in the bill in gallons). Because
a consumer is unlikely to have real-time knowledge of water use, but may change
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behavior from month to month based on the amount billed, this constructed variable is
lagged one billing period.
While water demand studies regularly use a FEIV (or similar) empirical strategy
due to its straightforward nature (Kenney et al., 2008; Porcher, 2014; Price et al., 2014;
Romano et al., 2014; Wichman et al., 2016), other recent studies employ alternative
methodologies in an effort to account for shortcomings associated with this approach.
For example, Klaiber et al. (2014) and Wichman (2014) utilize an experimental approach
and a difference-in-difference estimation methodology to account for omitted variable
bias. Also attempting to account for the effect of omitted variables, Brelsford & Abbott
(2017) use the decomposition procedure put forward by Gelbach (2016). Although the
underlying estimation approach is FEIV in nature, Clarke et al. (2017) and Hung & Chie
(2013) employ a Stone-Geary functional form, which allows for greater flexibility by
allowing for non-fixed elasticities. Meanwhile, Ben Zaied & Binet (2015) and
Ghavidelfar et al. (2016) harness the time series analysis literature by employing
cointigration and error correction methodological approaches (Appendix 3.1contains a
table of recent water demand studies along with elasticity estimates and methodological
innovation). Nevertheless, and despite the situational benefits of alternative estimation,
the present study uses a straightforward FEIV estimation approach.

3.4.1 The model
All estimation proceeds according to variations on the following general model
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lnWU𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1 lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝐵𝐵2 Temp𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵3 Precip𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝐵𝐵4 lnIncome𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵5 HHsize𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵6 BldPermit 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3

11

𝑗𝑗=1
3

𝑘𝑘=1

(3.1)

+ � 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 Rebate𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + � 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 Month𝑘𝑘
+ � 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 MeterSize𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑙𝑙=1

In this model, 𝐵𝐵0 is the intercept term and terms from 𝐵𝐵1 to 𝐵𝐵6 correspond to estimated
coefficients on continuous variables. On preliminary analysis, it was determined that
Precip was correlated with both VegIndex (𝜌𝜌 = 0.40, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.000) and PDSI (𝜌𝜌 =

0.47, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.000); because precipitation is straightforward and an input into both indices,
it was retained and VegIndex and PDSI were excluded. For estimation that includes the
two indices, see table 3.8 in Appendix 2.2. The natural logarithm of water use is the
dependent variable, and the water price and income variables are log-transformed so that
their estimated coefficients can be directly interpreted as elasticities.
𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 , 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 . 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 are coefficients on indicators for particular states or events. The

coefficient on rebates, 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 , corresponds to three non-mutually exclusive events: receipt of

toilet rebate, washing machine rebate, and landscaping rebate. The coefficient on Month,
𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 , corresponds to the billing month and is mutually exclusive; December is the base

month. While one could argue that monthly control is unnecessary and behavior should

be tied to actual measurable phenomena, such as temperature and precipitation (which
may be correlated with months anyway), it is likely that there are both psychological and
systematic calendar-based arguments, such as holidays, watering schedules, or turning off
an evaporative cooler, for it use (Kenney et al., 2008).
The coefficient on MeterSize, 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 , is mutually exclusive and controls for the size of

the delivery pipe connected to the premises. Only three sizes are explicitly identified in
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5"

this analysis, 8 , 1" , and 1.5" . However most observations (around 98%) occur within

these three sizes; the remaining sizes are combined into a composite base category. The
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 term controls for the premise-level fixed effects, while 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. The

subscripts 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 are indices that correspond to premises and time period (month),
respectively.

3.5 Results & discussion
3.5.1 Model of entire dataset
Models based on equation (3.1) were estimated utilizing all available data; results
are shown in table 3.2. Although not shown, controls for billing month and water delivery
pipe size are employed in all cases.
Because the dependent variable (gallons of water demanded per day) is logtransformed, interpretation of the continuous explanatory variables is relatively
straightforward as is the interpretation of the log-transformed continuous variables. With
regard to the non-logged continuous variables (such as temperature or precipitation), the
estimated coefficients correspond to a percentage change in the water use (gallons per
day) for a one unit change in the variable of interest. Therefore, a one inch increase in
precipitation reduces daily water use by 1.2%, all else equal. Estimated coefficients from
the log-transformed variables represent elasticities. For example, the estimated
coefficient on water price in model 3.1 indicates that a 1% increase in water price will
reduce water demand by 0.53%, all else equal.
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Table 3.2 2SLS regression results (full model)

Variable
lnAvgPrice

Model 3.1
-0.534***
(0.0076)
ToiletPrem
-0.083***
(0.0042)
Washer
-0.060***
(0.0059)
Landscape
-0.100***
(0.0071)
lnIncome
0.568***
(0.0268)
HHsize
-0.009
(0.0122)
BldPermit
0.007***
(0.0001)
Temp
0.010***
(0.00001)
Precip
-0.012***
(0.0004)
Constant
-3.658***
(0.2554)
Obs.
1,575,980
Premises
16,904
2
R
0.280
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Interpretation of the estimated coefficients on the rebate indicators (and in
particular, marginal effects), however, is more complex and are computed according to
Kennedy (1981),
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 = 100 �𝑒𝑒

�𝚥𝚥 −
�𝛿𝛿

�𝚥𝚥 �
� �𝛿𝛿
𝑉𝑉
�
2

− 1�

(3.2)

Where 𝛿𝛿�𝚥𝚥 corresponds to the estimated coefficient on the 𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡ℎ rebate and where 𝑉𝑉� �𝛿𝛿�𝚥𝚥 � is
the estimated variance of the estimated coefficient. Therefore, the effect on the average
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toilet-rebate-receiving premises is 7.9%. On a per premises basis, the average effect of
the qualifying landscaping rebate on water demand is a 9.5% reduction in water demand.
Because the average size of landscaping changes in the dataset is 1,960 square feet, the
average effect on water demand is a reduction of 0.49% per 100 square feet. The receipt
of the washing machine rebate reduces demand by 5.8%. All of these are roughly in line
with the recent results found by Price et al. (2014), in the much larger city of
Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Unlike Arbués et al., (2010), the estimated coefficient on the household size
variable is not significant in model 3.1, while the estimated coefficient on the building
permit variable is positive and significant at a 1% level. In particular, the estimated
coefficient on this variable is interpreted as premises-level water use increasing by 0.7%
for each additional building permit. This general result implies that, all else equal,
relatively newer premises use more water than older premises. As this variable is used to
proxy for housing stock age, this result is somewhat puzzling because one might expect
that relatively newer constructed homes would use less water than older homes; some
empirical analysis has found this to be the case (Brelsford & Abbott, 2017; Ouyang et al.,
2014). This seemingly contradictory result requires additional investigation and will be
discussed further in Section 3.5.3.
The estimated coefficients on temperature and precipitation are significant at a
1% level; the estimated coefficient has the expected (positive) signs for temperature in all
cases and the expected (negative) signs on precipitation. Although the R2 is on the low
side (0.28), a relatively low model fit is likely due to “noisy” data associated with
individual premises-level records. This includes the effects of unbalanced panels,
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premises entering or leaving the dataset at irregular intervals, and idiosyncratic water use
patterns.
Interestingly, rebate-receiving households used more water on average than those
not receiving rebates in each year (2006 to 2015). Table 3.3 shows predicted mean,
standard deviation and, number of observations for premises that received at least one
type of rebate at some point over the ten year period and those that never received a
rebate. Median values are also reported to control for the possibility of outliers. Both the
mean and median values generally trend downward; however, the data imply that
relatively higher water-using premises tend to be attracted to rebates.
Table 3.3 Predicted gallons used per day per premises: non-rebate & rebate comparison

Without rebate
With rebate
Mean Std. Dev. Median Obs.
Mean Std. Dev. Median Obs.
2006 240
94
226
117,716
305
98
305
13,588
2007 215
88
200
133,067
264
92
253
15,504
2008 215
101
201
139,792
269
85
261
16,243
2009 217
81
202
139,839
274
85
254
16,027
2010 202
75
188
143,189
241
77
232
16,136
2011 213
90
197
139,784
258
98
249
15,871
2012 213
152
199
144,963
253
83
239
16,356
2013 187
75
174
151,652
215
73
205
16,834
2014 180
65
170
153,297
202
65
196
16,898
2015 171
62
160
152,340
187
63
179
16,884
Total 204
94
190
1,415,639
245
89
233
160,341
Note: Without rebate subset only includes premises that never received a rebate at any
time. With rebate subset only includes premises that received at least one rebate at any
time.
The reason for the pattern of premises that received rebates for water-saving
Year

technology using relatively more water on average is unclear; however, it is likely that
higher-use premises have more to gain by investing in water saving technology or
xeriscaping precisely because they are higher demand users. In addition, it may be the
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case that lower-water-using households have already installed water saving technology or
a xeriscape yard. However, the present data does not allow for that analysis.
To better characterize responses among different water use cohorts, data were
subsetted based on whether the user was a low, medium, or high water users. Here low
water users were those whose daily use averaged the lowest 25th percentile (less than
124.3 gallons per day); medium users were those whose daily use was between the 25th
and 75th percentile (between 124.3 and 288.4 gallons per day) ; high water users were
those whose daily use averaged over the 75th percentile (more than 288.4 gallons per
day). Estimation proceeds according to equation (3.1) with the focus on estimated price
and income elasticities. Key results are shown in table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Comparison of elasticities subset by low, medium and high volume users

Model 3.2
Model 3.3
Model 3.4
Variable
Low Water Users
Medium Water Users
High Water Users
lnAvgPrice
-0.596***
-0.563***
-0.434***
(0.014)
(0.011)
(0.016)
lnIncome
0.611***
0.559***
0.462***
(0.056)
(0.036)
(0.054)
Obs.
383,218
799,935
392,827
Premises
4,747
8,062
4,095
2
R
0.269
0.293
0.336
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. Low water users used less than 124.3
gallons per day; medium water users used 124.3 gallons to 288.4 gallons on average per
day; high water users used more than 288.4 gallons per day. Price and income elasticities
shown; remaining variables suppressed.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Estimation demonstrates that low water users are less price inelastic than high
water users. In other words, low water users are relatively more impacted by water rate
changes compared to medium and high water users. In addition, low water users are more
income elastic than medium and high water users meaning that a marginal change in
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income will constitute a relatively larger change in water use by low water users. 11
Although data are not available to better understand the composition of each group (i.e.
socioeconomic composition), it stands to reason that the low water-using group is likely
the most economically disadvantaged group. This is inferred because the low water user
group is the most impacted by marginal income changes. Similarly, this group is also
most heavily impacted by water rate changes. If it is indeed true that the low water user
group is indeed the most economically disadvantaged, then water rate changes – and in
particular rate increases – may operate to be regressive. In terms of policy and equity
considerations, the water utility and regulator should investigate how groups are
differentially impacted prior to adjusting water rates.

3.5.2 Subset analysis: rebate models
To further isolate the effects of the rebates, additional regression analyses were
conducted on three data subsets. Only included in each regression were premises from the
original data set that had participated in the toilet, washing machine, and landscape rebate
programs, respectively. Overall, the estimated coefficients on rebates, water price,
temperature and precipitation are highly significant and have the expected signs in all

11

Two things to note are that although the point estimates are nominally different, the 95% confidence
intervals for the price elasticity estimate overlap for the low- and medium- volume users and the 95%
confidence interval overlaps for the income elasticity estimate for the low- and high-volume users.
Specifically, the 95% price elasticity confidence intervals for the low, medium, and high users are: -0.623
to -0.567; -0.583 to -0.541; and -0.464 to -0.404, respectively. The fact that the confidence intervals for the
low and medium users slightly overlap may not be surprising given that there is no definitive data
separation between the two groups (i.e. the cutoff for each group is somewhat arbitrary and they flow into
each other). The 95% income elasticity confidence intervals for the low, medium, and high users are: 0.502
to 0.720; 0.490 to 0.631; and 0.356 to 0.568, respectively. Overlap in the confidence intervals is also
probably unsurprising given that the income data has no spatial variation; in other words, income is not
defined at the premises level. Nevertheless, the key result related to the direction of the nominal estimates
remains and makes consideration of the disparate impacts on various groups an important consideration for
policy makers.
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cases. With regard to temperature and precipitation, estimated coefficient magnitudes are
similar to those shown in the estimation original estimation.
Table 3.5 2SLS regression results (subset model)

Model 3.5
Model 3.6
Model 3.7
Variable
ToiletPrem
Washer
Landscape
Rebate
-0.098***
-0.098***
-0.049***
(0.007)
(0.010)
(0.010)
lnAvgPrice
-0.426***
-0.303***
-0.712***
(0.032)
(0.050)
(0.047)
lnIncome
0.374***
0.644***
0.251
(0.101)
(0.150)
(0.167)
HHsize
-0.146**
-0.207**
-0.01
(0.048)
(0.070)
(0.076)
Temp
0.020***
0.020***
0.020***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Precip
-0.012***
-0.010***
-0.014***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
BldPermit
0.009***
0.008***
0.009***
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Constant
-1.668
-3.689**
-2.335
(0.949)
(1.405)
(1.576)
Obs.
100,870
47,460
34,616
Premises
926
459
328
2
R
0.3504
0.3541
0.4242
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses
Month and MeterSize indicators not shown.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The estimated coefficient (elasticity) on water price in the toilet rebate model
is -0.43 and -0.30 in the washing machine model; both elasticities are similar to those
found in Price et al. (2014): -0.34 for toilet rebates and -0.30 for washing machine rebates
in that case. The estimated coefficient on water price in the landscape model is -0.71,
which makes that group more price elastic than the toilet and washing machine rebate
groups. This result is consistent with prior analyses showing that outdoor water use is
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more responsive to price change than indoor use (Dandy et al., 1997; Lyman, 1992; Price
et al., 2014).
Application of equation (3.2) to the estimated coefficient of the rebate variable in
the toilet rebate model indicates that a premise with a low-flow toilet reduces water use
by 9.3%. This is a stronger effect than the whole model estimation, which was estimated
to be 7.9%. Following the same procedure, the average effect of the qualifying
landscaping change on water demand is a 4.8% reduction in monthly water demand; this
effect is much lower than the one estimated in the whole dataset. Because the average
size of landscaping changes in the dataset is 1,960 square feet, the effect on water
demand is a reduction of 0.24% per 100 square feet. The receipt of the washing machine
rebate reduces demand by 9.3%; this is larger in magnitude than with the whole dataset.
The difference between the computed marginal effects using the entire dataset and
the subsetted models, which were targeted at the individual rebate programs, illustrates
why selecting the proper data subset is important if the particular question of interest is
the impact of the individual (voluntary) rebate programs. To make this point more
concrete, when the entire dataset is used, the control (or base) group includes premises
that never received a rebate at any point in addition to premises that had not yet received
a rebate. As a result, the estimation for the rebate variable of interest is likely to be
imprecise because it is subject to the additional statistical noise resulting from including
the extraneous premises that never participated in the rebate program. However, when the
data are subsetted to only include premises that received a rebate at some point, the
control group is premises that had not yet received a rebate but at some point receive a
rebate. Therefore, the estimated coefficient in the subset analysis for the relevant rebate
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variable more accurately captures the rebate effect, which is the primary goal of this
analysis.
Interestingly, as the number of premises (and observations) decline from 926
(100,870) in the toilet rebate case, to 459 (47,460) in the washing machine rebate case
and 328 (34,161) in the landscape rebate case, the model fit tends to improve (with an R2
of 0.35, 0.35 and 0.42, respectively). This is likely due to increasing homogeneity with
regard to the type of premises that are likely to participate in the various types of rebate
programs.

3.5.3 Subset analysis: premises age
Because premise-level analysis is conducted, it is possible to discern trends based
on when the premises began to receive water from the water utility. A possible
contributor to declining demand is rebalancing of the housing stock such that newer
construction is likely to use less water than relatively older construction all else equal
(Brelsford & Abbott, 2017; Ouyang et al., 2014). To investigate this issue, the data are
subsetted into premises served by EPCOR prior to 2007 and into premises that began
receiving water from EPCOR after 2008. A two-year gap in data (2007 and 2008) is used
to ensure temporal separation between subsets. In addition, estimation is confined to the
84-month period from January 2009 to December 2015 in an effort to compare periods
where premises in both data subsets were present.
Most premises in the analysis existed in 2006 at the start of the series and only an
additional 10% was added over the period from 2009-2015; however, estimation results
suggest group differences with older premises appearing to be relatively more price
elastic than newer premises and older premise being relatively less income elastic than
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newer premises. In addition, although washing machine and landscaping rebates
significantly reduced water demand for both older and newer premises, toilet-rebate
premises only significantly reduced demand in older premises. Based on the estimations
results, table 3.6 shows estimated water demand for each subset.
Table 3.6 Gallons used per day per premises: prior to 2007 versus post-2008

Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total

Mean
219
203
215
212
188
180
169
198

In dataset prior to 2007
Obs.
Std. Dev. Median
65
210
149,907
60
197
150,780
76
202
145,764
108
199
148,682
64
179
151,374
53
174
150,884
50
165
149,242
73
190
1,046,633

Entered dataset post-2008
Obs.
Mean Std. Dev. Median
219
141
160
1,136
229
141
172
3,623
247
161
189
5,401
260
159
196
7,705
228
141
174
11,299
211
126
160
13,377
199
120
153
14,199
223
139
170
56,740

It is clear that premises in the dataset prior to 2007 and premises that entered after
2008 both experienced declining water demand over the period from 2009 to 2015.
However, it is also true that premise-level demand, in terms of average gallons per day, is
lower for pre-2007 premises, indicating that relatively newer premises use more water
than older premises. This result is inconsistent with the expectation that newer premises
tend to be more water-efficient than older premises, but it explains the positive
coefficient on the estimated building permit (BldPermit) variable seen in model 3.1. On
the other hand, water use for the median premises is relatively lower for the new
premises, implying that outliers in the new premises group are likely pulling up the
average. The contradictory results, and the fact that average use does not conform to
expectations, indicates a need for better understanding the idiosyncratic characteristics of
each premises, such as number of bathrooms, lot or premises size, etc.; in this case, the
data are not available for that type of premises-level detail.
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3.6 Cost effectiveness of rebate programs
While it is clear that each rebate program reduces the quantity of water demanded,
less clear is cost-effectiveness of each program. Given constrained budgets, evaluating
the cost-effectiveness of rebate programs is a critical element to effective municipal water
demand management. In order to rank the effectiveness of this type of rebate program, at
least with regard to cost effectiveness from the perspective of the utility, Fane & White
(2003) and Price et al. (2014) suggest the use of the following levelized cost formula,
Ckn
(1 + r)n
Levelized cost =
Skn
∑
(1 + r)n
∑

(3.3)

In this case, levelized cost is given as the present value of costs divided by the present
value of water conserved. Here Ckn denotes the cost of rebate-type k in year n, Skn the

annual volume reduction in water demand resulting from rebate-type k in year n, and r is

the annual discount rate. Because the purpose of the assessment is to compare the relative
cost-effectiveness of rebate programs and not absolute cost-effectiveness, it is assumed
that the nominal value for water reduction is USD1 at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0. In addition, note that

this calculation does not take into consideration the cost outlays by the consumer for the
purchase of water saving technologies (or landscaping changes) nor does it account for
reduced payments by the consumer for the purchase of water that accrue due to lowered
water demand. Rather, the levelized cost calculation only contemplates the utility’s
outlays for qualifying rebates and the water saved due to reduced demand.
Marginal effects, based on the estimated coefficients and standard errors from
equation 3.1, are computed from the appropriate rebate outcomes presented in table 3.5
(i.e. subset analysis). However, in the case of toilet rebates, data type and availability
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make it impossible to accurately compute the marginal effect of a single installation; in
particular, the premises-level effect is likely inaccurate because the average premises
received more than one rebated toilet. This problem is mitigated somewhat because it is
probable that the first toilet installation provides the greatest water use reduction since it
is likely replacing the most frequently used or most inefficient toilet. And as Price et al.
(2014) found, the marginal benefit of the second toilet rebate was much lower than the
marginal benefit of the first toilet rebate.
Therefore, in order to improve the accuracy of this assessment, the estimated
impact of the first toilet rebate is computed as follows. First, because the average rebatereceiving premises received 1.8 toilet rebates, or 90% of 2.0 toilet rebates, the marginal
1

effect calculation is inflated by 11.1% (i.e. 0.9) to arrive at a likely marginal effect

assuming that premises received a full 2.0 toilet rebates. Price et al. (2014) provides
estimated water demand reductions for the first and second toilet installation, in this case:
37.98 gallons per day for the first installation and a total reduction of 46.87 gallons per
day for the first and second installation. Therefore, the first toilet accounts for
approximately 81% of impact for the first and second toilet installation. This percentage
is applied to the computed marginal effect in order to better estimate the impact of a the
first toilet. It is important to note that the reported results therefore assume that the
relative impact of first and subsequent toilet use in Clovis is similar to the relative impact
in Albuquerque.
Change in daily water use is computed by applying the marginal impact to mean
estimated water use for each premise prior to obtaining the rebate. Rebate value is the
rebate amount paid by EPCOR per device: USD150 for toilets and washing machines and
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USD 40 per 100 ft2 converted to xeriscape. Device lifespan is assumed to be 25 years for
a toilet, 12 years for a washing machine (Gleick, 2003a), and 25 years for xeriscape
(Price et al., 2014). Outcomes are given under the assumption of 5%, 7% and 10% rates
of interest. While 10% rates of interest are high, this rate is included to show how high
the rate must be before a washing machine rebate begins to overtake the toilet rebate as
the most cost effective. Results are shown in table 3.7.
Table 3.7 Change in water use due to low-flow device and levelized cost
Marginal
Change in
Rebate
Device
Cost
effect
water use
value per lifespan
r=5%
per
(gal/day)
device
(years)
(USD per
Rebate
device
(USD)
1000
(percent)
gal.)
ToiletPrem
Washer
Landscape
(100 ft2)

-8.36
-9.21

-31.74
-37.70

150
150

25
12

0.87
1.17

-0.24

-0.98

40

25

7.55

Cost r=7% Cost
(USD per r=10%
1000 gal.) (USD
per
1000
gal.)
1.04
1.30
1.28
1.45
8.96

11.19

Notes: Marginal effects computed by applying equation (3.2) to estimated coefficients in
model 3.1. Change in water use computed by applying marginal effects per device to the mean
water use prior to receipt of water rebate.

The results suggest that on a device-by-device comparison, washing machine
rebates are more effective at reducing water use than toilet rebates and both toilet rebates
and washing machine rebates are more effective at reducing water use than the average
premises that received a 1960 ft2 landscaping rebate. Given the rebate prices and the
respective expected lifespans, the most cost effective rebate type is the toilet rebate
which, at a 5% discount rate, costs less than USD 1.00 per every 1,000 gallons of water
conserved. 12
12

A related issue that is not directly considered here, but is discussed in Appendix 3.4, is the notion of peak
day demand. Peak day demand corresponds to the highest, or peak, demand in a particular year and
typically occurs in the summer months. Since landscaping changes are likely to reduce water use primarily
in the summer months – when the peak day is likely to occur – it may be the case that landscaping rebates
are undervalued in this analysis in terms of cost-effectiveness.
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In contrast, washing machine rebates cost about 20% more than toilet rebates at
just under USD 1.20 per 1,000 gallons conserved. Although washing machine rebates are
more effective than toilet rebates in terms of reducing water use, the expected lifespan of
only 12 years make those rebates more costly per volume conserved. Landscaping rebates
are significantly more expensive per volume conserved.

3.7 Conclusion
This analysis investigated factors contributing to declining water demand in
Clovis, New Mexico, a small but growing municipality that has an arid climate and
depends on the dwindling southern Ogallala aquifer. While Clovis is the focus of our case
study, its experience can be used as a benchmark for other small to mid-sized
municipalities in the region that may also be confronting declining demand, a changing
climate, are dependent on rapidly dwindling groundwater supplies, and that do not have
sufficient resources or population bases to enhance supplies. While this appears to be a
very particular set of characteristics, Clovis’ experience is far from unique for many
municipalities that sit atop of the declining Ogallala. We argue that detailed
understanding of the effects of various demand-side factors will be especially critical for
these municipalities going forward, and cannot just be the purview of large-scale water
utilities; hence the need for detailed case studies.
With regard to rebates for water-saving technology, results indicate that rebate
programs successfully reduce premises-level water use. Overall, after controlling for
confounding factors such as temperature and precipitation, the installation of a rebated
toilet reduced water use by an average of nearly 32 gallons per day, installation of a water
saving washing machine reduced water use by an average of about 38 gallons per day,
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and an average household receiving a landscaping rebate saved 19 gallons per day. While
it might be surprising that landscaping rebates save so little water, it is likely due to the
fact that irrigation only takes place in part of the year; washing machines and toilets, on
the other hand, are used year-round.
In addition, this analysis confirmed that water demand is price inelastic at current
prices in Clovis; however, elasticity varies depending on which data are studied, with
data subsets based on rebate type experiencing different levels of (in)elasticity. Elasticity
for the entire dataset, as well as those households that did not receive a rebate, was
around 0.50. When the data is subset to only include premises that received toilet or
washing machine rebates, price becomes relatively more inelastic; however, premises that
received landscaping rebates, while still price inelastic, were much less so, indicating the
relative ease at which premises can reduce their outdoor water consumption in the face of
price increases.
Given the likely effects of climate change (e.g. longer more prolonged droughts,
Deser et al., 2014; Gutzler & Robbins, 2011), this analysis confirmed that climate plays
an important role in influencing water demand; as the temperature increases water use
increases and as precipitation increases, water use declines. This result provides useful
information which can be brought to bear in times of high temperature or low
precipitation, such as the period from 2011 to 2014 when Clovis experienced prolonged
drought. In general, income variables show that water is a normal good – as income
increases, water demand increases.
It is important to note that this analysis only looks at part of the story. Building
upgrades, such as pipe and plumbing replacement and new efficient building practices
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may also play a role in reducing water demand, but the data in this analysis lacks the
richness to fully investigate this issue. Causing additional confusion is the subset analysis
that showed that the mean premises built prior to 2007 used relatively less water than the
mean premises built after 2008, while the median behavior shows the opposite. Further
research could be devoted to better understating the premises-level characteristics that are
likely driving this result. In addition, changes to preferences, or an increasing desire of
the population to conserve, may also play a role in declining demand. Future work could
include an assessment of some of those factors. For example, panel or repeated cross
section surveying methods may be used to uncover true household-level responses. In
addition, improved accuracy with regard to spatial scale, especially with regard to
vegetation, could better pinpoint landscaping changes and its impact on water use.
Although the cost of the washing machine rebate and the toilet rebate is the same
(USD 150), toilet rebates are the most cost effective rebate program of the three
programs. However, as the discount rate increases to around 10%, the washing machine
begins to approach the toilet rebate program in terms of cost effectiveness. Despite
initially appearing to be inexpensive (USD 0.40 per ft2), landscaping rebates are the most
expensive per unit of water conserved. This implies that toilet rebates should generally be
prioritized before washing machine rebates and both should be prioritized before
landscaping rebate. However, it is important to note that it is not uncommon for premises
that received landscaping rebates to have already participated in other rebate programs.
So if a water user has a relatively high propensity to participate in rebate program and
they have already received a toilet or washing machine rebate, the landscaping rebate
program may be the only way to significantly reduce that user’s actual demand.
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Furthermore, it is important to note that the analysis really only considered the
cost-effectiveness from the standpoint of the utility and did not consider the rebate type
that is most attractive to the consumer. In general, one would expect that toilets are likely
to be less costly than qualifying washing machines (and also landscaping changes), so
toilet changes are likely to be the most attractive to consumers, strictly in terms of cost
savings.
It is clear that rebates for water-saving technology induce water savings by water
users. However, from the utility’s perspective, a question remains as to why it would
subsidize the purchase of products that effectively reduce the demand for the product that
it sells (namely, water). Therefore, the Chapter 4 introduces a theoretical justification for
the provision of rebates for water-saving technology. Additionally, a model is developed
demonstrating some of the tradeoffs that a utility faces when deciding to engage in that
type of problem. Finally, an empirical model is developed that may be used to test
whether utilities participating in water rebate programs are behaving optimally.
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Appendix 3.1 Recent studies estimating price and income elasticity
Author

Study
Location

Estimated
Price
Elasticity of
Demand
-0.12 to -0.37

Clarke et al.,
2017

Tucson,
Arizona, USA

Brelsford &
Abbott, 2017

Las Vegas,
Nevada, USA

O’Donnell &
Berrens, 2017

Clovis, New
Mexico, USA

-0.29 to -0.53

Hung et al., 2017

Taipei, Taiwan

-0.23 to -0.45

Cabral et al.,
2017

Nuevo León,
Mexico

-0.40 to -0.60

AlmendarezHernández et al.,
2016

El Vizcaino
Biosphere
Reserve,
Mexico

Short run:
-0.26 to -0.28
Long run:
-0.67 to -0.71

Ghavidelfar et
al., 2016

Auckland, New
Zealand

Short run:
-0.14
Long Run:
-0.12

Mieno &
Brozović, 2016

Southwestern
Nebraska, USA

-0.12 to -0.76

Ghimire et al.,
2016

Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma,
USA

-0.38 to -0.66
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Estimated
Empirical
Income
Methodology or
Elasticity of Innovation
Demand
Stone Geary model,
investigating
seasonal elasticities
Decomposition of
drivers of declining
demand using
Gelbach (2016)
0.57 to 0.83 Spatial fixed effects
instrumental variable
estimation
0.23
Agent-based
modeling using
Stone Geary model
0.12 to 0.16 Understanding
residential price
perception under
increasing block rates
using Shin (1985)
Short run:
Understanding short0.10 to 0.13 and long-run
Long run:
residential price
0.27 to 0.29 elasticities using
Shin (1985)
Multifamily (highrise) residence
analysis using
cointigration & error
correction models
Examination of
biased price elasticity
estimation for
irrigator groundwater
consumption
0.28 to 0.30 Two-stage least
squares model with
random effects used
to assess effects of
drought and
seasonality

Author

Study
Location

Ashoori et al.,
2016

Los Angeles,
California,
USA
Municipalities
in North
Carolina, USA

Wichman et al.,
2016

Estimated
Price
Elasticity of
Demand
Negative

-0.15 to -0.30

Zuo et al., 2016

Murray-Darling -0.53 to -0.69
Basin, Australia

Fullerton Jr. et
al., 2016

El Paso, Texas,
USA

-0.32

Ben Zaied &
Binet, 2015

Tunisia

Lee &
Tanverakul,
2015

East Los
Angeles and
South San
Francisco,
California,
USA
Palestinian
West Bank

Short run:
-0.07 to -0.37
Long run:
-1.95
-0.22 to -0.44

Galaitsi et al.,
2015

Yoo et al., 2014

Phoenix,
Arizona, USA

Estimated
Income
Elasticity of
Demand
Ambiguous
based on
user type

0.08 to 0.23

-0.19 to -0.37

Short run:
-0.66
Long run:
-1.16
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0.14 to 0.58

Empirical
Methodology or
Innovation
Analysis of water
demand by water
user type
Assessment of
demand
responsiveness to
prescriptive versus
price strategies using
fixed effects
instrumental variable
approach
Combination of
irrigator stated and
revealed preference
data to estimate
elasticities given
different water
entitlement types
Development of
municipal water
demand forecasting
model
Seasonal and nonseasonal modeling
using cointigration
analysis
Comparison of price
responsiveness in
two California cities
with different pricing
structures
Household survey
methodology
focusing on water
security
A difference in
consumption design
with direct measures
of price

Author

Study
Location

Estimated
Price
Elasticity of
Demand
-0.12 to -1.83

Klaiber et al.,
2014

Phoenix,
Arizona, USA

Price et al., 2014

Albuquerque,
New Mexico,
USA

-0.28 to -0.48

Ouyang et al.,
2014

Phoenix,
Arizona, USA

-0.04

Binet et al., 2014

Réunion
(French
Territory)

-0.31

Baerenklau et al., Western
2014
Riverside
County,
California,
USA
Romano et al.,
Key town in
2014
Italian
provinces

-0.76

Sebri, 2014b

N/A

-0.37

Porcher, 2014

Municipalities
in France

-0.22 to -0.60

(Brelsford &
Abbott, 2017)

Chapel Hill,
North Carolina,
USA
Taipei, Taiwan

-0.43 to -1.14

Hung & Chie,
2013

Negative

-0.22 to -0.61
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Estimated
Empirical
Income
Methodology or
Elasticity of Innovation
Demand
A quasi-experimental
research approach
using a difference in
consumption design
to assess seasonal
effects, climate
conditions, and water
use
Evaluation of lowflow appliances and
demand-side water
management
0.19 to 0.34 Analysis of demand
on multiple spatial
scales
0.25
Updated version of
Shin (1985) to
estimate water price
perceptions
0.16
Investigation of
increasing block rate
structure on
residential water
demand
Positive, but Linear mixed-effects
small
model estimated
using maximum
likelihood methods
0.21
Meta-analysis from
2002 to 2012
Fixed effects
regression to estimate
welfare changes
Difference in
difference approach
Proposal for using
augmented price
signal to resolve
conflicting
residential uses

Author

Study
Location

Polycarpou &
Zachariadis,
2013

Urban Cyprus

Worthington &
Hoffman, 2008

N/A

Dalhuisen et al.,
2003

N/A

Espey et al.,
1997

N/A

Estimated
Price
Elasticity of
Demand
-0.25 to -0.45

Estimated
Income
Elasticity of
Demand
0.53 to 0.75

Short run: 0.0
to -0.5
Long run:
-0.5 to -1.0
-0.41 (mean)
-0.35
(median)
-0.51

Positive and
less than
unity
0.43 (mean)
0.24
(median)

Note: Short run elasticities are displayed unless stated otherwise
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Empirical
Methodology or
Innovation
Novel geographic
analysis; assessment
of effect of
interrupted supply on
demand
Review of literature

Meta-analysis from
1963 to 2001
Meta-analysis from
1967 to 1993

Appendix 3.2 Robustness checks
Variations of equation (3.4) were estimated in an effort to also include explanatory
variables VegIndex and PDSI.
lnWU𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1 lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝐵𝐵2 Temp𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵3 Precip𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝐵𝐵4 lnIncome𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵5 HHsize𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵6 VegIndex𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3.4)

3

+ 𝐵𝐵7 BldPermit 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵8 PDSI𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 Rebate𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
11

3

𝑘𝑘=1

𝑙𝑙=1

𝑗𝑗=1

+ � 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 Month𝑘𝑘 + � 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 MeterSize𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
Specifically, four models were estimated: model 3.1 (i.e. the same model 3.1
estimated in the main text) controls for water price, rebate type, household income and
size, building permits in the city, and temperature and precipitation. Model 3.7 also
includes controls for PDSI; model 3.8 is the same as model 3.1 but also controls for
vegetation index values; model 3.9 controls for both PDSI and vegetation index. The
number of observations (and premises) declines when moving from model 3.1 to 3.8
because only eight years of vegetation index data were available (whereas ten years of
data was available for other series). Nevertheless, estimated coefficients, in terms of
signs, levels and significance are generally similar across most models. Because
VegIndex and PDSI were found to correlate to temperature and precipitation, the focus
will be on those variables.
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Table 3.8 2SLS regression results (full model including VegIndex and PDSI)

Variable
lnAvgPrice
ToiletPrem
Washer
Landscape
lnIncome
HHsize
BldPermit
Temp
Precip
PDSI

Model 3.1
-0.534***
(0.0076)
-0.083***
(0.0042)
-0.060***
(0.0059)
-0.100***
(0.0071)
0.568***
(0.0268)
-0.009
(0.0122)
0.007***
(0.0001)
0.010***
(0.00001)
-0.012***
(0.0004)

Model 3.8
-0.584***
(0.0074)
-0.080***
(0.0041)
-0.060***
(0.0058)
-0.094***
(0.0071)
0.301***
(0.0264)
0.067***
(0.0123)
0.006***
(0.0001)
0.010***
(0.00001)
0.005***
(0.0008)
-0.018***
(0.0003)

VegIndex

Model 3.9
-0.448***
(0.0084)
-0.079***
(0.0049)
-0.048***
(0.0069)
-0.009
(0.0114)
0.387***
(0.0295)
0.055***
(0.0134)
0.004***
(0.0001)
0.010***
(0.00002)
-0.006***
(0.0007)

Model 3.10
-0.494***
(0.0083)
-0.078***
(0.0049)
-0.048***
(0.0068)
-0.019
(0.0113)
0.064*
(0.0296)
0.029*
(0.0134)
0.004***
(0.0001)
0.010***
(0.00002)
0.005***
(0.0008)
-0.015***
(0.0003)
0.000
(0.0001)
2.111***
(0.2862)
1,173,761
15,533
0.265

-0.001***
(0.0001)
Constant
-3.658***
-2.111***
-1.114***
(0.2554)
(0.2862)
(0.2827)
Obs.
1,575,980
1,575,980
1,173,761
Premises
16,904
16,904
15,533
2
R
0.280
0.292
0.254
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

The estimated coefficients have the expected (positive) signs, levels of significance,
and magnitudes for temperature in all cases. However, the expected (negative) signs on
precipitation are present only in models 3.1 and 3.9. The common denominator in models
3.8 and 3.9, however, is the inclusion of PDSI, which is likely causing the sign to flip due
to the expected correlation between precipitation and PDSI. Therefore, either PDSI or
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precipitation should be chosen as explanatory variables, but not both. Because of the
straightforward nature of the precipitation variable, the present analysis prefers
precipitation over PDSI.
To further isolate the effect of rebate programs on water demand, an additional
regressor (RebateControl) is introduced that controls for the presence of other rebates.
For example, the toilet rebate subset is based on premises that received a toilet rebate;
however, an indicator is assigned to that premises if they participated in an additional
rebate program (i.e. washing machine or landscaping). This step is undertaken because
the presence of additional rebate programs could conceivably bias the estimated rebate
coefficient.
Applying equation (3.2) from the full analysis renders marginal effects similar to
those already reported. According to the toilet rebate model, the average premises with a
low-flow toilet reduces water use by 9.3%. On a per premises basis, the average effect of
the qualifying landscaping change on water demand is a 4.7% reduction in water demand.
Because the average size of landscaping changes in the dataset is 1960 square feet, the
effect on water demand is a reduction of 0.24% per 100 ft2. The receipt of the washing
machine rebate reduced demand by 9.2%.
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Table 3.9 2SLS regression results (sub-model: rebate type and additional control)

Variable
Rebate
RebateControl
lnAvgPrice
lnIncome
HHsize
Temp
Precip
BldPermit
Constant
Obs.
Premises

Model 3.14
ToiletPrem
-0.097***
(0.007)
-0.036***
(0.009)
-0.411***
(0.032)
0.368***
(0.101)
-0.141**
(0.048)
0.020***
(0.000)
-0.012***
(0.002)
0.009***
(0.000)
-1.538
(0.952)
100,870
926

Model 3.15
Washer
-0.097***
(0.010)
-0.044***
(0.012)
-0.278***
(0.051)
0.633***
(0.150)
-0.195**
(0.070)
0.020***
(0.000)
-0.010***
(0.002)
0.008***
(0.001)
-3.467*
(1.410)
47,460
459

Model 3.16
Landscape
-0.048***
(0.010)
-0.040**
(0.013)
-0.690***
(0.048)
0.24
(0.167)
0.003
(0.076)
0.020***
(0.000)
-0.014***
(0.003)
0.009***
(0.001)
-2.111
(1.579)
34,616
328

R2
0.3479
0.3497
0.4226
Standard errors reported in parentheses
Month and MeterSize indicators not shown.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All other estimated coefficients are also generally similar to the full model. In
addition, the estimated coefficient on the RebateControl indicator is negative and
significant (at a 5% level or better) indicating that households engaging in more than one
rebate program reduce their water use by an additional amount due to that program. That
outcome is probably not surprising given the results shown in the original estimation.
While the previous models provide insight into the behavior of rebate-receiving
premises, they clearly do not explain the behavior of premises that did not receive

108

rebates. Table 3.12 shows the results from estimations that only include premises that did
not receive any type of rebate. While there are fewer regressors (because no premises
received a rebate), remaining estimated coefficients are similar to those from the full
model.
Table 3.10 2SLS regression results (sub-model: no rebates)

Variable
lnAvgPrice

Model 3.17
-0.544***
(0.008)
lnIncome
0.587***
(0.028)
HHsize
0.0034
(0.013)
Temp
0.010***
(0.000)
Precip
-0.012***
(0.001)
BldPermit
0.007***
(0.000)
Constant
-4.119***
(0.269)
Obs.
1,415,639
Premises
15,394
2
R
0.273
Standard errors reported in parentheses
Month and MeterSize indicators not shown.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Of particular interest is that the estimated coefficient on the price variable are
negative and in the neighborhood of 0.50. Like the other models, this implies inelastic
demand, although that figure makes non-rebate premises relatively more price elastic
than premises receiving toilet or washing machine rebates and less price elastic than
premises receiving landscaping rebates.
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Appendix 3.3 Spatial panel econometric analysis
While spatial effects have been acknowledged to impact demand (Brelsford and
Abbott 2017), and spatial panels used to assess water utilization efficiency (Sun et al.,
2014), only static spatial demand analysis has been undertaken (de Maria André &
Carvalho, 2014). Using monthly municipal consumption data (2006-2015) in Clovis,
New Mexico, this analysis applies spatial panel econometrics to water demand
estimation, and compares to non-spatial estimations. Results inform future empirical
strategies as well as future data collection requirements.

Appendix 3.3.1: Data and modeling approach
As shown in table 3.12, monthly premises-level data on water use (2006-2015)
were provided by EPCOR, Clovis’ water utility, as were rebate and price data. Average
unit price was computed and adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index.
County-level monthly average temperature and precipitation data was obtained from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. County-level median income
estimates from the American Community Survey were used.
Table 3.11 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Variable
Description
Period

Unit

Mean

Std. dev.

Source

WU

Average daily household water use

Month

Gallons

190.6

2.75

EPCOR

AvgPrice
ToiletPrem
Washer
Landscape

Average water price
Toilet rebate indicator
Washing machine rebate indicator
Landscape rebate indicator
Average household income in
county
Average monthly temperature
Average total monthly precipitation

Month
Month
Month
Month

$/Gallons
1/0
1/0
1/0

0.002
0.03
0.02
0.01

1.54
0.18
0.13
0.08

Annual

Dollars

40,945

1.02

Month
Month

Fahrenheit
Inches

56.80
1.28

14.86
1.44

EPCOR
EPCOR
EPCOR
EPCOR
US Census
(ACS)
NOAA
NOAA

Income
Temp
Precip
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A fixed effects instrumental variable (FEIV) approach at the premises and Census
block group levels is employed. Instrumental variable estimation is undertaken to
remove bias from price endogeneity (Arbués et al., 2004). Spatial weights matrices are
constructed based on the nearest 2, 3, and 4 neighbors and are applied in spatial
estimations.
Estimation follows:
lnWU𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1 lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝐵𝐵2 Temp𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵3 Precip𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3

11

𝑗𝑗=1

𝑘𝑘=1

(3.5)

+ 𝐵𝐵4 lnIncome𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 Rebate𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + � 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 Month𝑘𝑘 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

lnWU is logged monthly water consumption. 𝐵𝐵0 to 𝐵𝐵5 are estimated coefficients.

lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) , is lagged water price (Arbués et al., 2010). 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 corresponds to premise

receipt of one or more available rebates. 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 is the coefficient on month (December base).

𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 controls for fixed effects; 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 are indices for location and time
period, respectively.

Rewritten in matrix form:
lnWU = (𝜄𝜄 𝑇𝑇 ⊗ 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 )𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝜀𝜀

(3.6)

lnWU is a vector if size (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 x 1), stacked by location, 𝑁𝑁, and then time period, 𝑇𝑇. ⊗

represents the Kronecker Product, 𝜄𝜄 𝑇𝑇 is a ones vector sized 𝑇𝑇, 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 is an (𝑁𝑁 x 𝑁𝑁) identity

matrix; 𝜄𝜄𝑇𝑇 ⊗ 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 = 𝜄𝜄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 x 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) matrix; 𝛼𝛼 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 x 1) vector of fixed effects. 𝑋𝑋 is

a (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 x 𝐾𝐾) matrix; 𝐾𝐾 is the number of non-endogenous explanatory variables; 𝛽𝛽 is a

(𝐾𝐾 x 1) vector of estimated coefficients. 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 x 1) vector of price, with
estimated coefficient 𝜑𝜑. 𝜀𝜀 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 x 1) vector of residuals, 𝜀𝜀 ~ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼[0, 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ].
Simplifying:
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lnWU = 𝜄𝜄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 + 𝜀𝜀

(3.7)

𝑍𝑍 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 x (𝐾𝐾 + 1)) matrix; 𝑍𝑍 = [𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑋] and 𝛿𝛿 is a �(𝐾𝐾 + 1) x 1� vector of
coefficients.

Equation (3.8) illustrates the spatial lag model:
lnWU = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 WU + 𝜄𝜄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 + 𝜀𝜀

(3.8)

𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 x 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) spatial weights matrix for 𝑁𝑁 locations across 𝑇𝑇 periods. 𝜆𝜆 is an

estimated spatial lag coefficient and 𝜀𝜀 ~ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼[0, 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ]. Failure to account for spatial lag

can lead to biased and inconsistent estimation (Anselin et al., 2008; Elhorst, 2010).

In (3.9), the error structure is given by 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝜀𝜀, where 𝜌𝜌 is estimated, plus 𝑢𝑢;

𝑢𝑢~𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼[0, 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ]. Spatial error leads to inefficient estimation (Anselin et al., 2008;
Elhorst, 2010).

lnWU = 𝜄𝜄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 + 𝜀𝜀

(3.9)

𝜀𝜀 = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝜀𝜀 + 𝑢𝑢

If neither spatial lag nor spatial error exists estimation simplifies to (3.5).
Several methods of panel balancing were considered including multiple
imputation, deletion, and temporal and geographical aggregation. Due to a large amount
of missing data, imputation and deletion methods were discarded. Estimation was
undertaken by averaging key variables across Census block groups while retaining all
time periods producing a 3,960 x3,960 weights matrix (33 block groups, 120 months).
Census block estimation was disregarded due to missing data and high computational
requirements. Centroids were computed for each block group and spatial weights
matrices were computed for the nearest two, three, and four neighbors (𝑘𝑘 = 2, 𝑘𝑘 =
3, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘 = 4).
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The splm package in R is used to estimate spatial models (Kapoor et al., 2007;
Millo and Piras, 2012). The spgm command accounts for endogenous price (Millo &
Piras, 2012). Although Akaike’s information criterion is typically the preferred measure
of model fit for spatial models, an R2 measure according to Elhorst (2010) is instead
computed for consistency and to facilitate comparability with non-spatial models.

Appendix 3.3.2: Results and discussion
As shown in table 3.13, FEIV estimation in models 3.1 and 3.15 provide baselines
for comparing spatial models (3.16-3.20). Fixed effects are applied in spatial models as
the Hausman specification test was rejected in the lag model (𝜒𝜒 2 = 41.8, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01);

although not rejected in the error model (𝜒𝜒 2 = 1.1, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.999), fixed effects were

retained for comparability. Lagrange Multiplier tests for spatial dependence could not
rule out the presence of either spatial error or spatial lag (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 217.2, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =
248.1, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01, respectively).

Price is negative (inelastic) and significant in models 3.1 and 3.15, which is

consistent with prior research (Sebri, 2014) and significant in all cases except model A14
(positive but insignificant). Estimated coefficients on rebate variables are negative
implying that they decrease demand; however, coefficients, especially on ToiletPrem are
insignificant in models 3.15-3.18. lnIncome is positive and significant in nearly every
case and the temperature and precipitation variables retain the expected signs and are
significant in most cases.
The spatial lag parameter, 𝜆𝜆, is positive in all cases, nominally increases with 𝑘𝑘

and is statistically significant when 𝑘𝑘 = 3 and 𝑘𝑘 = 4. Similarly, the spatial error
coefficient, 𝜌𝜌, increases with 𝑘𝑘. R2 in models 3.1 and 3.15 are 0.280 and 0.581,
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respectively. Improved fit in model 3.15 is likely due to data aggregation which reduces
noise, but may limit accuracy; e.g., ToiletPrem which is insignificant in the model 3.15.
R2 in the spatial error models is about 0.630, whereas it ranges from 0.652 to 0.963 and
increases with 𝑘𝑘 in the spatial lag estimations.

The spatial lag effect dominates other explanatory variables as 𝑘𝑘 increases. Price

loses significance when 𝑘𝑘 = 4, and given the weight of evidence suggesting significant
inelastic demand (Sebri, 2014), spatial lag estimation is difficult to justify. Spatial

proximity may be correlated with factors impacting demand and overshadowing other
meaningful signals. Spatial dependence may explain demand because each location
confronts similar factors.

Appendix 3.3.3 Conclusion
Although spatial panel analysis has been understudied in a water demand,
diagnostics suggest that demand is subject to spatial error and lag. Controlling for spatial
error produces estimates similar to the analogous non-spatial analysis. Although spatial
lag models appear to fit well, given reduced statistical significance of key variables, there
is little justification for spatial lag estimation in this context. This is especially true where
premises are subject to similar exogenous factors such as climate and pricing.
Furthermore, due to data constraints such as incomplete panels and high computational
requirements in panel spatial estimation, the benefits may not outweigh the costs of
losing the additional detail from a more fine-grained premises-level analysis.
Nevertheless, if data are only available at relatively large geographic scales, testing and
controlling for spatial effects, and particularly spatial error, is prudent.
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Table 3.12 FEIV and spatial models

Variable
lnAvgPrice
ToiletPrem
Washer
Landscape
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lnIncome
Temp
Precip
𝜆𝜆

Model 3.1
FEIV
PremisesLevel
-0.534***
(0.0076)
-0.083***
(0.0042)
-0.060***
(0.0059)
-0.100***
(0.0071)
0.568***
(0.0268)
0.010***
(0.0001)
-0.012***
(0.0004)

Model 3.15
FEIV

Model 3.15 Model 3.16 Model 3.17 Model 3.18 Model 3.19 Model 3.20
Spatial Lag Spatial Error Spatial Lag Spatial Error Spatial Lag Spatial Error

Block Group
-0.406***
(0.0386)
-0.123
(0.1061)
-0.613***
(0.1567)
-0.937***
(0.1697)
0.829***
(0.1415)
0.011***
(0.0009)
-0.012***
(0.0028)

𝑘𝑘 = 2
-0.407***
-0.392***
(0.0967)
(0.0423)
-0.107
-0.156
(0.1140)
(0.1047)
-0.595***
-0.683***
(0.1601)
(0.1570)
-0.921***
-0.864***
(0.1698)
(0.1688)
0.806***
0.829***
(0.1744)
(0.1704)
0.010***
0.011***
(0.0016)
(0.0011)
-0.011***
-0.012***
(0.0034)
(0.0034)
0.021
(0.1337)
0.183
3,960
3,960

𝜌𝜌
1,575,980
N
3,960
2
0.280
R (FEIV)
0.581
R2 (Spatial)
0.652
0.631
Standard errors reported in parentheses
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

𝑘𝑘 = 3
-0.285***
-0.389***
(0.0823)
(0.0445)
-0.152
-0.148
(0.1112)
(0.1046)
-0.659***
-0.769***
(0.1628)
(0.1531)
-0.856***
-0.814***
(0.1739)
(0.1700)
0.635***
0.821***
(0.1705)
(0.1838)
0.008***
0.011***
(0.0015)
(0.0012)
-0.010***
-0.012***
(0.0032)
(0.0036)
0.227**
(0.1146)
0.246
3,960
3,960
0.776

0.630

𝑘𝑘 = 4
0.0358
-0.383***
(0.0924)
(0.0471)
-0.268**
-0.176*
(0.1215)
(0.1031)
-0.836***
-0.738***
(0.1794)
(0.1490)
-0.670***
-0.722***
(0.1933)
(0.1650)
0.229
0.826***
(0.1888)
(0.2004)
0.003**
0.011***
(0.0016)
(0.0013)
-0.001
-0.011**
(0.0036)
(0.0039)
0.738***
(0.1309)
0.321
3,960
3,960
0.963

0.630

Appendix 3.4 Peak Day Demand Estimation
In this analysis, peak day demand volume is estimated. One peak day data point
per year was provided and regression analysis was conducted. Several variables, and sets
of variables, were tested to determine which fit best. Tested variables included
temperature, precipitation, Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), Atlantic Multidecadal
Oscillation (AMO), Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI), Palmer Drought Hydrologic
Index (PDHI) and others. The more ‘exotic’ series like PDO and PDSI were tested
because it was hoped that those series could be leveraged several months prior to the
peak day volume in order to prepare well in advance; however, in most cases those series
produced relatively poor fit. The variables that tended to fit best were straightforward
temperature and precipitation variables. The upshot is that those variables are fairly
contemporaneous, intuitive, and easy to defend.
Volume
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Figure 3.4 Peak day volume in each year (1987-2015)

Variations of the following model are estimated:
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡
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(3.10)

Where 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 is peak demand volume, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is the sum of precipitation over the prior

six months (in inches), 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is average temperature over the last fourteen days (in

Fahrenheit), 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇is a trend series beginning in 1987 through 2015 (1-29), 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼is

a dummy variable indicating 2013 to 2015, which experienced sharp declines in peak day
demand. 𝛽𝛽0, 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, 𝜏𝜏, and 𝛿𝛿 are estimated coefficients. The subscript 𝑡𝑡 corresponds to
the particular data point in a particular year.

The first model presented includes all listed variables (shown in table 3.14). As
the table shows, all variables are highly significant and the model fits well (adjusted R2 is
0.74).
Table 3.13 Peak day model: best fit
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations
Variable
Intercept
Precipitation (Inches last 6 months)
Temperature (Average last 14 Days)
Trend (1-29)
Indicator (2013 - 2015)

0.879
0.773
0.735
0.069
29
Coefficients
8.640
-0.012
0.009
-0.004
-0.190
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Standard Error
0.241
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.055

t Stat
35.889
-3.370
3.515
-2.319
-3.467

P-value
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00

Volume
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Figure 3.5 Predicted vs. actuals: best fit model
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Figure 3.6 Errors: best fit model

Although the prior model fits well, it is difficult to justify the indicator to control
for the years from 2013 to 2015 because it is not clear that there was anything systematic
that should (in principle) cause the series to decline over that period. The inclusion of a
trend variable is also atheoretical; however, given the declining trend found in the
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demand analysis (as well as the seasonal trend and breakpoint analysis) it stands up to
more scrutiny. As a result, the next model only includes the simple trend.
Table 3.14 Peak day model: trend
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.537
R Square
0.288
Adjusted R Square
0.262
Standard Error
0.115
Observations
29
Variable
Intercept
Trend (1-29)

Coefficients
9.462
-0.008

Standard Error
0.044
0.003

t Stat
215.560
-3.305

P-value
0.000
0.003

Volume
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
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Figure 3.7 Predicted vs. actuals: trend model
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Figure 3.8 Errors: trend model

The trend model captures the declining trend over time in peak use, which is consistent
with the general trend of declining use in the city of Clovis. However, the model only
explains about 26% of the variation and it is not uncommon for errors to be greater than
15% in any given year. The next model includes temperature and precipitation but
excludes the trend.
Table 3.15 Peak day model: temperature & precipitation
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.641
R Square
0.411
Adjusted R Square
0.365
Standard Error
0.107
Observations
29
Variable
Intercept
Precipitation (Inches last 6 months)
Temperature (Average last 14 Days)

Coefficients
8.162
-0.014
0.014

Standard Error
0.340
0.006
0.004
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t Stat
24.038
-2.409
3.702

P-value
0.000
0.023
0.001

Volume
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Figure 3.9 Predicted vs. actuals: temperature & precipitation model
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Figure 3.10 Errors: temperature & precipitation model

Fit in the temperature and precipitation model is better overall than the trend model
(given a higher R2 value); however, it begins to overestimate beginning in 2011 in a fairly
significant fashion. Therefore, the following model incorporates temperature,
precipitation and the trend.
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Table 3.16 Peak day model: temperature, precipitation and trend
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.812
R Square
0.659
Adjusted R Square
0.618
Standard Error
0.083
Observations
29
Variable
Intercept
Precipitation (Inches last 6 months)
Temperature (Average last 14 Days)
Trend (1-29)

Coefficients
8.312
-0.012
0.013
-0.008

Standard Error
0.266
0.004
0.003
0.002

t Stat
31.281
-2.824
4.615
-4.267

P-value
0.000
0.009
0.000
0.000
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Figure 3.11 Predicted vs. actuals: temperature, precipitation & trend model
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Figure 3.12 Errors: temperature, precipitation & trend model

While the last estimation does not provide the best fit, it is probably the most
practical model. In order for this estimation to work, it would be necessary to basically
compute expected demand each day based on temperature and precipitation while
controlling for the annual trend. As final error figure shows, this method generally
preformed within +/- 10% (at least in-sample). It is also important to reiterate that it is
peak day demand that is being estimated; in other words, the relevant question is: if today
is a peak day, level of demand should we expect? It is clear that most days will not be in
the neighborhood of the peak day, but knowing what it could be should help to safeguard
against inadequate supply.
In any event, because temperature and precipitation data are available through the
summer of 2016 (but the actual peak day volume is unknown), it is possible to estimate
the maximum day volume for the year as well as estimate the date at which it was likely
to have occurred. Specifically, the models shown in table 3.17 and table 3.14 are used to
predict the date of max day as well as the volume.
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Figure 3.13 Max day volume: left panel without additional indictor (from Table 3.17), right panel with
additional indicator (from Table 3.14)

In both cases, the models predict that the max day occurred on about July 19,
2016 and near-peak day volumes are likely to have been demanded in the several days
prior to and post July 19. The model that does not include an indicator from 2013 through
the current date estimates that peak day volume was about 10.7 million gallons while the
model that includes the atheoretical indicator for the period 2013 forward predicts that
the volume was about 9.3 million gallons. In both cases, the predictions are above the
2014 and 2015 volumes, while the prediction from the model that includes the indicator
is near to the peak day volume experienced in 2013 (of about 9.4 million gallons).
To improve the estimation, having information in addition to peak demand in a
particular year would be useful. In particular, having daily data even at an aggregate
level, would help to provide insight into rapid behavioral responses (rapid in the face of
changing temperature and precipitation). It would also help in providing estimates of
general daily demand because then it would simply be a model of demand – which, given
drivers of behavioral response should still help to predict peak demand. Other factors
such as day of the week, presence of holidays, and even items discussed in the demand
models such as rebates (and especially landscaping rebates) could also be brought into
the analysis. If daily data was brought to bear, it might be advisable to include a lagged
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term or control for autocorrelation. In other words, yesterday’s demand may impact
demand today. In the present case, that was not necessary because of the temporal
differences between data points.
Another strategy would be to study the composition of the premises on each peak
day. It might be the case that certain premises contribute most to the peaks while other
premises do not change demand much even in the face of the conditions that bring about
the peaks. If the premises that contribute the most to the peaks can be identified, and
other premises are only marginal contributors, focus can be put on the high-contribution
premises and characteristics governing behavior may be uncovered and leveraged.
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Chapter 4: Advertising Rebates for Water-Saving Technology: An
Optimal Control Model for Utility Investment Decisions and Demand
Management
4.1 Introduction
Water utilities regularly engage in advertising campaigns to promote public
awareness for water conservation and manage demand. These campaigns may include
investments in billboards, mailers that are included with water bills, television and radio
advertisements – all of which are designed to influence consumer preferences. At the
same time, some utilities also engage in advertising to entice water users to purchase and
install water-saving technologies, and in some cases, utilities provide rebates for
replacement of old, and relatively less efficient, technologies. These types of advertising
and rebate programs have undoubtedly played a role in reducing municipal water use
(Heiman, 2002; Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014). However, given that
advertisement encourages conservation, and conservation reduces demand, how does a
utility justify investing scarce resources to reduce the demand for the product that it sells?
This research investigates the conditions under which advertising investment by a
water utility, for the purpose of inducing water users to purchase and install water saving
technology, makes economic sense from the utility’s perspective. Along this front, one
state engineer offers some guidance when it notes that the potential benefits of rebate
programs (for the purchase and installation of water-saving technology) is that they
effectively reduce water demand and thus eliminate some otherwise necessary water and
wastewater treatment construction costs (OSE 2001, p. 76). In other words, by the utility
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engaging in demand management, including advertising for water rebate programs, costly
investment and maintenance decisions can be delayed. 13
To assess this claim, a dynamic analytical framework using a capital
accumulation approach that outlines the tradeoffs that a water utility faces when
advertising for and engaging in a water rebate program is developed. In particular,
infrastructure maintenance and expansion are costly, so the focus is on how advertising
may be leveraged by an optimizing utility and how a utility may tradeoff between regular
maintenance or investment and advertising for the purchase and installation of water
saving technology. Specifically contemplated in this analysis are private water utilities. 14
The choice of investigating this issue from the perspective of a private utility informs the
model design as behavior is assumed to flow directly from a private utility’s objective to
profit maximize. 15
In this dissertation chapter, Chapter 4.2 provides a brief literature review on
rebates, advertising, and water infrastructure. Chapter 4.3 develops the various elements
considered by an optimizing utility, specifies the private utility’s objective, and develops
the utility’s maximization problem. After solving the utility’s maximization problem,

13

A key issue not considered in this analysis is that of conservation and delaying future supply
augmentation. For example, a utility may be interested in advertising technologies that reduce demand and
therefore slow the current rate of groundwater extraction so that it can postpone future supply investments.
This issue is not addressed here but presents an additional economic justification for a utility to engage in
advertising for water-saving technologies.
14
In the United States, approximately 85% of all water utilities are publicly owned and about 15% are
privately owned. This research focuses on private ownership due to its increasing popularity (Griffin,
2006).
15
As discussed by Griffin (2006, p. 339-343), the two extreme ownership cases for a water utility are public
ownership and private ownership. In the case of a publicly owned water utility, its objective, at least in
principle, is a cost-minimizing one. In other words, given the demand for water, an efficient utility will
provide the resource at the lowest cost. In the case of a privately owned water utility, the utility’s objective
is to maximize profits. As the utility is typically a natural monopoly sanctioned by the state to provide
service in a given territory, private utilities are incentivized to engage in typical monopolistic behavior, for
which the state generally finds reason to regulate.
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Chapter 4.4 provides a qualitative assessment of optimal utility action under several
scenarios. Chapter 4.5 develops an empirical model with hypothesized outcomes that can
be tested with appropriate data and Chapter 4.6 concludes by enumerating limitations of
the current work and offering possible directions for future investigation.

4.2 Background & Literature Review
Advertising for the purposes of water demand management is common among
water utilities and has been demonstrated to reduce demand (Heiman, 2002). Similarly,
water rebate programs, or utility subsidization of water-saving technologies, have also
been shown to reduce demand (Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014). While the general
impact of advertising in terms of altering preferences and shifting demand is well known
in the marketing and economics literature (e.g. Dorfman & Steiner, 1954; Hamilton,
1972; Krugman, 1965), the economic analysis of rebates is somewhat more arcane; and
in particular, the analysis of rebates for the purchase of water-saving technology from the
perspective of a cost minimizing or profit maximizing water utility has not yet been
undertaken. While the model that is developed and presented in this dissertation assumes
that the utility directly controls advertising efforts and not uptake of rebated technology,
in order to frame the relevant issues, a brief discussion of the economics of rebates
follows.
Rebates offered by a producer or seller effectively reduce the purchase price of
products for the individuals taking advantage of the rebate. In the economics literature,
rebates are said to allow a business to price discriminate and thus extract greater surplus
(Gerstner & Hess, 1991; Lu & Moorthy, 2007). According to Edwards (2007), a rebate is
a “delayed incentive offered by either a product manufacturer or retailer that requires
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consumers to: (1) make a purchase at a pre-rebate shelf price; (2) submit a request for
refund amount by mail or the Internet to the rebate offeror…; and (3) wait some period of
time after the purchase and rebate submission for the rebate offeror… to send a rebate
check or something of value…” Rebates are often distinguished with coupons based on
the time at which the refund is provided with a coupon being instituted at the time of sale
and a rebate being at a later date.
Commentators have generally concluded that the economic purpose of rebates is
that they offer a seller a means of price discrimination, thereby granting the seller larger
surplus (Lu and Moorthy 2007; Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1995; Gerstner and Hess 1991).
In other words, some individuals will pay full price and either not know or not care about
the rebate offer while other individuals, that would have not purchased the product at the
listed shelf price, may be induced to purchase the product given the rebate opportunity.
Of course, some consumers that would have purchased the product without the rebate
will apply for the rebate, but the additional revenues obtained from induced customers
will be greater than the loss from customers that would have purchased the product at the
un-rebated price given the optimal rebate. However, at least one strand of research has
suggested that rebates may be profitable even when all purchasers are induced to
participate in the rebate program (Gerstner & Hess, 1991).
Rebates for the purchase of water saving technology functionally operate in a
similar fashion to other rebate programs at least from the perspective of the consumer. In
that case, a water utility makes a public offer to the community whereby the utility agrees
to remunerate consumers that purchase products that qualify for the rebate program and
replace existing products in their homes or businesses. Qualifying products often include
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water saving showerheads, low flow toilets, high efficiency washing machines, or any
device that the utility chooses to include in its program, each with stated purpose of
reducing household water use. A distinguishing feature between a rebate granted by a
manufacturer or retailer and a water utility, however, is that the utility does not build or
sell the product for which it is rebating; rather, the utility is essentially providing a
subsidy for the purchase of qualified technology produced and sold by another entity.
Nevertheless, the “rebate” terminology generally persists.
Whereas a typical rebate effectively reduces the product price and provides a
means of price discrimination, a rebated product that lowers water use, effectively
reduces the demand for the product that the utility sells: namely, water. Furthermore,
rebates are costly because they are subsidized by the water utility. So, it would seem that
with reduced water demand and increased costs to the utility, its profitability would be
negatively impacted. For example, administration of the Albuquerque Bernalillo County
Water Authority’s toilet rebate program from 1995 to 2002 was estimated to cost the
utility more than $2.3 million (Smith, 2004; WRA, 2008). Meanwhile, from 2002 to
2006, the city of Aurora, Colorado’s water utility spent nearly $1 million on toilet and
high efficiency washing machine rebate programs (Aurora, 2007; WRA, 2008). Similar
programs to those described above exist in other cities and municipalities across the
United States.
In addition, the utility, by encouraging the installation of water saving technology,
effectively reduces the demand for the good that it sells – this has been demonstrated in
theory as well as in practice (Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014). As a result, water
rebate programs simultaneously impact the revenue and cost sides of the ledger in a
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negative manner. Therefore, it begs the question as to why an optimizing utility would
engage in this type of activity.
Several hypotheses could be offered that in some cases reducing demand may be
optimizing. For example, a utility may be supply-constrained and if demand exceeds
current supply, the utility may be obligated to engage in costly supply enhancement.
Similarly, and especially for utilities reliant on a declining aquifer with little opportunity
for supply augmentation, a forward-looking utility may directly or indirectly consider the
value of the remaining underground stock (the shadow value), which rises as the
available volume falls. It is clear that in the first case, rebated technology, and demand
management in general, offers a near-term solution to excess demand. In the latter case,
the focus is having adequate supplies over a relatively longer period and, by considering
the value of the remaining water, the utility can extend the useful life of the aquifer.
While these rationales likely play a role, the highly regulated nature of the water
utility, and its inability to effectively set price, makes it difficult for the utility to
adequately cover the rebate investment costs. Furthermore, a utility’s inability to adjust
price in the face of changing supply and demand conditions can create operational
difficulties for the utility and those conditions may run counter to the city or
municipalities’ stated conservation goals (Timmins, 2003).
An alternative hypothesis that may explain how rebate investment may be optimal
for a utility is that reduced system and infrastructure demands that occurs due to lowered
water demand, reduces the investment that is required by the utility for infrastructure
replacement and expansion. In this chapter, the term infrastructure is used to generally
describe various municipal water utility capital assets including water reservoirs,
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treatment facilities, groundwater wells, and any other component of the utility’s water
collection, management and distributions systems. This rationale, at least with regard to a
desire to put off investment, has particular merit given the current state of water
infrastructure. As water infrastructure in the United States nears the end of its useful life
(American Water Works Association 2012), rebate and demand management programs
can help postpone costly maintenance, replacement, and expansion. However, this
attitude has led to underfunding: according to the American Society of Civil Engineers
(2017), United States’ drinking water infrastructure is currently underfunded to the tune
of about $100 million nationwide in 2017, earning it a grade of “D” in annual report card.
In addition, as a result of continued infrastructure underinvestment, as well as population
shifts in some parts of the country (which requires infrastructure expansion in some
cases), the investment costs are projected to total $1 trillion over the next 25 years
(American Water Works Association 2012). These statistics make attempting to better
understating optimal utility investment all the more critical.

4.3 The Model
To determine whether an advertising program that promotes the purchase of water
saving technology is optimal for a water utility in the face of infrastructure costs and
investment, a capital accumulation model is developed. Because the focus is on the
utility’s capital infrastructure and its ability to adequately supply the customer base, this
research also applies an adjustment cost model to the capital accumulation problem
(Carey & Zilberman, 2002; Hansen, 2009; Rubio, 1992). The practical effect of this
model is that investment decisions by the water utility constrain the utility’s production
capacity in the current period and therefore does not positively affect instantaneous
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output (Hansen, 2009). In an effort to analyze this problem, the following sub-chapters
develop relevant aspects of the model in per capita terms (Chapter 4.3.1), specify the
private utility’s objective (Chapter 4.3.2), and define and solve the utility’s profit
maximization problem (Chapter 4.3.3).
4.3.1 Model development in per capita terms
It is natural to assume that the objective for a generic publically owned and
optimally-performing utility is to minimize its costs given a particular level of production
or output. In other words, the volume demanded by water users must be fulfilled by the
utility, and the optimizing utility seeks to satisfy demand at the lowest possible cost. This
cost-minimizing approach makes particular sense for a public utility that is uninterested
in profit. However, there exist a set of private water utilities that are indeed driven by
profits rather than cost minimization. 16
While duality between cost minimization and profit maximization should generate
identical results, the present research focuses on profit maximization rather than cost
minimization; this approach is taken for two main reasons. First, and most obvious, is
that a private business is generally expected to be driven by the profit motive, making the
profit maximization problem the most direct avenue of study. Second, some model
parameters, such as water price, for example, do not appear in a cost minimization
problem but are included in a profit maximization problem. 17 In an effort to retain those
parameters of interest, this analysis focuses on profit maximization. The examination of a

16

EPCOR, the water utility that provides service to Clovis and Edgewood, New Mexico is an example of a
private utility that arguably seeks to maximize profit. Private water utilities are discussed in Griffin (2006).
17
Conceptually, this is because in a cost minimization problem, demand must be fulfilled regardless of
water price. Focusing in the dual profit maximization problem retains that key parameter in the analysis and
could allow for further comparative static analysis.
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water utility from the perspective of a profit maximizing firm is not new and has been
used in similar contexts (Hansen, 2009; Timmins, 2003).
Additionally, in an effort to proxy for a socially optimal outcome, the water utility
is assumed to operate in a perfectly competitive market. While the market is not perfectly
competitive in practice, due to the highly regulated environment that a water utility
operates in, this framework allows for the utility to act as a price taker, where water price
is taken as given and the regulator sets the price 𝑝𝑝.

Water production, 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡), at any point in time is a function of existing capital,

𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), labor, 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 18 direct capital infrastructure investment, 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡), and indirect

investment via advertising for rebated water saving technology, 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡). The utility’s
production function is given by

𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐹𝐹[𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)]

(4.1)

The utility seeks to choose its optimal level of investment 𝑀𝑀∗ (𝑡𝑡) and advertising

𝐴𝐴∗ (𝑡𝑡) such that it maximizes the present value of it stream of profits. The firm uses 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡)

to replace worn out existing capital, if needed, and to expand capital to meet the demands
of a growing consumer base. The firm uses 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) to effectively reduce demand on its
existing capital.

Consistent with economic theory, 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾 > 0, 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 < 0, 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 > 0, 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 < 0. In other

words, production increases with greater levels of capital and larger populations, but each
increase at a decreasing rate. The theory of the adjustment cost model says that 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 ≤ 0,

𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ≤ 0. Similarly, 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 ≤ 0, 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ≤ 0. Because budgets are assumed to be fixed in each
18

In this analysis, labor is assumed to be synonymous to population. Similarly labor growth is assumed to
equal population growth.
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time period, these assumptions suggest that by spending costly resources on 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) or

𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡), production in the current period is reduced commensurate with the amount invested
or spent. This model is similar to Hansen (2009), however, in the current model, 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) is
included in the production function; the inclusion of 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) recognizes that advertising
assists the transition to water saving technologies, which reduces stress on existing
capital and may delay costly investment in capital expansion.
The effect of population growth 19 enters the production function and translates the
utility’s decisions into per capita terms. Assuming homogeneity of degree one in the
production function
𝐹𝐹[𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡), 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡), 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡), 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡)] = 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇[𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)] ∀ 𝜇𝜇 > 0
1

Given, 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) > 0, let 𝜇𝜇 = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) , 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) =

𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) =

𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

, 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) =

𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

(4.2)

. Substituting into

equation (4.2), and assuming that the production function is multiplicatively separable
𝑓𝑓[𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡), 1] = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)−1 𝐹𝐹[𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)]

(4.3)

𝐹𝐹[𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)] = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓[𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡), 1]

(4.4)

such that

The right hand side of equation (4.4) is the population weighted production function in
per capita terms.
Advertising, 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) induces the purchase of water saving technologies that are

rebated by the utility. This produces a stock of rebated technology that changes according
to
𝑂𝑂̇ = 𝐷𝐷�𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)�
19

(4.5)

Again, population growth and labor growth are assumed to be equivalent.
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Where 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡) is the stock of rebated low-flow technology installed as a result of utility

advertising efforts. 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡) is functionally related to 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) via 𝐷𝐷(∙), which corresponds to

uptake of rebated water saving technologies that occurs as a result of advertising efforts.
Assuming constant returns to scale, dividing through by the population size, 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), to

express the equation in per-capita terms produces

𝑂𝑂̇ (𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

𝑂𝑂̇(𝑡𝑡)
= 𝑑𝑑�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

(4.6)

is the path of rebated technology expressed in per-capita terms and 𝑑𝑑�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� is uptake

of advertised technology per capita.

Next, define the stock of rebated technology in per-capita terms as: 𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡) =

𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

.

Rearranging this equation produces 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡), which is a new equation for the
stock of rebated technology that, for the moment, is no longer in per-capita terms. In
particular, the left hand side of the equation corresponds to the stock of rebated

technology and the right hand side is the population weighted per capita stock of rebated
technology. Differentiating with respect to time elicits equation (4.7).
𝑂𝑂̇(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑜𝑜̇ (𝑡𝑡) + 𝐿𝐿̇(𝑡𝑡)𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡)

(4.7)

The left hand side of equation (4.7) shows the time-path of the stock of rebated
technology and must be equal to the sum of the product of the per-capita path of rebated
technology and population size (𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑜𝑜̇ (𝑡𝑡)), and the product of the population path and
per-capita rebated technology (𝐿𝐿̇(𝑡𝑡)𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡)). Dividing both sides by the population size
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), to formulate a new equation in per-capita terms produces
𝑂𝑂̇(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿̇(𝑡𝑡)
= 𝑜𝑜̇ (𝑡𝑡) +
𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)
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(4.8)

𝐿𝐿̇ (𝑡𝑡)

Defining the rate of population growth as

𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

𝑂𝑂̇(𝑡𝑡)
= 𝑜𝑜̇ (𝑡𝑡) + 𝜂𝜂𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

= 𝜂𝜂, and substituting, yields

(4.9)

Equations (4.6) and (4.9) are now both expressed in terms of the time path of rebated
𝑂𝑂̇ (𝑡𝑡)

technology stock in per capita terms �

𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

�, so setting them equal and solving for 𝑜𝑜̇ (𝑡𝑡)

produces the per capita time path for rebated technology
𝑜𝑜̇ (𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝜂𝜂𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡)

(4.10)

In equation (4.10), 𝜂𝜂𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡) corresponds to the additional per capita rebated technology

required to accommodate the rate of population growth. Therefore, at the steady state,
when 𝑜𝑜̇ (𝑡𝑡) = 0 ⇒ 𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡) =

𝑑𝑑�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�
𝜂𝜂

. In other words, per capita rebated technology, 𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡),

must equal the per capita uptake in advertised technology, 𝑑𝑑�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�, while accounting for
1

the effect of population growth, 𝜂𝜂.

Investment (i.e. capital replacement and expansion), 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡), in any period impacts

the utility’s capital stock, 𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), as does the rate of depreciation, 𝛿𝛿; for simplicity, only
used capital is assumed to depreciate. Additionally, water saving technology 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡)

reduces the demand on capital and therefore effectively reduces the amount of capital
used (or consumed) and that is subject to deprecation. Therefore
𝐾𝐾̇ (𝑡𝑡) = 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) − 𝛿𝛿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡)�

(4.11)

Next, define investment and capital stock in per capita terms as 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) =
𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

and (𝑡𝑡) =

, respectively. Dividing both sides of equation (4.11) by population, 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), produces
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𝐾𝐾̇ (𝑡𝑡)
= 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − 𝛿𝛿�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡)�
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

(4.12)

Next, recall that capital per capita is defined as 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) =

𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

. Rearranging in terms of total

capital stock produces 𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), which sets the capital stock equal to the
population weighted per capita capital stock. Taking a time derivative elicits
𝐾𝐾̇ (𝑡𝑡) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘̇(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐿𝐿̇(𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡)

(4.13)

Dividing by 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) and using the definition of the population growth rate,

produces equation (4.14).

𝐿𝐿̇ (𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

= 𝜂𝜂

𝐾𝐾̇ (𝑡𝑡)
= 𝑘𝑘̇(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

(4.14)

In other words, the change in capital divided by population size is equal to the change in
capital in per capita terms plus the current level of capital multiplied by the rate of
population growth.
Equations (4.12) and (4.14) provide equations expressed in terms of the time path
𝐾𝐾̇(𝑡𝑡)

of the total capital stock divided by the population size �

𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)

�. Setting the equations equal

and solving for 𝑘𝑘̇ (𝑡𝑡) produces equation (4.15), which is the time path for 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) and is a
function of per capita infrastructure investment, per capita capital, and water saving
technology stock 𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡).

𝑘𝑘̇(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)

In steady state, 𝑘𝑘̇(𝑡𝑡) = 0 ⇒ 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) =

𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡)+𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)
(𝛿𝛿+𝜂𝜂)

(4.15)
. In other words, for 𝑘𝑘̇(𝑡𝑡) = 0, per capita

capital 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), must be fulfilled by a combination of direct per capita investment, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), per

capita rebated technology that takes the place of capital that would have been depreciated
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but for the technology, 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡), and the combined effect of depreciation and population
1

growth, (𝛿𝛿+𝜂𝜂).

4.3.2 The (private) utility’s objective
With all of the key pieces in per capita terms, it is helpful to briefly take stock of
the utility’s objective before developing the utility’s dynamic problem. Recall that a
private water utility is interested in maximizing its profits (Π), or the difference between
its total revenue (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) and (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) total costs (i.e. Π = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇). In this case, the utility’s

total revenue is given by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�, where total revenue is the

product of unit price, 𝑝𝑝, population size 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), and the volume produced by the utility per

the utility’s production function (e.g. 𝑓𝑓�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�). The utility charges price 𝑝𝑝 for
water, which is exogenous and determined by the regulator.

The volume produced by the utility is a function of capital stock, 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡),

infrastructure investment, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), and advertising investment, 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) (all in per capita

terms). The utility will choose the optimal levels of infrastructure investment, 𝑚𝑚∗ (𝑡𝑡), and

advertising, 𝑎𝑎∗ (𝑡𝑡). Due to the application of the adjustment cost model, both 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 , 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ≤ 0,
meaning that investment is costly in terms of foregone production in the current period;
resources that are expended are not part of current revenues, since according to the
adjustment cost model, current period investment does not bring about instantaneous
adjustment (Hansen, 2009). 20

Following the adjustment cost model in per capita terms, 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ≤ 0 (Hansen, 2009). While the second
derivative of production with regard to investment or advertising appears to be somewhat abstract, the
direction is needed for appropriately signing the investment and advertising time paths.
20
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The utility’s total costs are given by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡), where 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0,

𝑔𝑔 ≥ 0, and 𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0 are the unit costs for repair, infrastructure investment, and advertising,
respectively. In other words, investment, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), is costly and comes at 𝑔𝑔 dollars per unit

of capital investment, resulting in a capital investment expenditure of gm(t). Similarly,
advertising, 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡), is costly and comes at 𝑠𝑠 dollars per unit investment, resulting in an

advertising expenditure of sa(t). 21 Therefore, the utility maximizes profit according to

Π = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − �𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)�, and, to reiterate, does so by
choosing the optimal level of infrastructure investment, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), and advertising, 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡).

22

21F

4.3.2 The utility’s dynamic maximization problem in continuous time
In order to construct the dynamic model a few other assumptions are required.
First, the utility anticipates that the population grows according to the logistic equation
𝐿𝐿(0)𝑒𝑒 𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂 where 𝐿𝐿(0) is the population size at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝜂𝜂 is the rate of population
growth. In addition, the utility’s internal discount rate is 𝜌𝜌. Accounting for the utility’s
profit maximizing objective (i.e. the revenues and costs discussed in the prior section),
the utility maximizes the following model in continuous time
𝑇𝑇

max 𝑉𝑉 = � 𝑒𝑒 −𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 𝐿𝐿(0)𝑒𝑒 𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡)

𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)

0

(4.16)

− 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)� 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

Setting 𝐿𝐿(0) = 1, the objective function becomes,
Clearly repair is also costly and comes at 𝑐𝑐 dollars per unit of repair, resulting in repair expenditure of
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡), but capital is not directly chosen by the utility so is ignored for the purpose of highlighting the
choice variables.
22
For simplicity, it is assumed that the utility advertises the purchase of water saving technology but does
not subsidize it.
21
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𝑇𝑇

max 𝑉𝑉 = � 𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)� 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)

(4.17)

0

Where 𝑟𝑟 = 𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 and for 𝑟𝑟 < 0, 𝜌𝜌 > 𝜂𝜂.

The maximization problem is constrained by the various stocks described in equations
(4.10) and (4.15), as well as the additional starting, terminal, and range conditions shown
in (4.18).
𝑘𝑘̇ = 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)
𝑜𝑜̇ = 𝑑𝑑�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝜂𝜂𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡)

𝑘𝑘(0) = 𝑘𝑘0 ; 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 𝑘𝑘; 𝑘𝑘(𝑇𝑇) = 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡

(4.18)

𝑜𝑜(0) = 𝑜𝑜0 ; 0 ≤ 𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 𝑜𝑜; 𝑜𝑜(𝑇𝑇) = 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇) = 0, ∀𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇 fixed

In other words, the utility chooses 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) in order to maximize its stream of

profits over the planning horizon 𝑇𝑇 under the constraints given by 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡). As the
planning horizon is fixed at terminal time 𝑇𝑇, this can be also be interpreted as a

management horizon over which a utility operates. Minimum and maximum values of
𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡) are given, indicating that per capita levels of capital and rebated

technology must be contained within the given intervals. In addition, 𝑟𝑟, which is given by
the difference between the population growth rate (𝜂𝜂) and the utility’s internal discount
rate (𝜌𝜌), is the social discount rate and is assumed to be less than zero. This condition

requires that the utility’s internal discount rate, 𝜌𝜌, be greater than the rate of population
growth, 𝜂𝜂. Given this framework, the current value Hamiltonian is:
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𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)
+ 𝜆𝜆1 [𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)]

(4.19)

+ 𝜆𝜆2 �𝑑𝑑�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝜂𝜂𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡)�

𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 represent the shadow (or option) values of capital and water saving technology
(or the state variables) respectively. Dropping the time subscripts for simplicity, the first
order necessary conditions are:
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 ⟺ 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 − 𝑔𝑔 + 𝜆𝜆1 = 0
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

(4.20)

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 ⟺ 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 − 𝑠𝑠 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 = 0
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
−
−

(4.21)

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝜆𝜆̇1 − 𝑟𝑟𝜆𝜆1 ⟺ 𝜆𝜆̇1 = −𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝜆𝜆̇2 − 𝑟𝑟𝜆𝜆2 ⟺ 𝜆𝜆̇2 = 𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿1
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝑘𝑘̇ ⟺ 𝑘𝑘̇ = 𝑚𝑚 − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆1
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝑜𝑜̇ ⟺ 𝑜𝑜̇ = 𝑑𝑑(𝑎𝑎) − 𝜂𝜂𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆2

(4.22)

(4.23)

(4.24)

(4.25)

lim 𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐻𝐻(𝑘𝑘, 𝑚𝑚, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑜𝑜, 𝜆𝜆1 , 𝜆𝜆2 ) = 0
𝑡𝑡→𝑇𝑇

(4.26)

Assuming that an interior solution exists, and solving equations (4.20) and (4.21),

yields equations in terms of 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 and 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 , or the marginal revenue products of

investment and advertisement, respectively. Because 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 , 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 < 0 correspond to

production in the current period that is given up in favor of investment, 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 and 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎
therefore represent opportunity costs of investment and imply tradeoffs between

production in the current period and investment (or advertising). Additionally, 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 > 0, or
142

the marginal impact of advertising on rebate uptake, enters equation (4.21) and plays a
key role in the optimal advertising decision.
Given the potentially costly tradeoffs that a utility must make in terms of
investment decisions and production, at the optimum the utility invests up to the point
where the costs of investment are equal to the benefits from investment. As such, solving
for 𝜆𝜆1 in equation (4.20) gives
𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑔𝑔 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚

(4.27)

In this case, 𝑔𝑔 is the unit cost of infrastructure investment and 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 is the opportunity cost

of investing. Therefore, given that 𝑔𝑔 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 is the marginal cost of investment, 𝜆𝜆1
represents the marginal benefit, or marginal value, to the utility of infrastructure
investment.

Similarly, the utility optimally chooses advertising investment such that the
marginal costs of advertising equal the marginal benefits of advertising. Solving for 𝜆𝜆2 in

equation (4.21)
𝜆𝜆2 =

𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎

(4.28)

The term 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 corresponds to the combined costs of the direct and opportunity cost of
advertising. The term in the denominator, 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 , scales the marginal cost by marginal

advertising effectiveness In particular, as 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 increases, relatively less advertising is
required to achieve the same marginal cost outcome, all else equal. As a result, 𝜆𝜆2

represents the marginal value to the utility of advertising, or the marginal value of rebated
technology.
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Critical to the analysis is that 𝜆𝜆1 , 𝜆𝜆2 > 0. 23 In the case of 𝜆𝜆1 , the unit cost of

investment, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), is positive (𝑔𝑔 > 0) and because the opportunity cost of infrastructure
investment is negative (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 < 0), the shadow (or option) value of infrastructure

investment is positive (𝜆𝜆1 > 0). Similarly, because the unit cost of advertising, 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡), is
positive (𝑠𝑠 > 0), the opportunity cost of advertising investment is negative (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 < 0),
and the marginal effect of advertising on technology uptake is positive (𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 > 0), the

shadow (or option) value of advertising is also positive (𝜆𝜆2 > 0).

Taking the time derivative of equation (4.27) produces a time path for the shadow

value of investment, 𝜆𝜆1

𝜆𝜆̇1 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎̇ �

(4.29)

Taking the time derivative of equation (4.28) produces a time path for the shadow value
of advertising, 𝜆𝜆2
𝜆𝜆̇2 = −

𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇� + 𝑎𝑎̇ (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎

(4.30)

Equations (4.29) and (4.30) must hold if 𝑚𝑚 and 𝑎𝑎 are optimally chosen.

Equations (4.22) and (4.23) also provide time paths for the shadow values of

investment and infrastructure (𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 , respectively) and correspond to how the

objective changes given changes in the respective stocks, 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡). These time paths
can be used in conjunction with equations (4.29) and (4.30), respectively, to solve for

time paths of the choice variables, 𝑚𝑚̇ and 𝑎𝑎̇ . Therefore, setting equation (4.23) equal to

equation (4.30) and solving for 𝑎𝑎̇ produces and equation that is a function of the time path
of infrastructure investment, 𝑚𝑚̇
23

Recall that 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑔𝑔 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 and 𝜆𝜆2 =

𝑠𝑠−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎

.
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𝑎𝑎̇ = −

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
−
𝑚𝑚̇
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

(4.31)

Similarly, setting equation (4.22) equal to equation (4.29) and solving for 𝑚𝑚̇ produces
and equation that is a function of advertising time path, 𝑎𝑎̇
𝑚𝑚̇ =

[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ � 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
−
𝑎𝑎̇
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

(4.32)

Equations (4.31) and (4.32) provide a system of equations that can be solved for both 𝑎𝑎̇

and 𝑚𝑚̇. Equation (4.32) is particularly noteworthy because it similar to the result found in

(Hansen, 2009), but because the present analysis incorporates the effect of advertising, it
𝑓𝑓

includes the additional term 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎̇ . In addition, this term is subtracted on the right hand
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

side of equation (4.32) implying that as advertising investment increases, the optimal
infrastructure investment path decreases because the utility is effectively trading off

between the two investment types. Plugging equation (4.31) into (4.32) and solving 𝑚𝑚̇ for
produces

𝑚𝑚̇ =

(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 2 �

�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]

𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇�
− �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ � +
�
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

Equation (4.33) is the optimal path for 𝑚𝑚.

Substituting equation (4.33) back into (4.31) and solving for 𝑎𝑎̇ produces the

optimal path for 𝑎𝑎.
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(4.33)

(1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )�𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑎𝑎̇ = − �
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
+

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐]
(𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) − (𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )2 )

(4.34)

− [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ ���

For complete solutions, the shadow values of infrastructure investment and advertising,
𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 , respectively, should be substituted into optimal 𝑚𝑚 and 𝑎𝑎 paths and 𝑘𝑘̇ should be
replaced by the restriction given in equation (4.18); however, those terms are left in the

present analysis for compactness. Furthermore, because 𝜆𝜆1 , 𝜆𝜆2 > 0, they pose no special

difficulty with regard to understanding the behavior of each path. 24

4.4 Signing and Analysis
In an effort to better characterize the optimal choice for a utility (given a variety
of underlying assumptions), this section provides qualitative results for key terms,
parameters, and relationships. To facilitate this discussion, assume that 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0, or that
the cross partial derivatives of the production function with respect to both control
variables are equal to zero. 25 Simplifying equation (4.32) yields
𝑚𝑚̇ =

1
�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ 𝑝𝑝 �

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
� 𝑘𝑘̇ �
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

(4.35.1)

Although, depending on the assumed signs for augmented depreciation (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) and the population
effect (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌), the relative magnitudes for 𝜆𝜆1 , 𝜆𝜆2 may make a difference.
25
This is indeed a strong assumption. However, simplification is required to make meaningful qualitative
comparisons.
24
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Equation (4.35.1) is in the same general form given in (Hansen, 2009) but it includes the
additional term 𝑝𝑝 �(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓

𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

� 𝑘𝑘̇, which accounts for the effect of advertising on the

changing capital. Equation (4.35.1) is rearranged in equation (4.35.2) in order to capture
the full effect of 𝑘𝑘̇ in the path for 𝑚𝑚.
𝑚𝑚̇ =

1
�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

(4.35.2)

𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
−�
� 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘̇�
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

In addition, applying the assumption 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0 to equation (4.34) produces

equation (4.36.1)
𝑎𝑎̇ = −

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

(4.36.1)

For comparability, equation (4.36.1) is rearranged in equation (4.36.2) to be consistent
with equation (4.35.1). In particular, each contain the same 𝑝𝑝 �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

� 𝑘𝑘̇ term. This

demonstrates that both the infrastructure (𝑚𝑚̇) and advertising (𝑎𝑎̇ ) paths are subject to
similar offsetting factors.

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 )
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎̇ = − �
+ 𝑝𝑝 �
� 𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

However, for the purpose of analyzing the 𝑎𝑎 path, equation (4.36.3) is derived,
𝑎𝑎̇ = −

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)𝜆𝜆2
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
+
− 𝑝𝑝 �
� 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

(4.36.2)

(4.36.3)

By assumption, 𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 < 0 (i.e. the social discount rate 𝑟𝑟 < 0); however, the sign

of 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌, which essentially accounts for the combined effects of population

augmented depreciation (augmented depreciation) and the utility’s internal discount rate,
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in the 𝑚𝑚̇ path in equation (4.35.2), is unknown. Similarly the direction of 𝑎𝑎̇ turns in part
on the sign of 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌, which is essentially the difference between the scaled rate of

population growth rate (population effect) and the utility’s internal rate of discount, and is
also unknown. In both cases, empirical data are necessary to uncover the true signs for
the augmented depreciation and population effect terms. Nevertheless, the following
scenarios demonstrate the various relationships given the various possible signs of
𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 and 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌; in other words, the paths depend on the strength and direction of
the effects of augmented depreciation and the population effect.

4.4.1 Scenario 1:Population effect greater than utility discount rate
(𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 > 𝟎𝟎) and augmented depreciation greater than utility discount rate
(𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 > 𝟎𝟎)

Based on the 𝑚𝑚 path shown in equation (4.35.1), there exist several possible

directions of 𝑚𝑚̇ depending on whether capital is accumulating or declining; i.e. given the
sign of 𝑘𝑘̇.

Define 𝐴𝐴 =

𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 −𝑐𝑐
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

; 𝐵𝐵 =

𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿+2𝜂𝜂−𝜌𝜌)
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

; and 𝐶𝐶 =

𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

1

; and 𝐷𝐷 = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

�(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓

𝐴𝐴 can be described as the marginal net benefit (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ) of repairing existing

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

� 𝑘𝑘̇.

infrastructure. A prudent manager would not spend more fixing existing infrastructure
than it receives in benefits, so 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0. However, 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 0, so 𝐴𝐴 < 0.

Because 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑔𝑔 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 , 𝐵𝐵 is the marginal value of infrastructure investment

(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ). The marginal benefit of infrastructure investment is equal to the costs of

investment, so it must be that 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑔𝑔 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 > 0. However, the relationship between

augmented depreciation and the utility’s internal discount rate (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) is unknown,
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which makes assessing the sign of 𝐵𝐵 and empirical question. In this case it is assumed
that 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 > 0, or that augmented depreciation is positive; therefore, 𝐵𝐵 > 0.

𝐶𝐶 and 𝐷𝐷 both capture effects from the change in capital stock modeled through 𝑘𝑘̇.

Specifically, 𝐶𝐶 accounts the marginal capital changes occurring due to infrastructure

investment and 𝐷𝐷 accounts for marginal changes in capital due to advertising investment.
With regard to 𝐶𝐶, 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 0 and 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 0; however, because of the leading negative sign

on 𝐶𝐶, the sign is opposite of 𝑘𝑘̇. For 𝐷𝐷, (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

> 0 and 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 0, so like 𝐶𝐶, the sign

is opposite of 𝑘𝑘̇. Table 4.1 shows the optimal direction for infrastructure investment given
the assumptions already described.

Table 4.1 Summary of impacts for optimal path of 𝒎𝒎̇ when 𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 > 𝟎𝟎

𝑚𝑚̇ < 0
𝑚𝑚̇ = 0
𝑚𝑚̇ > 0

𝑘𝑘̇ < 0
𝐴𝐴 > (𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷)
𝐴𝐴 = (𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷)
𝐴𝐴 < (𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷)

𝑘𝑘̇ = 0
𝐴𝐴 > 𝐵𝐵
𝐴𝐴 = 𝐵𝐵
𝐴𝐴 < 𝐵𝐵

𝑘𝑘̇ > 0
(𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷) > 𝐵𝐵
(𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷) = 𝐵𝐵
(𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷) < 𝐵𝐵

In situations when the change in capital stock is negative, i.e. when 𝑘𝑘̇ < 0, the

optimal path for infrastructure investment, or the direction of 𝑚𝑚̇, depends on the

magnitude of the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 from repairs. If the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 from repairs exceeds the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 and

the joint effects from the change in capital stock (i.e. capital stock changes coming from
direct investment and advertising), then the utility should shift its focus away from new
capital investment and toward repairs. However, if 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 from repairs is less than the

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 and the joint effects from the change in capital stock, then the utility should shift

its focus to capital investment.

When changes to capital stock are positive, i.e. when 𝑘𝑘̇ > 0, the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 tends to

dominate. For example, if the combined 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 from repairs and the joint effects from

change in capital stock are less than the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 , the utility should focus its efforts on new
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investment; however, if the combined impact is greater than 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 then the utility should
focus on repairs. Finally, the 𝑚𝑚̇ = 0 row provides steady state relationships for each
instance of 𝑘𝑘̇ when net infrastructure investment is equal to zero – in other words, it

provides situations when a utility would be indifferent between infrastructure investment
and repairs. 26
Similarly, to outline the various possible directions of 𝑎𝑎̇ given the various signs of

𝑘𝑘̇, define 𝑋𝑋 =

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂−𝜌𝜌)𝜆𝜆2

𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

, 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

and 𝑍𝑍 = 𝑝𝑝 �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

� 𝑘𝑘̇. Because 𝜆𝜆2 =

𝑠𝑠−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎

,

𝑋𝑋 is the marginal value of advertising investment (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 ); 𝑌𝑌, in a manner of speaking, is
the marginal value of infrastructure investment (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 ) put in advertising terms; and 𝑍𝑍 is

the impact on the 𝑎𝑎̇ path due to changing capital stock. Because 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 , 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 0, the

denominator for each quantity, 𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌, and 𝑍𝑍 is negative. Due to the increasing effect of

advertising on rebate uptake, 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 > 0, the positive shadow value for advertising, 𝜆𝜆2 > 0,
and given the assumption that the population effect outweighs the effect of the utility’s
internal discount rate, 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 > 0, the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 < 0. By similar logic, because the
depreciation term is positive, 𝛿𝛿 > 0, the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 < 0. Finally, because 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 0,
𝑝𝑝 �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

� < 0, so the sign for 𝑍𝑍 depends on the direction of the capital effect 𝑘𝑘̇.

26

Note that the critical comparison in this case is between the marginal benefit of repair and the marginal
benefit of investment – the effect of advertising only indirectly enters through the capital effect, and
1
𝑓𝑓
�(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
� 𝑘𝑘̇ . However, the following paragraphs describe the advertising
specifically through 𝐷𝐷 =
)
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

relationship and specifically how the marginal value of advertising is compared against the marginal value
of investment (i.e. how they are traded off). To put this in a concise fashion, in order for the utility to
behave optimally, it must choose the proper directions for 𝑚𝑚̇ and 𝑎𝑎̇ given the various assumptions already
described regarding the population effect and augmented depreciation, as well as the observed direction of
𝑘𝑘̇. In other words, the qualitative results describe whether it is optimal for a utility to increase (or decrease
or keep level) investment or advertising.
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Given the relations as shown in equation (4.36.3), and the assumption 2𝜂𝜂 > 𝜌𝜌, the

possible directions for the 𝑎𝑎̇ path are shown in table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Summary of impacts for optimal path of 𝒂𝒂̇ assuming 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 > 𝝆𝝆

𝑎𝑎̇ < 0
𝑎𝑎̇ = 0
𝑎𝑎̇ > 0

𝑘𝑘̇ < 0
(𝑋𝑋 + 𝑍𝑍) < 𝑌𝑌
(𝑋𝑋 + 𝑍𝑍) = 𝑌𝑌
(𝑋𝑋 + 𝑍𝑍) > 𝑌𝑌

𝑘𝑘̇ = 0
𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌
𝑋𝑋 = 𝑌𝑌
𝑋𝑋 < 𝑌𝑌

𝑘𝑘̇ > 0
𝑋𝑋 < (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍)
𝑋𝑋 = (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍)
𝑋𝑋 > (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍)

In this case, there is no analogue to 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ; rather, the relevant comparisons are

based on the marginal values of advertising and infrastructure investment. In this case,

when 𝑘𝑘̇ < 0, the optimal path for advertising investment, or the direction of 𝑎𝑎̇ , depends
on the magnitude of the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 and the capital effect. Specifically, if the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 and the

capital effect are less than 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 , then it makes sense to shift resources away from

advertising and toward infrastructure investment. However, if the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 and the capital

effect are greater than 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 , then it makes sense to shift resources toward advertising.

In cases when 𝑘𝑘̇ > 0, the magnitude of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 dominates. If 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎 is less than the

joint impact of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 and the capital effect, then it makes sense to invest in infrastructure.
However, if 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 is greater than the joint impact of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 and the capital effect, then it
makes sense to invest in advertising. The 𝑎𝑎̇ = 0 row provides steady state relationships
for each instance of 𝑘𝑘̇. These steady state outcomes occur when the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 of repairs
equals the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 of investment.

Of particular interest for 𝑎𝑎̇ and 𝑚𝑚̇ is that both depend on 𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 ; in other words,

the marginal value of both investment-types play a role in determining optimal

investment paths and illustrates that tradeoffs between investments depend on the
marginal values of each. The 𝑎𝑎̇ path is the most direct version of this and, as the signing

results suggest, it allows for a direct comparison of the various values of each investment
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type and provides qualitative guidance for when investment tradeoffs should occur.
However, even the 𝑚𝑚̇ path includes a correction for advertising as that path incorporates
the shadow value (or option value) of advertising, illustrating that both investment types
should be considered when attempting to achieve the optimal paths.

4.4.2 Scenario 2: Population effect equal to utility discount rate (𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 =
𝟎𝟎) or augmented depreciation equal to utility discount rate (𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 = 𝟎𝟎)

Although Scenario 1 produces the most likely set of outcomes, given the assumed

signs for 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 and 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌, nothing in principle prevents those expressions taking

on different signs. In this particular scenario, either (twice) the population growth rate is
equal to the utility’s internal rate of discount (2𝜂𝜂 = 𝜌𝜌) or the rate of augmented

deprecation is equal to the utility’s internal rate of discount (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 = 𝜌𝜌), but not both

(assuming that 𝛿𝛿 > 0). If the utility’s rate of augmented depreciation is equivalent to its

internal discount rate, then the various time paths for 𝑚𝑚̇, given the three conditions for 𝑘𝑘̇,
are given in table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Summary of impacts for optimal path of 𝒎𝒎̇ when 𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 = 𝟎𝟎

𝑚𝑚̇ < 0
𝑚𝑚̇ = 0
𝑚𝑚̇ > 0

𝑘𝑘̇ < 0
0 > (𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷)
0 = (𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷)
0 < (𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷)

𝑘𝑘̇ = 0
0 > 𝐵𝐵
0 = 𝐵𝐵
0 < 𝐵𝐵

𝑘𝑘̇ > 0
(𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷) > 𝐵𝐵
(𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷) = 𝐵𝐵
(𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷) < 𝐵𝐵

In this case, because the effects of augmented depreciation are offset against the
utility’s internal discount rate, 𝐴𝐴, or the marginal net benefit of repairs (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ), is zero.
Therefore, outcomes shown in the table do not offer insight into a meaningful tradeoff
between repairs and investment, but rather show conditions that must exist when the
directions for 𝑘𝑘̇ and 𝑚𝑚̇ and known.
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Similarly, if the population’s growth rate is equivalent to its internal discount rate,
then 𝑋𝑋 in the 𝑎𝑎̇ path, or the marginal value of advertising (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 ), is equal to zero. The
various time paths for 𝑎𝑎, given the three conditions for 𝑘𝑘̇, are given in table 4.4. Like

table 4.3, the results demonstrate that there is no meaningful tradeoff between investment
types and instead provides conditions that must exist for an optimally managed utility
given the various directions for 𝑎𝑎̇ and 𝑘𝑘̇.

Table 4.4 Summary of impacts for optimal path of 𝒂𝒂̇ when 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 = 𝟎𝟎

𝑎𝑎̇ < 0
𝑎𝑎̇ = 0
𝑎𝑎̇ > 0

𝑘𝑘̇ < 0
𝑍𝑍 < 𝑌𝑌
𝑍𝑍 = 𝑌𝑌
𝑍𝑍 > 𝑌𝑌

𝑘𝑘̇ = 0
0 > 𝑌𝑌
0 = 𝑌𝑌
0 < 𝑌𝑌

𝑘𝑘̇ > 0
0 < (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍)
0 = (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍)
0 > (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍)

4.4.3 Scenario 3: Population effect less than utility discount rate (𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 −
𝝆𝝆 < 𝟎𝟎)

In this scenario, it is assumed that the population growth is outweighed by the

utility’s discount rate 2𝜂𝜂 < 𝜌𝜌. This term enters into the 𝑎𝑎̇ time path, but not the 𝑚𝑚̇ time

path, and effectively changes the sign of 𝑋𝑋, or the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 . In essence, this change forces
𝑋𝑋 to the opposite side of the inequality compared to table 4.2.
Table 4.5 Summary of impacts for optimal path of 𝒂𝒂̇ when 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 < 𝟎𝟎

𝑎𝑎̇ < 0
𝑎𝑎̇ = 0
𝑎𝑎̇ > 0

𝑘𝑘̇ < 0
𝑍𝑍 < (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌)
𝑍𝑍 = (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌)
𝑍𝑍 > (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌)

𝑘𝑘̇ = 0
0 > (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌)
0 = (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌)
0 < (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌)

𝑘𝑘̇ > 0
0 < (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍)
0 = (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍)
0 > (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍)

In this instance, there is no tradeoff between 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 and the results simply

illustrate the conditions that must be true given various directions for 𝑎𝑎̇ , conditions for 𝑘𝑘̇,
and assuming that the utility is behaving optimally. However, the implication of the

utility’s discount rate being larger than the population growth rate is that it incentivizes
the acquisition of near-term profits at the expense of any other type of investment –
including advertising investment, which are expected to reduce future capital demands.
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4.4.4 Scenario 4: Augmented depreciation less than utility discount rate
(𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 < 𝟎𝟎)

The logic for the 𝑚𝑚̇ path, assuming that augmented depreciation is less than the

utility’s discount rate, is similar to scenario 3; when 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 < 𝜌𝜌, the utility no longer
trades off between repairs and capital investment. Results are shown in table 4.6.
Table 4.6 Summary of impacts for optimal path of 𝒎𝒎̇ when 𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 < 𝟎𝟎

𝑚𝑚̇ < 0
𝑚𝑚̇ = 0
𝑚𝑚̇ > 0

𝑘𝑘̇ < 0
0 > (𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷)
0 = (𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷)
0 < (𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷)

𝑘𝑘̇ = 0
0 > (𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵)
0 = (𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵)
0 < (𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵)

𝑘𝑘̇ > 0
(𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷) > (𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵)
(𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷) = (𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵)
(𝐶𝐶 + 𝐷𝐷) < (𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵)

When the utility’s internal discount rate exceeds the rate of depreciation and the

population effect, near-term profits are encouraged, which disincentives investment
because investment will bring the utility profits at a later date.

4.4.5 Scenario discussion
While the most interesting set of results occur when 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 > 0 and when

2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 > 0, the previous analysis demonstrate the possible outcomes when those

conditions are not met. Additionally, the results provide some bounds when some pieces
of information are known and may make it possible to deduce, or at least narrow down,
the list of possible options if some information is unknown. For example, if it is known
that 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 = 0, then it must be the case that 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 ≥ 0 because 𝛿𝛿 ≥ 0. In

addition, if 𝑘𝑘̇ > 0, for instance, then that only leaves a limited set of possible relations for
an optimally behaving utility for 𝑎𝑎̇ and 𝑚𝑚̇. While this assessment provides the possible

list of outcomes, the actual set of outcomes expected in a particular case is ultimately an
empirical question.
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4.5 Developing Testable Empirical Models
While previous analysis qualitatively describes the conditions that must be
satisfied to determine the directions of the various paths given the proposed models, and
produces generally intuitive results, it does not mean that the proposed models
necessarily behave in in the manner suggested in practice. Therefore, the time paths (for
𝑚𝑚̇, 𝑎𝑎̇ , and 𝑘𝑘̇ are manipulated in an effort to develop statistical models that may be tested
empirically and compared against expected parameter outcomes. Beginning with
equation (4.35.2) and distributing
𝑚𝑚̇ =

1

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ �
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
−
+
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

Substituting 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑔𝑔 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 and 𝜆𝜆2 =
𝑚𝑚̇ =

produces equation (4.37)

𝑠𝑠−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎

and collecting like terms yields

𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) 𝑔𝑔
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
� �−
�𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+�

1

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑐𝑐
��
𝑘𝑘̇ − �
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑝𝑝

Similarly, distributing − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓

1

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎̇ = −

(4.37)

(4.38)

in equation (36.2) produces

�[𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 )] + �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇��𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 )

Substituting 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑔𝑔 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 and 𝜆𝜆2 =

𝑠𝑠−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎

and collecting like terms
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(4.39)

�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 �
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑎𝑎̇ =
𝑝𝑝 −
𝑠𝑠
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿
+
𝑔𝑔
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑘𝑘̇ is straightforward,

−

(4.40)

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘̇
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑘𝑘̇ = 𝑚𝑚 − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿

(4.41)

Full algebraic derivations are provided in Appendix 4.1.1.
In equation (4.38), the 𝑓𝑓
knowing 𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑

1

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 −𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 )+𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

term is estimated econometrically but requires

. While the unit costs 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑠𝑠 are likely to be known from

underlying data, the various embedded partial derivatives and cross-partial derivatives of

𝑑𝑑(∙) and 𝑓𝑓(∙) are unknown. However, 𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 −𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 )+𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

is estimated directly in

equation (4.40) using known data; that estimate can be applied in the estimation of
equation (4.38).
To develop models that can be estimated econometrically, the continuous time
paths are converted into discrete time where, generally, 𝐺𝐺̇ = 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = ∆𝐺𝐺. In other
words, the time paths are first-differenced. Therefore, the following three models are

estimated econometrically
∆𝑎𝑎 = 𝜏𝜏0 + 𝜏𝜏1 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏2 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏3 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏4 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ∆𝑘𝑘) + 𝜖𝜖1𝑡𝑡

(4.42)

∆𝑘𝑘 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾2 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾3 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖3𝑡𝑡

(4.44)

∆𝑚𝑚 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1

𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
− 𝛽𝛽2 ∆𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽3 �𝜏𝜏�4 ∆𝑘𝑘 − � + 𝜖𝜖2𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
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(4.43)

Table 4.7 describes signs that are expected for each estimated coefficient given variables
used in the estimation as well as the underlying theory described by each coefficient.
In this case, the data variables for the ∆𝑎𝑎 estimation are unit price, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 , advertising

cost, 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 , infrastructure investment cost, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 , and the change in capacity multiplied by price,
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ∆𝑘𝑘. With regard to the ∆𝑚𝑚 estimation, data variables include the infrastructure
𝑔𝑔

investment price ratio, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 , the change in capacity, ∆𝑘𝑘, and the negative of the sum of
𝑡𝑡

capacity change times the appropriate estimated parameter from the ∆𝑎𝑎 estimation plus
𝑐𝑐

the capital repair cost to price ratio, − �𝜏𝜏�4 ∆𝑘𝑘 − 𝑡𝑡 �. For the ∆𝑘𝑘 estimation, the data
𝑝𝑝
𝑡𝑡

variables include the levels at each point in time for infrastructure investment, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ,

capacity, 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 , and rebated technology, 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 . 𝜖𝜖1𝑡𝑡 , 𝜖𝜖2𝑡𝑡 , and 𝜖𝜖3𝑡𝑡 are model errors from the ∆𝑎𝑎,

∆𝑚𝑚, and ∆𝑘𝑘 estimations, respectively. Signs on estimated coefficients can be compared
against the column of expected signs to test for model consistency. However, in four

cases, the expected signs are ambiguous. Contributing to the ambiguity is the fact that
2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 and 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 could take on positive or negative values depending on the

relative sizes of the respective elements. Additionally, because the underlying data and
models were defined in per capita terms, population effects enter the model through 𝜏𝜏4 ,

𝛽𝛽2, 𝛾𝛾1, 𝛾𝛾2, and 𝛾𝛾3. Capital effects come into the model via 𝜏𝜏4 and 𝛽𝛽3. And policy effects

enter from 𝜏𝜏2 , 𝜏𝜏3 , and 𝛽𝛽1.
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Table 4.7 Summary of coefficients, theory, variables, and expected signs

Model &
Coefficients
For ∆𝑎𝑎 estimation
𝜏𝜏0
𝜏𝜏1

𝜏𝜏2
𝜏𝜏3
𝜏𝜏4

For ∆𝑚𝑚 estimation
𝛽𝛽0
𝛽𝛽1

𝛽𝛽2
𝛽𝛽3

For ∆𝑘𝑘 estimation
𝛾𝛾0
𝛾𝛾1
𝛾𝛾2
𝛾𝛾3

Theory

Data Variable

Expected sign

0
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
−
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
−
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁

𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
0
1
−(𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)
𝛿𝛿

𝑝𝑝

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑔𝑔

−

𝑠𝑠

𝑝𝑝∆𝑘𝑘

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
−

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

∆𝑘𝑘

−

𝑔𝑔
𝑝𝑝

𝑐𝑐
− �𝜏𝜏�4 ∆𝑘𝑘 + �
𝑝𝑝
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚
𝑜𝑜

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
−

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
+
−
+

Because there are multiple equations to be estimated and because they are likely

to be related either directly or through their error structure, proper estimation suggests the
use of simultaneous estimation or seemingly unrelated regression techniques as well as
the integration of additional model controls. In order to commence estimation, data are
needed for each variable and Hansen (2009) provides some direction with regard to this
analysis; however, the inclusion of advertising makes estimation challenging. In order to
estimate the proposed models, advertising budgets and advertising unit costs would need
to be collected.
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4.6 Conclusions
The act of advertising is costly to a profit maximizing business or entity.
However, while advertising is typically done for the purpose of encouraging the purchase
of the product or service that the entity sells, and effectively shifting the demand curve
rightward, utility-level advertising for water-saving technology does the opposite: it
reduces the demand for the product that it sells. The fact that this activity increases a
utility’s cost and reduces demand for the product it sells operates to make the rationale
for the activity unclear at least on the surface, especially in the case of a profit
maximizing private utility. One justification that is often given is that by encouraging the
purchase of water-saving technology, the utility can put off infrastructure investment and
repairs. To investigate this claim, a capital accumulation framework is utilized that
illustrates the conditions that must be present for this type investment.
A key result from this analysis is that the optimal path for each investment type
depends on the other. This is immediately apparent from equations (4.31) and (4.32), as 𝑎𝑎̇
is a function of 𝑚𝑚̇ and vice-versa. In addition, after substituting to find the optimal paths
and simplifying (equations (4.35.1) and (4.36.3)), it is clear that each path contains the
same capital accumulation term: 𝑝𝑝 �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

� 𝑘𝑘̇ . Furthermore, in the 𝑚𝑚̇ path, that term is

positive and in the 𝑎𝑎̇ path it is negative, implying that there is an inverse relationship

between the two paths and suggesting that there are tradeoffs between investment types.
Additionally, supporting this conclusion is that embedded in both paths are 𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 ,
which are essentially the marginal values (or option values) associated with both

investment types. Therefore, in order to assure that the optimal paths are reached, it is
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critical to not only consider how that investment compares against the benefits of repairs,
but also how one investment type impacts the other.
One element that is not included in the model is utility payment for qualifying
rebated technology. This analysis essentially assumed that the cost to the utility was zero;
however, because the utility subsidizes the purchase, the cost to the utility should be
included. This assumption was used for simplicity as adding another element to the
model significantly increases its complexity and reduces its ability to be easily
understood. Future work could be done to add this element. In addition, the simplifying
assumption that the cross partial derivative of production with respect to advertising and
direct investment is equal to zero (i.e. 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0) was employed to facilitate the qualitative

signing analysis. In a future investigation, this assumption could be relaxed.

While the analytical model and qualitative results provide some insight into when
a utility should invest in infrastructure or advertising, they provide no assistance with
regard to determining whether the model accurately describes the utility decision.
Therefore, empirical models were developed which, assuming the availability of
appropriate data, can be compared against expected outcomes. While the empirical
methodology will likely require estimation by a system or a similar method, the inclusion
of various controls, and the testing of various model specifications, the necessary data are
not currently available. Specifically, although Hansen (2009) provides insight into some
data that could be used to estimate the models, the current unavailability of advertising
costs and budget data, rebate uptake data (or how advertising translates into purchases),
and rebated water-saving technology stock data make estimation impossible. Future work
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could be devoted to attempting to collect or estimate this data and simulation
methodology may be employed for certain variables.
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Appendix 4.1 Detailed Mathematical Appendix
Appendix 4.1.1: Developing time paths
Take the time derivative of equation (4.27) to produce equation (4.30),
𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 = 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎

(4.27)

𝜆𝜆̇2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎̇ = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎̇ �
𝜆𝜆̇2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎̇ � − 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎̇

𝜆𝜆̇2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇� − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎̇ − 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎̇

𝜆𝜆̇2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇� − 𝑎𝑎̇ (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝜆𝜆̇2 = −

𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇� + 𝑎𝑎̇ (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎

(4.30)

Set equation (4.22) equal to equation (4.28) and solve for 𝑚𝑚̇ to produce equation (4.32)
𝜆𝜆̇1 = −𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
(4.22)
𝜆𝜆̇1 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎̇ �

(4.29)

−𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎̇ � = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)

−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚̇ − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎̇ = −𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 −𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎̇ − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚̇

𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚̇ = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 −𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎̇ − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑚𝑚̇ =

1
�𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 −𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎̇ − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑚𝑚̇ = −

1
�𝑐𝑐 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 +𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎̇ + 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑚𝑚̇ = −

1
�𝑐𝑐 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 +𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑚𝑚 − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)(𝑘𝑘 − 𝑜𝑜)� + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎̇
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)�
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𝑚𝑚̇ = −

1
�𝑐𝑐 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 +𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑚𝑚 − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)(𝑘𝑘 − 𝑜𝑜)� + 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−

𝑚𝑚̇ =

1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎̇
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] + [(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 − 𝑔𝑔)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇� 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
𝑎𝑎̇
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

(4.32)

Set equation (4.23) equal to equation (4.30) and solve for 𝑚𝑚̇ to produce equation (4.31)
𝜆𝜆̇2 = 𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿1
(4.23)
𝜆𝜆̇2 = −

𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇� + 𝑎𝑎̇ (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎

𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿1 = −

(4.30)

𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇� + 𝑎𝑎̇ (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿1 ) = − �𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇� + 𝑎𝑎̇ (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )�
𝑎𝑎̇ (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇� − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿1 )
𝑎𝑎̇ = −
𝑎𝑎̇ = −

𝑎𝑎̇ = −

𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇� + 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿1 )
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇ + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚̇ + 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿1 )
−
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
−
𝑚𝑚̇
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

Substitute equation (4.31) into equation (4.32) to produce equation (4.33)
[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] + [(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 − 𝑔𝑔)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇� 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚̇ =
−
𝑎𝑎̇
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

163

(4.31)

(4.32)

𝑚𝑚̇ =

[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ �
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+
+

𝑚𝑚̇ =

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑚𝑚̇�
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ �
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+

𝑚𝑚̇ −

𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
�
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
�
�
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 2
+
𝑚𝑚̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 2
𝑚𝑚̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇�
=
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
+
�
�
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 2
𝑚𝑚̇ �
�
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇�
=
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
+
�
�
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚̇ =

(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 2 �

�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]

𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇�
− �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇ � +
�
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

Substitute equation (4.33) into equation (4.31) to produce equation (4.34)
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(4.33)

𝑎𝑎̇ = −
𝑎𝑎̇ = −

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
−
𝑚𝑚̇
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

(4.31)

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
−

(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
�
�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) 𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 2 �

− 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇�
+

𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇�
��
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑎𝑎̇ = − �
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
+
�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐]
�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 2 �
− [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇�
+
��
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

165

(4.34)

Appendix 4.1.2: Developing empirical models
To develop testable empirical models, substitute for 𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 and collect terms for

variables for which data are likely to be available. To derive the empirical model for 𝑚𝑚̇,
begin with equation (4.35.2).
𝑚𝑚̇ =

1
�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
−�
� 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘̇�
(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑚𝑚̇ = �
−
+
�
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
𝑚𝑚̇ = �
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ �−

𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
+
� 𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

+ �−

𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
+
� 𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] − [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
𝑚𝑚̇ = �
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑚𝑚̇ =
𝑚𝑚̇ =

[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐𝑐] [𝜆𝜆1 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
+�
� 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘
1 𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) 𝑔𝑔(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
−
+
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+�

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
� 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

166

(4.35.2)

𝑚𝑚̇ =

𝑚𝑚̇ =

𝑚𝑚̇ =

𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘
1 𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) 𝑔𝑔(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
−
+
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+�

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
� 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

+�

𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
� 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
1 𝑐𝑐 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) 𝑔𝑔
−
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝

𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
1 𝑐𝑐 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) 𝑔𝑔 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
−
−
𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+�

𝑚𝑚̇ =

𝑚𝑚̇ =

𝑚𝑚̇ =

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 )�

� 𝑘𝑘̇

𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
1 𝑐𝑐 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) 𝑔𝑔 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
−
−
𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+�

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
� 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 )

+�

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
� 𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
1 𝑐𝑐 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) 𝑔𝑔 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
−
−
𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
1 𝑐𝑐 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) 𝑔𝑔 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
−
−
𝑘𝑘̇
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+�

1

𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

�

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑘𝑘̇
(𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )

167

𝑚𝑚̇ =

𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) 𝑔𝑔
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
� �−
�𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
1

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑐𝑐
+�
��
𝑘𝑘̇ − �
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 )
𝑝𝑝

(4.38)

Equation (4.38) can now be converted into equation (4.43),
∆𝑚𝑚 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1

𝑔𝑔
𝑐𝑐
− 𝛽𝛽2 ∆𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽3 �𝛼𝛼
�∆𝑘𝑘
− � + 𝜖𝜖2
4
𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝

To derive the empirical model for 𝑎𝑎̇ , begin with equation (4.36.2).
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (𝜆𝜆2 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 )
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎̇ = − �
+ 𝑝𝑝 �
� 𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎̇ = −

(𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 )
(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿(𝑔𝑔 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 )�� + �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇�� 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎
��𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 �
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 )

(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 − 𝑠𝑠)(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 + 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿(𝑔𝑔 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 ) − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑎𝑎̇ =
𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 )
𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 � − 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) + 𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘̇�
𝑎𝑎̇ =
𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 )
�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 �
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑎𝑎̇ =
𝑝𝑝 −
𝑠𝑠
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿
+
𝑔𝑔
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
−

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘̇
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
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(4.43)

(4.36.2)

�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 �
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚
𝑎𝑎̇ =
𝑝𝑝 −
𝑝𝑝𝛿𝛿
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
−

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑠𝑠
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

−

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘̇
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿
+
𝑔𝑔
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎̇ =

�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 �
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑝𝑝 −
𝑠𝑠
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 2 𝛿𝛿
+
𝑔𝑔
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
−

(4.40)

𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘̇
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

Equation (4.40) can now be converted into equation (4.42),
∆𝑎𝑎 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑝𝑝 − 𝛼𝛼2 𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝑔𝑔 − 𝛼𝛼4 (𝑝𝑝∆𝑘𝑘) + 𝜖𝜖1

The 𝑘𝑘̇ equation is simple and is given directly by equation (4.24).
𝑘𝑘̇ = 𝑚𝑚 − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿

(4.42)

(4.24)

Equation (4.24) can now be converted into equation (4.44),
∆𝑘𝑘 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑚𝑚 − 𝛾𝛾2 𝑘𝑘 + 𝛾𝛾3 𝑜𝑜 + 𝜖𝜖3

(4.44)
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future Work
Understanding water use trends and drivers of demand is important particularly in
arid locations often subject to risks related to water shortage. This is especially true in
areas such has the American West that generally have increasing populations and may
experience serious disruptions from climate change and extreme weather events including
severe drought. While supply augmentation is one way to manage shortage, due to
possible legal, technical, environmental, and financial constraints, this dissertation
focused instead on understanding the demand side. Focusing on demand is particularly
attractive in this context because demand-side responses may be more flexible and are
likely to operate more quickly to clear a shortage than supply enhancement.
Furthermore, the analysis presented in this dissertation provides qualitative and
quantitative estimates of demand behavior via both utility action and exogenous stimuli.
Results may be leveraged for planning purposes by a city or municipality. In any event,
this dissertation argued that it is paramount to acquire a better understating of the drivers
of demand to ensure that water resources are effectively managed.
While it is true that demand estimation has been undertaken many times, largely
ignored in the literature are small cities and municipalities, so this dissertation made a
concerted effort to focus on the small city experience; without additional evidence, it is
unclear that demand estimation from large cities should be used as a proxy for the
experience of small cities. Therefore, relatively small New Mexico cites such as Clovis,
Rio Rancho, and Edgewood are highlighted (along with the large city Albuquerque) in
Chapter 2, with specific attention to Clovis in Chapters 2 and 3. The analysis was
broadened from the small city context to the non-specific context in Chapter 4 as the
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general optimizing behavior of a private utility engaging in a rebate program for water
saving technology was investigated.

5.1 Key Results and General Conclusions
This dissertation demonstrated not only that demand is declining in the small set
of New Mexico municipalities examined, but that key drivers of declining demand are
price (rate increases) 27 and water-saving rebate programs. Specifically, Chapter 2
identified declining demand in all New Mexico municipalities studied (Albuquerque, Rio
Rancho, Clovis, and Edgewood); this pattern is generally true for high and low volume
users on a per premises basis, and perhaps more significantly, in terms of aggregate water
use.
Aggregate declines may present two interrelated management challenges: first,
most projections for aggregate demand call for increasing demand over the next few
decades – despite generally declining demand over the last decade (or longer). However,
if demand stays flat or continues to fall, the assumption of increasing demand may call
for unnecessary costly overinvestment in infrastructure and supply enhancement. Second,
all else equal, declining aggregate demand will lead to reduced revenues which will
constrain a utility’s financial ability to make necessary infrastructure investments and
repairs. Due to these vulnerabilities, it is critical to develop a better qualitative
understanding of the factors contributing to demand as well a better quantitative estimates
of responsiveness to utility and non-utility stimuli (including rate changes, climate, etc.).

27

However, it is important to reiterate the fact that the price-inelastic nature of municipal water dictates that
price changes only have a modest impact on water use. In addition, elasticity heterogeneity with regard to
group (e.g. low versus high water users, rebate program participants, etc.) highlights the value of deeper
investigation into the various population cross-sections examined in this type of analysis.
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Also found in this analysis were statistically significant breaks in trend, which
were uncovered for the cities of Clovis for all users, and Rio Rancho for high volume
users. Despite the generally declining trend in water demand in the city of Clovis, upward
breaks appear to relate to severe drought conditions. This is interesting because, despite
the fact that all municipalities experienced drought over their respective series, no other
municipality exhibited sufficient climate sensitivity to induce a break in trend. The break
observed in the Rio Rancho series is likely associated with the large rate increases
experienced in the municipality and the associated reduction in demand from industrial
users.
Focusing specifically on Clovis, an econometric model of demand was developed
at the spatial scale of the entire city and compared against results from premises-level and
US Census block group spatial scale estimations. That analysis confirmed that price and
weather responses were not dissimilar to more disaggregated analysis. However, the
estimation also uncovered estimation limitations at this spatial scale; in particular,
premises-level inferences are at the very least imprecise, and at most impossible, when
using highly aggregated data.
Due to the limitations discussed in Chapter 2 related to trying to understand
premises-level response with city-level data, Chapter 3 investigated factors contributing
to declining water demand in Clovis, New Mexico at the premises level. This approach
allows for a detailed understanding of the effects of various demand-side factors. Key
results indicate that rebate programs for landscaping changes and for the installation of
water saving technology successfully reduce premises-level water use. Overall, after
controlling for confounding factors such as temperature and precipitation, the installation
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of a rebated toilet reduced water use by an average of nearly 32 gallons per day,
installation of a water saving washing machine reduced water use by an average of about
38 gallons per day, and an average household receiving a landscaping rebate saved 19
gallons per day. While it might be surprising that landscaping rebates save so little water,
it is likely due to the fact that irrigation only takes place in part of the year; washing
machines and toilets, on the other hand, are used year-round.
In addition, this analysis found that water demand is price inelastic at current
prices in Clovis; however, elasticity varies depending on which data are studied, with
data subsets based on rebate type experiencing different levels of (in)elasticity. Elasticity
for the entire dataset, as well as those households that did not receive a rebate was
estimated to be around -0.50. When the data is subset to only include premises that
received toilet or washing machine rebates, price becomes relatively more inelastic;
however, premises that received landscaping rebates, while still price inelastic, were
much less so, indicating the relative ease at which premises can reduce their outdoor
water consumption in the face of price increases.
Additionally, in an analysis of low, medium, and high water users, results suggest
that low water users are both more price and income elastic than high water users (though
still inelastic). Given the relatively higher income elasticity, it is likely the case that low
volume water users have relatively lower incomes; however, that in concert with their
increased price sensitivity possibly raises equity concerns that call for increased
investigation by the utility and regulator prior to a new rate increase.
This analysis also confirmed that weather and climate plays an important role in
influencing water demand at the premises level; as the temperature increases water use
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increases and as precipitation increases, water use declines. This result provides useful
evidence of the relationship between climate and water use, which can be brought to bear
in times of high temperature or low precipitation, such as the period from 2011 to 2014
when Clovis experienced prolonged drought. In addition, income variables show that
water is a normal good – as income increases, water demand increases.
Although the cost to the utility of the washing machine rebate and the toilet rebate
is the same (USD 150), toilet rebates are the most cost-effective rebate program of the
three programs because of the relatively longer expected useful life of a new toilet
compared to a new washing machine (25 years versus 12 years). This implies that toilet
rebates should generally be prioritized before washing machine rebates and both should
be prioritized before landscaping rebates. However, it is important to note that it is not
uncommon for premises that received landscaping rebates to have already participated in
other rebate programs. So if a water user has a relatively high propensity to participate in
rebate programs and they have already received a toilet or washing machine rebate, the
landscaping rebate program may be the only way to significantly reduce that user’s actual
demand.
In addition, although data on the year each structure was built is not available, two
separate analyses provided evidence that relatively newer construction used more water
than older construction – this result was unexpected. In particular, the coefficient on the
building permit variable in the underlying econometric estimation, which was used to
proxy for new construction, was positive and statistically significant, indicating that as
permits for new construction increases, water use also increased. This was confirmed by
a subset analysis, which compared water use for premises that were on the utility’s rolls
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in January 2006 with premises that entered the rolls during or after January 2009. In that
case, estimated mean water use for the relatively new construction was higher than the
old construction. However, estimated median use for the new construction was relatively
lower than the old construction, implying the existence of outliers that operated to inflate
the mean.
Given that rebates for water-saving technology effectively reduced demand in
Clovis, Chapter 4 turned to investigating optimal investment by a water utility in the
context of advertising (by the utility) for the installation of water-saving technology.
While advertising is typically done for the purpose of encouraging the purchase of the
product or service that the entity sells, and effectively shifting the demand curve
rightward, utility-level advertising for water-saving technology does the opposite: it
reduces the demand for the product that it sells. The fact that this activity increases an
element of a utility’s cost and reduces demand for the product it sells, operates to make
the rationale for the activity unclear at least on the surface. To investigate a possible
justification for this behavior, a capital accumulation framework is utilized.
A key result from this analysis is that the optimal path for each investment type
(e.g. advertising investment and infrastructure investment) depends on the other and both
impact the optimal repair behavior – in other words, the path of infrastructure investment
depends on the path of advertising investment and vice-versa. Therefore, in order to
ensure that the optimal paths are reached, it is critical to not only consider how
investment compares against the benefits associate with repairs, but also how one
investment type impacts the other. While the analytical model and qualitative results
provide some insight into when a utility should invest in infrastructure or advertising,

175

they provide no assistance with regard to determining whether the model accurately
describes the utility decision. Therefore, empirical models are developed which,
assuming the availability of appropriate data, can be compared against expected
outcomes. While the empirical methodology will likely require estimation by a system or
a similar method, the inclusion of various controls, and the testing of various model
specifications, the necessary data are not yet available.

5.2 Discussion of Methodologies and Analytical Tools
This dissertation highlighted several analytical techniques that can be leveraged to
better understand factors affecting water demand. Because the many techniques and
empirical approaches are diverse, this section is designed to demonstrate how the various
pieces may be used in concert to more broadly describe demand.
Chapter 2 utilized seasonal trend and breakpoint analysis which can help inform
water demand analysis by stripping away seasonal noise in an effort to uncover trends in
demand as well as systematic series breaks. Given the relatively light data requirements,
these analyses can be useful in quickly identifying patterns or trends that can be
qualitatively compared against known events. It is important to note that seasonal trend
and breakpoint analysis provides only a preliminary approach to understanding demand;
however, trends and qualitative analysis may be leveraged in the development of
economic models and further econometric estimation. Also developed was a simple
instrumental variable demand model (2SLS) that controlled for water price and weather
conditions and produced estimation results for those variables that were not dissimilar to
results from more disaggregated analysis.
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However, the benefit of large scale estimation is limited; while it is possible to
make some useful inferences regarding general water use, it is nearly impossible to
develop more fine-tuned inferences. Therefore, Chapter 3 used premises-level data to
investigate demand using a fixed effects instrumental variable model (FEIV). Analysis at
a more refined geographic scale allows for estimation of effects at the premises-level,
such as uptake in water-saving rebated technologies or landscaping changes. Results,
such as elasticity estimates, responsiveness to weather or climate conditions, behavioral
response to rebate programs, and the like, can be directly useful for setting more targeted
policy. In addition, estimation results can be further leveraged to gain additional useful
insight. For example estimated marginal effects of the rebate variables can be used to
estimate relative cost effectiveness of rebate programs per volumes of water conserved
using techniques such as levelized cost analysis.
Both intuition and diagnostic testing suggested that water use may have spatial
characteristics that require empirical correction; therefore, spatial panel econometric
estimation was undertaken in Appendix 3.3. In particular, spatial lag and spatial error
models were employed. Although spatial lag models appear to fit well, there may be little
theoretical justification for spatial lag estimation in this context. This is especially true
where premises are subject to similar exogenous factors such as climate and pricing.
Furthermore, due to data constraints such as incomplete panels and high computational
requirements in spatial panel estimation, the benefits may not outweigh the costs of
losing the additional detail from a more fine-grained premises-level analysis.
Nevertheless, if data are only available at relatively large geographic scales, testing and
controlling for spatial effects, and particularly accounting for spatial error, is prudent.
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Both Appendix 2.2 and Appendix 3.4 discussed in-sample and out-of-sample
prediction using straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques. In
the case of Appendix 2.2, the focus was on city-level econometric estimation using
monthly price and climate data; that estimation offered a significant improvement over
simple trend models. Appendix 3.4 focused on peak-day estimation. From the perspective
of a water utility, ensuring adequate water supply each day is paramount; this includes
the day of highest (or peak) demand during the year. While it is unclear from year to year
what day the peak will occur, this appendix showed how it may be possible to predict the
peak volume using lagged temperature and precipitation data, which is readily available
to the water manager. Both of these appendices demonstrate that the inclusion of simple
information and/or a few variables (e.g. price, temperature, precipitation, PDSI), it is
possible to produce reasonably accurate predictions of water use.
Finally, an optimal control model was used in Chapter 4 that investigated optimal
investment by a water utility. This technique is useful for first identifying the key
elements of the utility’s decision: this includes identifying what the utility is optimizing,
what the utility is choosing, and quantifying additional key parameters. Uncovered are
the various tradeoffs that are faced when the utility is attempting to make the optimal
decision and it allows the analyst to infer whether a particular course of action is likely to
place the utility on the optimal path. While the outcomes presented in the chapter are
generally qualitative in nature, also developed is an econometric model along with
expected signs for the parameters to be estimated. With appropriate data, this system may
be estimated and coefficients can be compared to expected signs, which will provide
evidence about whether a utility is behaving optimally.
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5.3 Limitations and Future Work
It is important to note the limitations in this dissertation – some of which may be
investigated in future work. As has already been discussed in the text, although it is
possible to conduct rapid ad hoc analyses, the primary disadvantages of the seasonal
trend and breakpoint analysis presented in Chapter 2 is that the model is both atheoretical
and does not quantitatively tie the breaks and trends to exogenous events; in other words,
it does not explicitly capture behavioral responses. Nevertheless, it does provide some
information regarding the direction of the trend and timing of breaks, both of which can
be leveraged when attempting to fit an econometric model. Additionally, the large spatial
scales used (entire city) in the seasonal trend analysis as well as the econometric model in
Chapter 2 do not allow for an accurate estimation of premises-level responses; rather,
they provide a more general understanding of demand behavior for variables that are
likely impacting all premises in a similar fashion. Therefore, Chapter 3 focused on the
spatial scale of the individual premises (main text) and the US Census block group
(Appendix 3.3).
In addition, the issue of declining demand discussed principally in Chapters 2 and
3 do not fully tackle certain aspects of premises characteristics including new
construction and renovation. Although Chapter 3 attempts to model, or at least proxy for,
new construction, the fact that new construction uses more water than old construction
(on average) is puzzling and calls for a better understanding of individual building and
premises characteristics for both existing and new premises. With more accurate
information about property and building characteristics (such as property size, number of
bathrooms, and the like), water use estimates can almost certainly be tightened.
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Similarly, more fine-grained data regarding household characteristics could be
employed to better control for inter-household differences. While Chapter 2 described
demographic data generally and Chapter 3 used household income and household size as
explanatory variables, the fact that a county-level spatial scale was employed in
estimations make the results less robust. Better information about the residents of the
households at a premises-level (or at least at a scale smaller than the county) can provide
necessary variation required to produce stronger estimates. This, along with acquiring
additional premises information, will likely require surveying and direct communication
with occupants.
In addition, building upgrades, such as expansion (e.g. increase in the number of
bathrooms), or such as pipe and plumbing replacement and new efficient building
practices also likely play a role in reducing water demand, but were not estimated in this
analysis. Having this information would be extremely useful as the fixed effects
methodology used in Chapter 3 essentially assumes that building characteristics remain
static throughout the analysis. And while the fixed effects treatment may be valid in
general, it is almost certainly true that characteristics of at least some premises changed
throughout the ten year timeframe. Similarly, although rebated technology certainly
reduced water use, there are likely to be numerous premises that switched to low flow
toilets and washing machines, and maybe even engaged in landscaping changes, but did
not avail themselves of the benefits of the rebate program. Therefore the signals
corresponding to installation of a low flow device or landscaping change may be
somewhat muted.
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Controlling for other factors such as vegetation and drought indices appears (in
this case) to only provide marginal analytic benefit – at least in terms of the premiseslevel analysis presented in Chapter 3 (although drought indices provided a tighter model
fit in the simple estimations in Appendix 2.2). The marginal benefit is not surprising
given that those variables were correlated with the more straightforward temperature and
precipitation variables. Also, the vegetation variable presented in Chapter 3, suffered
from a relatively shorter time series (8 years versus 10 years) and also because the data
were annual in nature. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this conclusion is the end of the
investigation with regard to trying to understand vegetation and water demand; a longer
time series in concert with more frequent readings (and perhaps even finer spatial scale)
could help to better explain water use going forward.
Also with regard to the issue of spatial scale is the spatial analysis conducted in
Appendix 3.3. In that section, spatial panel econometric techniques were employed at the
spatial scale of the US Census block group. The major conclusion was that premises-level
data and analysis are likely preferable if they are available due to estimation challenges
and the current requirement of balanced panels – even despite the likely presence of
spatial effects (and in particular spatial error). However, it is likely that the frontier for
this type of estimation will move forward and allow for more robust techniques taking
advantage of the spatial dependencies apparently inherent in water demand.
Changes to preferences, or an increasing desire of the population to conserve, may
also play a role in declining demand. Future work could include an assessment of some of
those factors. For example, panel or repeated cross section surveying methods may be
used to uncover true household-level responses. In addition, improved accuracy with
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regard to spatial scale, especially with regard to vegetation, could better pinpoint
landscaping changes and its impact on water use.
Finally, and with specific regard to Chapter 4, an element that is not included in
the optimal control model of utility investment is utility payment for qualifying rebated
technology. Rather, the model assumes that the utility engages in advertising but it does
not subsidize the purchase of low flow technologies. In other words, that analysis
assumed that the cost to the utility was zero; however, because the utility subsidizes the
purchase, the cost to the utility should be included. This assumption was incorporated for
simplicity as adding another element to the model significantly increases its complexity
and reduces its ability to be easily understood. A natural addition to the model would be
to include the cost to the utility for subsidizing the purchase of new technology. In
addition, although econometric models were developed in that chapter and expected signs
were hypothesized, actual estimation was not undertaken. Therefore, this chapter could
be pushed ahead through data collection and model estimation. An alternative approach
would be to develop model simulations or phase diagrams based on the solved time paths
which could be leveraged to better understand the dynamic nature of utility choice and
response.
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